



CONCEPTUALIZATION
AND VERBALIZATION
OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE



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EDITED BY OLEG LESZCZAK



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The Linguistic Problems of Conceptualization

Conceptual and Non-conceptual Information as Content of Human Experience and as the Signified in the Process of Verbalization: a Kantian Perspective

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Abstract. According to functional-pragmatic methodology, information exists in the form of knowledge, which is a collection of data and models for its processing and gives an idea of objects, processes and phenomena occurring both in the energy-material world and in the psychic world itself. We can divide all information functions arising within the human psyche into four types: sensory information (reactive information about the object of experience forced by an energy-matter subject), emotional (reactive information about the subject itself, forced by internal impulses related to some informational change), volitional (active information about the subject resulting from evaluation of its current or future activities) and cognitive (active information about the object initiated and created by the subject). The chapter aims to analyze the difference between conceptual and non-conceptual information and typologize it.

Introduction

All mental functions of human experience can be combined into a single information system. This requires an ontological analysis of human experience, which implies dividing all its functions into two fundamentally different types: positive (energy-material) and negative (informational). This division is based on the main formal and methodological premise of functional pragmatism – relationism, which assumes that all components of human experience act as relations of distinction, identification or connection (these can be associations, dependencies, reciprocities or functions). According to the principles of relationism as a philosophical doctrine, when identifying information in the field of real-life experience, one should distinguish from

it something else that is not information. Such an entity is energy-matter, that is, carriers, the most concrete and actual object of human experience. Energy-matter is everything that relates to our senses, i.e., the object of our sensory experience; while information is everything that is not energy-matter, i.e., represents the direct action and result of our experience.

According to functional-pragmatic methodology, information exists in the form of knowledge, which is a collection of data and models for its processing and gives an idea of objects, processes and phenomena occurring both in the energy-material world and in the psychic world itself. Information is an intangible and attributive category, i.e., a function of experience that differentiates its objects. Thus, it must necessarily be associated with some physical and physiological basis (its natural basis is the brain). Without it, it simply cannot exist. This, however, does not mean that information as an essence exists in each or any energy-material form. The world of information (i.e., human experience as an integral dynamic system) “is organizationally different from the physical world, matter and energy, although it is immersed in it and based on it” [Skubiński 2012: 71]. Information is neither a substance nor a process. This is the relationship of difference. Gregory Bateson addressed the “profound and unanswerable question about the nature of those “at least two” things that between them generate the difference which becomes information by making a difference” [Bateson 1979: 68]. Ferdinand de Saussure had the same understanding of information (meaning). He understood information as a differentiation or distinction of values (although this was discovered only after his manuscript “De l’essence double du langage” was found in 1996): “Le sens de chaque forme, en particulier, est la même chose que la différence des formes entre elles. Sens = valeur différente” [Saussure 2002: 28]. According to Saussure, language as an information system represents a system of relationships of difference [for more about this see: Prosyaniuk 2018: 128–199]. In philosophy, this approach is called *relationalism*. Let’s note that neither Saussure nor Bateson were pioneers in this area. A careful reading of the *Critique of Pure Reason* shows that Immanuel Kant understands almost all the key informational functions of the human mind (consciousness, feeling, contemplation, cognition, substance, process, notion, judgment) as a relation. The unity of consciousness as the most general form of the human information system denotes, according to Kant, the relation of representations to the subject:

Folglich ist die Einheit des Bewußtseins dasjenige, was allein die Beziehung der Vorstellungen auf einen Gegenstand, mithin ihre objektive Gültigkeit, folglich daß sie Erkenntnisse werden, ausmacht, und worauf folglich selbst die Möglichkeit des Verstandes beruht [Kant 2006: 208].

Moreover, Kant understood philosophy as the science of the relationship of all cognition to the essential goals of the human mind [ibid., 610].

A statement that information exists in any derivative or related material form (for example, books, phonographic or electronic records) is simply a mental reduction or metaphor. Similar common metaphors are the ideas of “storage”, “transmission”, and “distribution” of information using energy-material entities (for example, ink on paper, recorded sound, or electromagnetic impulses), as well as the idea of “extracting” information from such carriers. The carrier contains only certain energy-material signal traces – audible or visual – which do not constitute a message since they do not make sense. Signals are not information carriers but only semiotic representatives of messages as texts or images (representations). The information that is the content of the message remains in the mind of the subject who created the message. The recipient of signal objects (sounds, traces of ink on paper, dots visible on the monitor screen, etc.) converts the signals into a message using semiotic codes (including language codes). Then, using that knowledge, he converts the message into information (primarily cognitive, but at the same time emotional, volitional and sensual). Not only does someone understand the message sent to them, but it also emotionally touches him, volitionally stimulates, and provokes perceptual representations.

The problemes of conceptual and non-conceptual content

Most linguistic messages contain encoded conceptual information (various types of judgments). However, such messages can also contain non-conceptual content (typically not directly, but through verbal signs with emotional and volitive connotations or very suggestive descriptions of physical objects). In such cases, the subject involved in the reception of the message may move beyond the conceptual content and continue interpreting it. Which may generate some non-conceptual content: emotional (the text will make a recipient sad or happy), volitional (the text can force him to act, evoke a desire or a sense of duty), and even sensual (the recipient may visualize or audialize what the received text communicates). Not everything that the speaker intends to convey is accepted by the recipient. Likewise, not everything the recipient receives has analogies to the sender’s intended message. Communication as the so-called *information flow* contains much more information than one can comprehend, conceptualize and „pass on” to others.

In a series of works [see: Leszczak 2011; Leszczak 2012; Лещак 2019], we have developed a typology of information based on two criteria: entity-based

(information content – external or internal) and functional (information function – passive, causal, resulting from certain external circumstances or active, teleological, serving a particular purpose). Taking both factors into account, we can divide all information functions arising within the human psyche into four types:

- **passive** (reactive) information **about the object** of experience forced by an energy-matter subject; the subject does not create it on purpose; such information arises as a reaction to external triggers; it comprises **perceptual** or **sensory information** (impressions, perceptions and images of sensory experiences),
- **passive** (reactive) information **about the subject** itself, forced by internal impulses related to some informational (including sensory) change; it is an evaluative response that presents the subject's attitude to changes in the circumstances of the experience; it comprises **emotional information** (emotional states and images of such states),
- **active** information **about the subject** resulting from evaluation of its current or future activities; it drives the subject's experience activity; it comprises **volitional information** (states and acts of will and images of such states and acts),
- **active** information **about the object** initiated by the subject and created by it (personally or in coordination with other subjects); it represents the active psychological experience of a given person aimed at organizing his knowledge; it comprises **mental** or **cognitive information** (thinking; judgments, notions).

Cognitive information can also be called *conceptual information*; the remainder (emotion, will and sensors) is *non-conceptual information*. The quantity and quality of information distinguish conceptual content from non-conceptual content. **Conceptualization** usually refers to the mental activity of consciousness. In other words, it is structured, hierarchical and abstracted from the actual experience, whereas the information obtained through perception (as well as that obtained through emotional and volitional experiences) is fuzzy, direct (actual) and has a continuous, non-discrete character.

Most researchers of information as a mental function focus only on objective information – conceptual and sensory – that relate directly to processes of cognizing. Emotions and acts of will are very rarely described in studies as informational functions.

Sensory information

Man perceives the world with five basic senses: sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste (there are, of course, attempts to extend this list to thermal, kinesthetic or other senses). Traditionally (especially in positivist and materialist doctrines), the senses are thought to reflect reality, giving us an accurate picture of reality:

As a result of these processes, observations appear in our minds. Those observations are the complex reflection of the object that can be described through the content of our impressions. At this stage of perception, one knows as much about this object as the content of the impressions provide information. One can answer the question of what it is and therefore describe the object. This is an extremely important stage of the perceptual process because only in this way can a person gain knowledge about the features of the world around [Żmijewska 2011:13].

Athanassios Raftopoulos and Vincent C. Müller, the authors of the theory of perceptual demonstratives, think similarly:

Thus, the reference of perceptual demonstratives is fixed through object individuation, which opens object files. This is the level at which we touch the world directly, in that this information is directly retrieved bottom-up. (...) This way, conceptual content of demonstratives is grounded in the world without the mediation of concepts [Raftopoulos, Müller 2006: 282]

It might be worth asking how, without having a conceptual framework, e.g., notions of attributes of objects and concepts of physical things, it is possible to understand that there is an „object” in front of us, that it is „this object” and that something has „this characteristic”. After all, one should „describe this object through the content of impressions”, which is, by definition, impossible because the description is not only analytical (conceptual, notional) but even semiotic or verbal (something that can be described only through some means of communication). One does not need sensory impressions to either describe or explain (that is what language is for) or understand or analyze or learn (that is what thinking is for). Instead, they need them to react to external triggers and create current and practical knowledge that will allow them to respond emotionally and volitionally to the environment and provide material for further thinking.

Although sensory information is the provider of intentional content about the world around man, it cannot give him knowledge about reality because it is, in principle, attributive. Sensory information indicates something that

can only be defined and determined conceptually by the intellect. For example, one sees (distinguishes) red and green, light and dark, hears (differentiates) loud and quiet, close and distant, long-lasting and individual or intermittent, he feels (distinguishes from one another) hard and soft, sharp and dull, smooth and rough etc. However, no sense can give him the knowledge of what it is: what is colourful and smooth, what makes sounds, smells or tastes. Moreover, it can not give him information about something happening or its characteristics. For this, one needs the notions of things, activities, attributes and circumstances. As noted by the Polish researcher Paweł Sikora, non-conceptual content carries much information about the observed and experienced object, and conceptual content represents the subject's state of belief that the perceived object is such [Sikora 2020: 48]. However, it would be more accurate to say that conceptual content is manifested as the subject's state of belief that the perceived object is precisely what it is thought to be.

Notions appear, operate and develop in the cognitive (acquiring knowledge) and cognitional (thinking as functioning knowledge) processes of human activity, fulfilling two main functions: generalisation (generalising-qualifying, cognitive) and referential function (denotative-qualifying, exploring). They are combined based on similarity (into classes) and tangency (into fields) and are preserved in memory as a whole of the conceptual knowledge system.

A group of Polish scientists defines a notion as a schematic representation of sets of objects, defining the essential properties of these objects [Maruszeński & oth. 1996: 185]. A notion, in their opinion, reflects the general, essential properties, connections of objects and phenomena (the term „reflects” is very unfortunate here, we would prefer to replace it with „contains”). When one says that he has an idea of something, he means that he understands the essence of that object or event. Every nominative unit of language is a sign of a notion (not a thing or an event as a phenomenon of reality), and every predicative unit of language is a sign of human judgment (not of a real state of affairs). One can see that there is no mirrored relation here. The sign is not a „reflection” of a notion or judgment but a representative in the communication process. The forms of the vast majority of words and word connections, phrases or phraseologies can only operate as a lexical sign due to their semiotic connection with a certain notion. Man connects completely different energy-matter beings (such as sounds pronounced by different people in different circumstances) or psychophysiological phenomena (such as sequences of acoustic-articulation sensations arising in the same person in different semiotic situations) into a piece of complete integral information. And it is possible only in one case – when they are united by one invariant meaning, which is semiotic information about some element of the mental image of the world, i.e., a notion.

Notions arise and function in the human mind only in certain connections, namely in the form of judgments. Thinking means judging something, revealing certain connections and relationships between different sides of an object of thought or between different objects themselves. Kant defined a judgment as a „representation of a representation” given its relational nature, associated with notions that are relational in their essence:

ein Begriff niemals auf einen Gegenstand unmittelbar, sondern auf irgendeine andre Vorstellung von demselben (sie sei Anschauung oder selbst schon Begriff) bezogen. Das Urteil ist also die mittelbare Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes, mithin die Vorstellung einer Vorstellung desselben. In jedem Urteil ist ein Begriff, der für viele gilt und unter diesem Vielen auch eine gegebene Vorstellung begreift, welche letztere denn auf den Gegenstand unmittelbar bezogen wird [Kant 2006: 156–158].

It is apparent that judgments must contain notions but are not limited to them. Judgments can combine notions, and they also can combine notions and non-conceptual content, e.g., sensory (e.g., judgments about the colour of the subject), emotional (e.g., judgments about a particular object), or volitional (e.g., judgments about the will to perform a particular activity). Such notions are said to be frequently updated. Some judgments may be true or false, and some do not refer to this opposition, reflecting only the subject's emotional-volitional attitude to the situation. Some judgments are strongly related to a person's life experience and views, aspects of his culture and civilization or social affiliation, and peculiarities and goals of his activity.

Just as notions constitute the core of our cognitive (and thus linguistic) image of the world, judgments are the essence of human more or less conscious thinking as controlled by discourse. They underlie most speech manipulations: every utterance formed as a sentence is semantically a judgment.

The only exceptions to these rules are words and statements that semiotically refer not to notions but also to representations – sensory (*knock-knock, meow, bang, hop*), emotional (*ah, eh, wow, ups*) or volitional (*yo, hey, whoa, chick chick*). As linguistic signs, they explicate non-conceptual content, while as speech signs, such words are used to express or demonstrate various senses and states, not to describe or narrate. Therefore, such an information unit generally does not relate to discursive thinking and is left aside when analyzing information.

Considering the critical role of notions in cognitive processes and in the processes of shaping one's image of the world, let us not forget, however, that the content basis for notions is perceptions (or, more correctly, apperceptions, as they are governed by a priori categories of space and time). Here is

another fragment from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in which Kant links the notions of cognition and sensory experience:

Daß alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anfangt, daran ist gar kein Zweifel; denn wodurch sollte das Erkenntnisvermögen sonst zur Ausübung erweckt werden, geschähe es nicht durch Gegenstände, die unsere Sinne rühren und teils von selbst Vorstellungen bewirken, teils unsere Verstandestätigkeit in Bewegung bringen, diese zu vergleichen, sie zu verknüpfen oder zu trennen, und so den rohen Stoff sinnlicher Eindrücke zu einer Erkenntnis der Gegenstände zu verarbeiten, die Erfahrung heißt? Der Zeit nach geht also keine Erkenntnis in uns vor der Erfahrung vorher, und mit dieser fängt alle an. [Kant 2006: 50].

Notions not only generalize different knowledge about an object of thought (this is the function of the part of the notion called intensity or content), but they can also help us distinguish between examples of the same object (thanks to extension or scope of the notion). It is in the latter case that perceptual information often helps. Sensory-cognitive information (reactive information about the world as an object of experience) is the material basis for mental processes based on the subject's attitude to the world and himself (e.g., conceptual cognition, emotional or volitional attitude). When the results of these parallel processes are integrated later, a complete empirical picture of the world around emerges. Moreover, individual sensory data in the form of senses (e.g., visual perception of colour, brightness, distance, silhouette, acoustic perception of height, duration, repetition, tone, the timbre of the sound, tactile perception of sharpness, coldness, roughness, etc.), also generalizes impressions about the external appearance of particular objects. Thus, it can and should be considered in terms of information theory, as it is a sensory differentiation produced by our senses.

In *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant described and justified two a priori forms (categories) of human sensory experience: space and time, which respectively shape the forms of external and internal senses. In other words, objects perceived by the external senses are defined as existing in space, while content obtained by the internal senses must be in a constant temporal relationship. These two forms of apperceptive intuition are not in opposing positions but are sequential and complementary. Phenomena obtained by the external sense organs must also stimulate activity in the internal sense organs. The outer senses provide locational information about the objects of sensory experience, and the inner senses are the source of temporalization of all information, including that provided by the external senses. According to the German philosopher, this does not mean that the internal sense organs have their own sources; all their content comes from the external

sense organs. Also, the internal sense organs can create images of objects as unchanging or changing (including images of the subject of perception itself). The function of the internal sensory organs results from their internal stimulation through the synthesis of imagination. Moreover, this stimulus also enables the internal sensory organs to visualize themselves. The dependence of sensory experience on the categories of time and space and the connection of the latter with the categories of intellect (quantity, quality, relation and modality) [see: Kant 2006: 172] allows for a completely different, non-traditional view of the role of sensory experience. In this approach, sensory experience is understood not as a tool of observation but of ordering the objective field of human experience.

Unfortunately, not all philosophers understand sensory experience as a cognitive function. Instead, most have traditionally held that the senses are something like a mirror objectively reflecting the features of the world, or worse, a sponge that absorbs and draws these features into itself. Aneta Załazińska writes that

what one hears are objects, and hearing is as good as seeing for perceiving reality. Such a framework means that perceptual activity of an organism represents extracting from the environment information about objects and their features essential for the organism's survival. This information is present in the environment in the form of ready „offers” (*affordances*), which reveal the benefit of a given object for the recipient of stimuli [Załazińska 2016: 74].

According to this concept, „information about objects” is not created in human consciousness (as understood by Kant and as understood by modern anthropocentrists) but is „extracted from the environment” through the senses. Thus, information is either material (like atoms) or metaphysical, spiritual that our senses pick up from the observed objects.

Janina Kotarbińska argues with the following statement: „sensory impressions are nothing other than signs of perceived objects, which are their counterparts in the minds of perceiving people, and that as signs they are the source of knowledge about the external world” and notes that:

Such an approach can be found both in those who emphasize that impressions are signs but not copies of perceived objects and in those who insist that, at least under certain conditions, the sensations faithfully reproduce objects to which they are an ad hoc sensual reaction [Kotarbińska 1956: 57].

The idea of sensory information as semiotic information is, without a doubt, more akin to Kantian thought than sensualistic thought because it assumes that they are not identical or equal to the object itself as the tra-

ditional „reflection” approach proposes. Nevertheless, this concept is quite distant from anthropocentrism, as it assumes the possibility of a world directly influencing a man’s information system (his consciousness) and leaving traces in it (i.e., signs in the form of sensory impressions). According to Kant, the senses provide a human being with specific content that should only be sorted out through the so-called mathematical categories of quantity and quality and shaped into cognitive units by dynamic categories of relations and modality. By themselves, they do not provide information about the world around or about a man.

According to Kant, a pure mind cannot create a picture of the world. It can and must only formalize the sense data in quantity, quality, relationship, and modality. However, the same applies to sensory experience, which is not a mechanism of passive registration or an objective „reflection” of the world, but a mechanism of pragmatically necessary and selective apperception in a priori categories of time and space. The mind that provides the senses with categories for organizing experience: quantity (relation to the division and association of sense data), quality (relation to the spatial and temporal determination of the boundaries of the integral object of sense perception), relation (establishing the mutual dependence of sense objects), modality (establishing the dependence of sense objects and object of sensory perception), is incapable of generating impressions and is dependent on the senses. On the other hand, without the intellect, sensory impressions and perceptions would not be distinguished and identified and would not form a coherent image of the object. And without the subjective categories of emotions and will, they would not arouse our interest and would not motivate us to act.

The sensual perception of reality has two poles – subjective and objective. Perceptual knowledge (information) results from a selective perception that results from previous perceptual experiences, the subject’s needs and attitudes. Each element of perception is organized into a certain semantic unity. Traditionally, psychologists and psychophysicists distinguish three such types of units corresponding to three stages of perception: a sensory impression (feeling), perception (observation), and envisioning (visual image). Kant distinguished sensations (as intensive quantities – *Empfindung*) and perceptions (as extensive quantities – *Wahrnehmung*) [see: Kant 2006: 292]. Moreover, he distinguished such a general form of “sensory apperception” as representation (*Vorstellung*) [Kant 2006: 44].

Following Kant’s footsteps, we single out three critical problems concerning the typology and description of sensory functions. The first concerns the distinction between sensory information and notions of sensory perception, the second relates to the distinction between sensibility (objective reactivity) and emotions (subjective reactivity), and the third concerns the inter-

nal differentiation of sensory information. In this last aspect, we propose to distinguish between relevant and generalized invariant data at each level of sensory information:

- senses: actual and mental (the most specific level of intense sensation),
- perception: actual and mental (level of extensive sensation),
- representations: actual and mental (pre-conceptual level of generalized sensation).

Under *current sensory experiences*, we understand those that arise in direct contact with the phenomena of reality. Under *mental experiences*, we understand their generalizations preserved in memory. In psychology, one can find a similar differentiation between short-term sensory mental images and long-term sensory memory traces (called engrams in neurophysiology) [see: Kosslyn, Shin 1990; Ochsner, Kosslyn 1994; Markiewicz, Przybysz 2016; Mietz 2016]. It is the latter (*sensory mental images* in our terminology) that, next to notions, can become objects of verbalization.

Thus, full perceptual knowledge—a visual image (vision, engram)—arises under the influence of notions that give perception the feature of constancy. Depending on their origin, visual images are divided into reproductive images (based on previous impressions and perceptions) and creative or fanciful images (created under the influence of a notion through any combination of mental impressions and perceptions). Jean-Paul Sartre, Jean-Pierre Cabestan, François Noudelmann, et al. devoted their research to this topic. Marta Chojnacka, who researches the image function, illustrates the diversity of material (reproductive) and mental (creative) images in this way:

By imagining the table, I can say that I have the image of the table, that is, the awareness of the table as imagined. The table image may have appeared because I just saw a physical object called a table. The visible object is related to spatiality, and the imagined image appears to be devoid of location in real space. Imagination and perception are, therefore, two different aspects of consciousness that are mutually exclusive [Chojnacka 2018: 134].

The key characteristic of sensory images is that they always arise with notions' participation (direct or indirect). The subject tends to perceive the object as stable and unchanging. The notion allows the conceived object to be understood as a class and an element of a categorical hierarchy, i.e. as a product of intellectual synthesis. At the same time, imagination allows us to perceive this object as a generalized product of perceptual synthesis. As Zenon Grabarczyk points out,

As a sensual being, man is exposed to many impressions, and from shifting images of reality, he must „evoke” objects, give them durability and the possibility of repeating themselves [Grabarczyk 1999: 42].

It is impossible to maintain a plurality of sensations and perceptions as a whole without a notion or a sensual representation (in order to combine tactical, optical, taste, olfactory and acoustic observations, one must know that they apply to the same object, e.g., an apple). A general representation based on the notion of an apple makes it possible to evoke a sensory image of an apple in the consciousness (general or as a specific fruit of this kind) and to recognize the object currently perceived by the senses as an apple. Thus, perceptual knowledge is not self-sufficient and arises directly related to rationality. Separating sensuousness from the real-life activity frame is a purely analytical procedure. Senses themselves (without cognitive analytical processing and volitional focus on them at the stage of reflection) cannot be identified and understood. Moreover, without an emotional response, our senses would never get our attention. All notions can be divided into objective (object-sensory) and non-objective notions depending on how they connect with sensory information. Objective notions are units of cognitive information with the categorical semantics of physical objectivity (things and beings, physical features and actions). The reference part of these units strongly bonds with sensory information, e.g., *table, square, saw, bird, forest, circle, ball, wooden, draw*. Non-objective notions (and words with objectless semantics) are related to abstract phenomena, features and processes. They do not contain sensory information but can be implicitly associated with sensually perceived objects and phenomena (*read, observe, pleasant, good, university, count, practice, to try*). The sensory seme (i.e., sensory information in the semantics of a lexical unit) may be essential in the categorical part of the meaning (a word or phrase names a feeling or physiological state). However, it may also be only complementary (the meaning of the word includes the sensory evaluation of the object or its physical properties). If the sensory sem is the core of the referential part of the meaning, the nominate denotes a physical object or its properties (*wall, tree, book, chair, pants, green, thick, wooden, long*). Suppose sensory semes occur on the fringes of the referential part of the meaning. In that case, one can be sure that he is talking about some generalized notion closely related to physical (e.g., manipulative or instrumental) manifestations (e.g., *city, forest, library, interior, clothing, full, rare, rich, clean*). A lack of sensory semes indicates a notion's abstract nature (*knowledge, intellect, good, plan, interesting, certainty*).

Verbalization of human sensory representations should consider that the vocabulary being described is very diverse, not only in terms of form (or meaning) but also in terms of semiotics and the informational essence of the signified. Sensory names should therefore include mental functions and attributes of these functions (sight, hearing, hear, smell, taste, touch, see, feel) as well as the nominations of the notions of various sensory features

and functions occurring in the phenomenal world of human beings through sensory organs (colour, red, red, red, salty, tasty, spicy, aromatic, etc.). The above-mentioned nominees, however, include not only sensory information but a particular notion categorized as a substance (sight, hearing, hear, smell, taste, touch, colour, red), activity (see, feel, touch, blush) or attribute (red, salty, tasty, spicy, aromatic).

People are unaware of the vast majority of sense representations they widely use. That is why sensorics has become a subject of linguistic research, both onomasiological (nominative) and discursive (pragmatic). Semiotic (and linguistic) research focuses on acoustic, visual and tactile images, which most often act as signals during semiotic interactions. Interestingly, visual signs often perform a recognition function (traces, signs, symptoms, i.e., non-communicative signs are most often recognized by eyesight). The exceptions are writing and visual images as cultural signs. Sight plays the most important role in the process of shaping sensory information:

Therefore, visual learners tend to stick to visible roads, e.g., those tread by other animals or people. Since, for the minimization of effort, animals and humans have an ethological tendency to pave roads as shortcuts, using them saves energy [Chmurzyński 2000: 264],

Slightly less important is the role played by hearing and touch (including kinesthetics and thermal sensations). The information about smell and taste is the least tamed by humans.

Regardless of the fact that the overwhelming majority of sensory information is produced through the sense of sight, most strictly communicative signs are of an acoustic nature: knocking on the door and the barking of a dog signal the arrival of guests, beeps on the radio indicate the time, whistles and hoots have command function and vocal sounds express emotional states and aesthetic experiences. And finally, all natural and artificial human languages have the acoustic-articulation character of communicative signalling.

Animal sounds can be interpreted in two ways: as an element of communication with humans (actual level) and as a harbinger of events (conventional-symbolic level). Piotr Kładoczny, in one of his articles, proves that auditory impressions:

appear only thanks to the ears, and due to the differences in perceived features and observation of the surrounding world they give people knowledge about the sounds themselves (their sensory features: loud – quiet, high – low, long – short, complex – simple), about the objects that caused them (wooden or metal objects, animals, people), and the way they are created (impact, fric-

tion, air flow, the operation of devices), as well as about a person, e.g., as regards the condition of one's sense of hearing or distance from the sound source. Sound names are primarily onomatopoeic. They are mainly derived from exclamation marks imitating the acoustic effects of the surrounding world in human language [Kładoczny 2015: 152].

Due to the acoustic-articulation nature of human verbal communication, acoustic information occupies a peculiar place in linguosemiotics. This applies to the onomatopoeia mentioned above and the entire field of phonetics and phonology. From an ontological point of view, neither sound imitation objects nor sounds or phonemes are mere sensations or perceptions. They contain information that goes beyond the scope of the usual intensive or extensive sensors. Voices and phonemes contain ethnolinguistic information (as they are distinctive language units), while onomatopoeias, apart from strictly acoustic information, have a reference to the object they are assigned. None of them is a notion. We can define them as *representations* or *acoustic images*. It would suffice to compare the signs of the notion of knocking, knocking and the image sign – knock-knock, to make a significant linguosemiotic difference between them. The first two name notions about a sound or the process of making a sound, and the last one expresses or demonstrates the image of such a sound. Let's look at another type of verbalization of sensory images. This time, kinesthetic images (acoustic-kinesthetic or optical-kinesthetic as images of movements often appear in conjunction with images of sounds or optical phenomena). These are the exclamation marks on *bang, kaboom, clunk, hop, bam, wham, blam* and such. This type of sensory information is verbalized neither by nomination (because it is not a notion) nor by prediction (because it is not a judgment). It is an entirely different semiotic and verbalizing procedure that does not consist of a story about a sensual experience or its description but its expression or demonstration. Such signs may be referred to as verbal sensory expressives.

Thus, the task of sensory impressions (perception) and notions (cognition) is, respectively, to recognize the objects of the phenomenal world and to know the world of our experience. They provide us with information about the world as the object of our activities, so they can be referred to as subject information. According to Kant, there are only two interconnected conditions for cognition in human experimental activity: sensory visualization and conceptual thinking:

Es sind aber zwei Bedingungen, unter denen allein die Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes möglich ist, erstlich Anschauung, dadurch derselbe, aber nur als Erscheinung, gegeben wird; zweitens Begriff, dadurch ein Gegenstand gedacht wird, der dieser Anschauung entspricht. [Kant 2006: 194].

On the other hand, not all content structures in our cognitive picture of the world serve cognition. Emotional states are also important, allowing a person to respond to stimuli recognized by the senses or to acquired knowledge. It allows us to assess the state of our experience and respond to it through our activities.

Emotional information

Researchers of human experience and human consciousness (including lingual consciousness) are interested in researching rational human behaviour, their conceptual (discursive) thinking, and other psychological aspects. Here they talk primarily about **emotions**, i.e., mental states such as joy, sadness, surprise, surprise, sadness, anxiety, fear, anger, abomination, and **feelings** derived from them, such as attachment, contempt, regret, happiness, love, hate, etc. It is assumed that emotions are involved in most, if not all, information processes and that both external and internal factors trigger them. For example, they arise when perceiving the surrounding reality (as a reaction to sensory information) and when handling conceptual or voluntary information [cf. Koziński 1980: 232–241]. The act of experiencing is, therefore, a person's relationship to the environment, which is located within the sphere of his emotions and feelings.

Emotions are a form of informative response to the changing circumstances of human experience. When functioning in the reality of an experience, man begins to relate to the world around him (the world of things and the world of people) and its absorption by the mind. Changes in the physical conditions of our body's functioning and realizing or simply thinking about something can cause changes in our mental state, which man feels as emotions. He constantly evaluates the information provided by his senses and mind – not intentionally but through a reactive change in his mental state – as a result, he feels good or bad for some reason.

It is commonly believed that emotions as states assessing the adequacy of the situational relationship of a given person as a result of their experience may be either positive or negative, i.e., they may differ in polarity and have a positive or negative sign: joy – sadness, contentment – dissatisfaction, euphoria – depression, etc. Positive emotions arise if a goal has been achieved or the circumstances are favourable to that person. Negative emotions, on the other hand, arise from facing obstacles to achieving a goal or satisfying one's needs. According to Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, all emotional experiences, apart from the emotional basis (i.e., what moves

us mentally), also have one of the so-called emotional tones – distress or pleasure [Ajdukiewicz 1985: 343].

In psychology, several emotional functions are distinguished. One is the reflective-evaluating function, which is the most important on the psychological level because it is through emotions that one evaluates the importance of objects and situations for achieving man's goals and satisfying his needs. This information and the semiotic system make one aware of the significance of events occurring both now, in the past and future. Other vital functions connect emotions with the volitive processes of the psyche. Researchers call it a stimulating function because, after assessing what has happened, emotional states in symbiosis with volitive states can prompt a person to act. Each person has the individual emotional excitability necessary for effective work. The results depend on various factors, for example, the activity's characteristics, the activity's conditions, and the actor's personality (e.g. temperament). Everyone experiences the same events in a unique way. The emotions that accompany each individual should be treated subjectively. In the general context, many psychologists and physiologists see regulation functions as the accumulation of individual experience. Emotional experiences leave a mark on the memory (emotional memory) and serve for further use. When a person reflects on an event in the past, an affective signal appears, indicating that the event has left an emotional mark. Emotions are the perception of somatic changes that occur in the relationship between the body and the environment. Some scientists believe that, like sight, smell, and hearing, emotions must have their neural channels and proprietary representations [see: Malewska 2016: 81]. Sabine Döring argues that emotions differ from sensory perception in their intentional content, which is both evaluative and affective, and believes that they cannot be equated with beliefs or critical judgments [see: Döring 2003: 220]. Thus, the emotional side of human life is reflected in emotional states (fatigue, apathy, boredom, aversion to activity, anxiety, joy, etc.). In contrast, the physiological side is manifested in changes in several functions, mainly autonomic and motor functions. Experience and physiological changes are inseparable, i.e., they always accompany each other. Emotions reflect a person's experience and the importance of this experience, establishing a specific event's subjective meaning.

Having emotional knowledge (information) must not be confused with knowing these states (having notions and making judgments about emotional states). It is one thing to experience emotions, and another to know about them or have conceptual knowledge about them. Firstly, emotional information is non-cognitive, and secondly, strictly **subjective**, as it contains information about ourselves as **subjects** of experience. Cognition, on the

other hand, is always objective by nature. Kant also wrote many times about the non-cognitive nature of emotions (and volitional states), e.g.:

Alle praktischen Begriffe gehen auf Gegenstände des Wohlgefallens oder Mißfallens, d. i. der Lust und Unlust, mithin wenigstens indirekt auf Gegenstände unseres Gefühls. Da dieses aber keine Vorstellungskraft der Dinge ist, sondern außer der gesamten Erkenntniskraft liegt, so gehören die Elemente unserer Urteile, sofern sie sich auf Lust oder Unlust beziehen, mithin der praktischen, nicht in den Inbegriff der Transzendentalphilosophie, welche lediglich mit reinen Erkenntnissen α priori zu tun hat [Kant 2006: 1006].

Emotions and feelings do not bring objective knowledge to the picture of the world but provide it with subjective and empirical judgments. It also indicates their subjective character. Similarly, according to Kant, modality does not contribute any object-cognitive content to judgments and is not a cognitive category:

Die Modalität der Urteile ist eine ganz besondere Funktion derselben, die das Unterscheidende an sich hat, daß sie nichts zum Inhalte des Urteils beiträgt (denn außer Größe, Qualität und Verhältnis ist nichts mehr, was den Inhalt eines Urteils ausmachte), sondern nur den Wert der Kopula in Beziehung auf das Denken überhaupt angeht [Kant 2006: 164–166].

Let us discuss the connection between emotional and cognitive (conceptual) information. Some researchers tend to use the so-called intellectualism, which reduces emotions to emotional notions and judgments, and panverbalism, which directly combines emotional experiences with the linguistic form of their expression. So, Jakub Kuš believes that

Every emotional term in the vocabulary is coupled with a cognitive scenario. Therefore, if one can use a particular emotional term correctly (and thus, he implicitly knows the corresponding cognitive scenario), he can also recognize a given emotion [Kuš 2010: 221].

According to Ronald de Sousa [1987], Marthy Nussbaum [2001], Mikko Salmela [2006; 2014] and some other cognitivists, emotions not only have a cognitive nature but are also identical to emotional judgments and evaluative statements.

Emotions can be related to the processes of both conceptualization and verbalization. However, the cognitive emotion scenario (models of behaviour in different emotional states) does not need verbalization (emotion terms) or even conceptualization. People often feel emotions without reflecting on them, and they know how to behave semiotically in joy, sadness, anger or surprise (as is customary in their culture). Few can name, describe or explain

these states or these signs (non-verbal and sometimes verbal), in words. In many cases, people behave in some conventional way (i.e., have specific cognitive and behavioural scenarios) without realizing it or conceptualizing their emotional states. Conceptualization of emotional states is unnecessary because, according to neurobiologists, even short-term emotional states can leave their traces in the human brain [see: Fuchs 2004], and „emotional and memory processes are an important component of the analytical process and have their biological correlates” [Pawłowska 2008: 63], in their connection to the limbic system (responsible for emotional processes) and the hippocampus (responsible for declarative memory). More and more researchers pay attention to the so-called *memory traces of experienced emotions* [Misterska, Głowacki 2013], *memory traces of emotional significance* [Murawiec 2010] and *emotional traces in memory* [Hancewicz 2018].

A fundamental problem is the semiotization of current emotional states (functioning in the so-called sensory memory) and the above-mentioned permanent traces of emotional memory. Whatever one thinks about the ways emotions are expressed via different signs, no other mental state is as closely and directly related to our unconscious and somatic reflexes (e.g., facial expressions, gestures, eyesight) as emotions. Everyone has experienced the physiological changes accompanying intense emotions – parched lips, palpitations, and trembling arms or legs. Various stimuli, from sudden perceptions or difficult decisions to complex or unexpected thoughts, can evoke emotions. Although scientific methods can investigate their neurophysiological basis, the neural-somatic identification of distinct emotions is still a hypothesis [see: Salmela 2014: 107–108].

Thus, in communicative activities, the links between emotional information and somatic (or, more precisely, psychophysiological) manifestations transform into the function of the semiotic expression of emotions. Such a reflection, i.e., expression (e.g., a certain face, movement, expression of the eyes, body posture), must be distinguished from the conceptual judgment (e.g., *Cool, I'm sad, It's fun! I'm angry*) and the nomination of notions about emotional states (e.g., *joyful, become happy, angry, become angry, sad, become sad*). The first ones are psychophysiological by nature and related to the index-symptom-signs type, while the latter are typical symbolic (conventional) linguistic and speech signs. Between these two extreme semiotic manifestations of emotional states are attempts to verbalize emotions as non-conceptual content. The language system refrains from giving names to mental functions occurring here and now because names are assigned only to those informational units that generalize similar information units updated in time and space and are preserved in the memory of many people (i.e., have been socialized). Thus, in addition to current emotional states and

notions about such states, the **generalized mental traces of emotions** common for members of a given society should also be considered. They can be called *emotional representations* or *representations of emotional experiences*. Such units do not have a categorical hierarchical structure (like notions) and therefore cannot be labelled by nouns, verbs or adjectives. However, they can be expressed with exclamations: *aj, phew, eh, tadam, ha ha, hehe, oh dear*. This type of verbalization can be described as *verbal emotional expression*, and it is one of the main subjects of this study.

As it turns out, psychobiologists or psychophysicists are not the only researchers who pay attention to emotional engrams. The need to distinguish these types of units also has arisen in psychology, along with the interest of scientists of **emotional memory** [Громова 1976; Zawadzki 2004; Кузнецов 2008; Соловцова 2017], **emotional experience** [Lewis, Haviland-Jones 2005; Бергфельд 2010; Ветрова 2010; Góralaska 2018] and **emotional knowledge** [Buchnat, Jasielska 2018]. Investigating these functions suggests the need to focus not only on short-term emotional states and their affects but also on the mental traces of such states (e.g., M. Kuznetsov uses the terms *emotional image* and *emotional trace*, whereas J. Siergienko and I. Vietrov call them *images of emotional experiences*).

A. Bergfeld proposes to differentiate conceptual and non-conceptual units of emotional experience – the **notions of emotions** and mental **representations of emotions** – stressing that the latter can also be interpreted as an ‘image’ [Бергфельд 2010: 44]. Polish researchers of emotional knowledge, Marzena Buchnat and Aleksandra Jasielska emphasize the field of reference or even model nature of emotional representations:

It seems that knowledge about emotions is inherently prototypical, not categorical, because it is based on direct and indirect emotional experiences that a person constructs, emotional representations that may be a script or a schema of both emotions and the category of emotions [Buchnat, Jasielska 2018: 378].

The verbalisation of emotional representations is of particular interest to linguists. The notion of emotional experience is broader than what is commonly referred to as EI (*emotional intellect*), which is categorised as a conceptual system and the effect of emotional reflection. Emotional judgments have the nature of simple sentences. Mental representations of emotions (emotional images) are different. They can neither be named (nominated) nor expressed by predication. Their explication requires a qualitatively different verbalisation mechanism, that aims at directly showing or demonstrating an image of an emotional state. We call this *emotional verbal expression*. The primary tool of such expression is exclamation.

Emotions and feelings are often associated with strong physiological arousal and behavioural changes that, when released, cause the subject's attention to focus on a specific object. Attention is one of the components of willpower as the main volitional mechanism that manages the entirety of our somatic (object-manipulative) and mental (cognitive or mental) activity. Therefore, it is also worth focusing on another subjective type of information – **volitional**.

Volitive information

Volition (volitional states and acts of will) refers to a non-cognitive informational function containing information about one's attitude and preparation for action. These informational states are responsible for our objective (external) and mental (internal) actions. These are the desires and/or the potential of a person to direct his/her behaviour and a sense of the need to adapt to external requirements and/or expectations to implement his/her intentions.

A person's lifestyle is strengthened by certain psycho-regulatory qualities, usually called volitional personality qualities. These properties are related to the type of nervous activity of a person and the requirements of the social environment. For example, desires differ regarding social significance and the strength of their manifestation. Most of the volitional functions belong to the subconscious realm and are sometimes called *the intuitive executive system of the will* [Schiep & oth. 2013]. Like emotions, preference does not require awareness, i.e. having a notion about this preference. One can want something, be able to do something, feel an obligation, or expect something (or feel that someone is expecting something from you) but not be aware of it. One does not always realize what he wants, can do, expects or what he should do; he is not always able to focus his attention, clearly feel his states and intentions, or readiness to act. Even the notion of trying to act is sometimes intuitive. Conceptual knowledge about states and acts of will appears only after the states and acts are conceptualized. Such conceptualized knowledge can be referred to as *awareness* and/or *self-awareness*. On the other hand, these states and acts are *de facto* non-conceptual information states and acts since they are non-conceptual knowledge about human being as subject of certain activities.

According to Alexander Pfänder, who pioneered the study of the essence (phenomenology) of the will [Phänomenologie des Willens, 1900], the will consists, first, in the insight of the object of pursuit and, second, in the antici-

pation of replacing lack of experience with satisfaction. As a result, the will is understood as a movement from imagining one's lack of an experience; the striving is directed toward a foretaste of an experience [Pfänder 1963: 54].

So, will and emotions are closely related, although they do not necessarily constitute unity and identity. It is not surprising, then, that ordinary people and scientists constantly confuse these types of subjective information mechanisms. Psychologists Wilhelm Wundt and William James introduced a clear differentiation of will and emotions. However, they were differentiated long before by Kant, who simultaneously emphasized that these two mental functions should not be understood as cognitive functions. He pointed out that feelings of pleasure or displeasure, just like volition, do not represent knowledge (“*der Lust und Unlust und den Willen, die gar nicht Erkenntnisse sind, ausgenommen*”) [Kant 2006: 128].

Behind every act of linguistic communication, in speech generation and reception and interpretation, there is a particular volitional state – the possibility/willingness/obligation or the expectation of speech interaction. Volitional information processes include: drive, attraction, desire, inclination, gravity, thirst, striving, will, demand, desire, willingness, wish, readiness, dream, aspiration, intention, intention, obligation, and decision [see: Leszczak 2012: 769]. All activities and states of the organism that contain information about a stage of initiating action and indicate a person as an active subject can be broadly defined as **volition**. The driving force is the information arising in the subject and relating to its active states. The volitional manifestations of the human psyche perform the function of mobilizing the forces and capabilities of the subject.

Jarosław Czarnota divides the volitional functions into states and acts, and the states into the synergetic stage (making decisions and preparation) and the cybernetic stage (the transition to acts of will and then to acts). Unlike volitional states, volitional acts are characterized by absolute activity. The activity of volitional states is relative. The most active volitional states are those related to direct preparation for acts of will, such as assessing one's certainty, readiness and intention to commit an act of will or attempt to commit it. Such states can be called cybernetic (i.e., controlled) states [Чарнота 2021: 104–114]. In collaboration with Czarnota, we proposed a typology of synergetic volitive states according to two criteria – dynamics (teleological vs causal states) and target/source location (internal vs external states) [Лещак 2019: 149; Чарнота 2021: 91–103]. We distinguished four types of such fundamental volitional states:

- potential – the feeling of possibility or inability to do something when the main causative factor is in the subject and consists in its physical or psycho-cognitive conditioning;

- optative – the desire or reluctance to do something when the factor determining achievement of the goal lies in the volitional subject itself;
- deontic – the obligation to do or not to do something when the main causative factor is outside the volitional subject (but not necessarily outside the psychological subject);
- sperative (from Latin *spero* – *I hope, expect*) – being expected to do or not do something by a person or circumstance when the goal's achievement factor is outside the volitional subject (but not necessarily outside the psychological subject).

Intention formation is the next phase in the development of the volitional processes. Intention (determination) is an unrestricted cybernetic state that arises (or does not arise) after the subject determines whether he is confident in his decision and whether he is ready to act, but occurs before the act begins. Intention closes the static (synergetic) phase of volition and opens up the possibility of volitional acts. Determination is also an extreme form of intention. You can be ready to act but not intend to do so; you can intend to act without being ready. However, it isn't easy to imagine determination without readiness and intention. Transformation of the subject's sense of certainty into a volitional act must always be preceded by a state of readiness (determination) to act. Willingness is a state that actualizes an opportunity/need and a desire/expectation in space and time; it is the actual ability to act. [see: Лещак 2019: 149; Чарнога 2021: 104–114].

Willpower is the mechanism of controlling the body (as an energy-material structure) and the psyche (as an information system). Many researchers, including linguists, have thoroughly discussed this function as a behaviour modelling tool. For example, Lev Vygotsky saw will as the mastery of one's behaviour, which becomes possible through association with cogitation mechanisms:

(...) the one who separates thinking from the affect makes it impossible to investigate the reciprocal influence of thinking on the affective, volitional side of mental life since the deterministic dispersion of mental life precludes both attributing to thinking the magical force of explaining human behaviour by its system alone and the transformation of thoughts into an unnecessary addition to behaviour, into its powerless and useless shadow [Вьготский 2005: 679]

The development of willpower as a management mechanism for all mental processes begins in early childhood. In preschool, a child is able to consciously set tasks for himself that he then tries to carry them out. Gradually, as a result of training and education based on involuntary attention, memory, situational actions, etc., volitional attention, memory, purposeful thinking, and voluntary actions are formed [see: Kurowska 2011: 86]

Volitional and emotional regulation can work in two opposing ways. In some cases, the will suppresses an emotional reaction. For example, in the event of fatigue, the desire to stop being active is compensated for by volitional effort and by such a volitional trait as patience. However, in other cases, there is a synergy between will and emotions, e.g., emotions related to curiosity can stimulate desire and activity.

Willpower consists of directing attention to and maintaining focus on a specific action, i.e., concentration. As a result, one can properly organize his/her behaviour even under the influence of other stimuli unrelated to the task being performed and achieve the intended goals. By the effort of will, a person can suppress hunger and thirst, fear and pain. For this reason, it is possible not only to perform complex activities that require high concentration but also to perform activities automatically. When a person has a greater desire to do something, the more willpower he has to exert.

An important part in the formation of human volitional activity is the conceptualization of volitional information and bringing it to the level of consciousness. As Thomas Metzinger states,

As soon as one gains the ability to experience the tool as part of their body self-consciously, he can pay attention to this process, optimize it, create notions that capture it and control it more subtly by doing what I now call volition [Metzinger 2018: 84].

The role of volitional functions in managing communicative interactions is also essential. The communicative-expressive intention as a volitional factor provokes a person to exhibit specific communicative behaviours that are typical for the sender and the recipient of a semiotic message. This communication effort is necessary not only to understand the signal but also to perceive it and identify it as a signal in general. The recipient also has an interpretive motivation as he/she may/wants/needs to understand what the sender is saying or expects a specific message from him. One does not simply understand a message; the receiver has to have the ability and desire to understand it; if this is not the case, the message is not understood. If they cannot or do not want to listen to the interlocutor, neither will it be heard. The states triggered by the subject's intentions (the goals he pursues) and his expectations are much more dynamic than those that arise as manifestations of man's internally or externally conditioned capabilities. When stimulated by the deliberate satisfaction of a need, subject is dealing either with a desire (wanting something, striving for something) or with an expectation (expecting something, hoping for something).

When describing the verbalization of volitional states, the researcher must differentiate a linguistic expression of his own feeling from a linguistic

representation of someone's state. By naming volitional states and acts with words or phrases, one is not naming the volitional functions but the notions of those states and acts that he or someone else has created in the process of conceptualization. These notions are only superficial and rather generalized knowledge abstracted from the specific volitional sensations that one experiences but cannot grasp with the mind.

Verbalizing a volitional notion or judgment is relevant to linguistic or speech **nominative procedures**, while verbalizing volitional information (especially imagines about states and acts of will) is related to linguistic or speech **expression**. When talking about the verbalization of volitional states, it should be emphasized that we are not talking about specific actual functions occurring in a specific time and space but making a generalization. Most often, these are notional (conceptual) generalizations, and they can sometimes be non-conceptual when the speaker does not provide information about the notion behind a volitional state or act but tries to express that state/act. Language, however, restricts from making such expression because it is based on the principles of generalization and invariance. Thus, such semiotic explanations stand for not several states and acts of personal will *hic et nunc*, but for **volitional mental images**, i.e., memories of the volitive states and acts most typical for a given linguistic and cultural community stored in one's memory. At the beginning of the last century, Russian academician Aleksandr Lappo-Danilewski, a follower of Christian Ehrenfels' thought, drew attention to the necessity to differentiate the current levels of volition (Russian: *воление*) and wrote that „evaluation is not related to feeling, but the act of will. Assessment is an act of will” [quoted according to: Малинов 2017: 174], and, most importantly, „not the feeling itself is assessed, but the perception of it” [ibid. 173]. According to Ehrenfels and Lappo-Danilewski, values are „functions of will and the representation of such will” [ibid.]. One can argue with this thought because values without their conceptualization and axiological hierarchy could not form the basis of a worldview. It is crucial for us that these psychologists recognize not only volitional states and acts and their notions but also such mental functions as volitional representations, because only taking into account these kinds of informational units can help differentiate 1) lexical nominations (*willingness, possibility, duty, expectation, wanting, ability, duty, expectation*), 2) predictive expressions of will (*I want to ask you for something; I hope you will come back; I can't do it; I don't want to, but I have to*) and 3) verbal units such as *hey, shh, kitty, wio, prr, no, ho ho ho, hop-hoop*. The latter are neither nominative verbalization of notions nor predicative verbalizations of judgments. Such volitive representations cannot be named. However, they can be demonstrated, expressed and presented in the form of linguistic expres-

sion through exclamations and phatic signs or hesitations. We call them *volitional verbal expressions*.

Thus, volitional knowledge is **subjective information** because it serves the satisfaction of needs and implementation of possibilities of human being as **subject** of experience. It is not information about processes of cognizing focused on objects of experience. One can be a subject when he acts (feels, thinks, experiences emotions, shows the will) and simultaneously be an object of self-reflection. Therefore, both one as a subject of experience and all objects of his experience are only his knowledge i.e information: sensual, emotional, volitional or cognitive. In this case, will and emotions are forms of purely subjective information, as they represent the active or passive relationship of the subject to the object, and cognitive (conceptual) knowledge, being the product of generalization and abstraction based on all other types of information, should be treated as secondary information, i.e. information about information.

Conclusions

All kinds of information can become part of one's mental picture of the world, provided that it is preserved in memory. Memory is a great function of the mind that allows human beings to acquire, store and recreate information about themselves, their experiences, and the world around them [por. Liguz-Lęcznar 2014: 167]. Memory is the mental function of remembering, recording and later recreating what they previously perceived, experienced or did, what they thought, preferred or lived. It is a highly reflective process, as it consolidates not so much what they consciously plan to remember or what is required of them to remember, but what is essential for them. They do it subconsciously. Conscious memorization of information requires special effort and the use of mnemonic techniques.

Summing up, it can be said that examination of image of the world, as well as communication in various types of discourses, can be reduced neither to the analysis of speech statements (and the judgments contained in them) nor to the nominative units of a language (with associated notions). The vast majority of information that a man operates daily or stores in his memory is non-conceptual – sensory, emotional and volitional information. Here he refers to both information contained in the current emotional states, volitional experiences or sensory impressions, and general imagines about such states in memory. This type of information comprises his worldview and empowers his communication, making it culturally meaningful and personified. It

necessitates being up-to-date in the context of the ever-growing importance of the unification of information and the process of technologization of the so-called „information circulation” and even more so in the context of the ever-closer possibility of creating artificial intelligence. Just as man’s ability to conceptually think of his time distinguished his species in the animal world, his sensations, emotions, and volition dictate that he remains human being without transforming into computers.

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Conceptualization of Quantity and Quality in Linguistics (Kantian Approach)

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Abstract. The aim of the paper is to explore the notions of quality and quantity in linguistics and the functions they may have in the linguistic and lingual discourses. The text discusses different types of these notions, analyses their correlation in the description of linguistic categories and summarizes similarities and differences in the colloquial metalogical and scientific approaches. The paper also presents the views of Immanuel Kant and the Kantian approach towards quality and quantity in relation to different parts of language and objects.

Introductory remarks

Both the theme of separation of qualitative and quantitative features of research objects and the differentiation between qualitative and quantitative research methods have become central themes of research in science. The distinction between the categories of quality and quantity may seem an important one. Nevertheless, a simple attempt to explain which characteristics of the objects studied by various sciences should be regarded as qualities or qualitative features and which as quantities (quantitative features) turns out to be problematic as it requires a clear and distinct differentiation of these concepts.

This problem has at least three aspects, which are equal in terms of their values. These are linguistic, discursive and strictly conceptual. First of all, while facing this issue, it is important not to fall into the trap of the language used to discuss the problem. As the same concept in one language may be denominated with different terms, whereas various languages can use the same linguistic form for different concepts. Secondly, both the names and concepts used in one ethnolinguistic space may be discursively determined. They vary depending on the pragmatic and functional sphere of their use. For instance, some concepts and names are universal, and some of them are used only in specific areas of social experience, such

as philosophy, science, economy or social life. Thirdly, even if we narrow down the problem of differentiating certain concepts to one language and one discursive field (e.g. philosophy or one of the sciences), it turns out that there are significant discrepancies between nomenclatures and conceptual apparatus in various philosophical or methodological trends. Therefore, speaking of quality and quantity, researchers should pay attention to all three aspects simultaneously.

Since the representatives of analytical philosophy pointed out that most of the so-called „Fundamental problems” of philosophy turned out to be strictly linguistic problems, which later allowed Richard Rorty to announce the famous „linguistic turn” [Rorty 1967]. It solved neither the basic problems nor the problems of linguistics because concepts were simply exchanged and areas of knowledge were confused. Andreas Bergh is right when he says that this „linguistic revolution” is nothing but „the endeavor to shift attention from the object of language to language itself” [Bergh 2011: 710].

Therefore, discussing this topic is rather a problematic one because it is uncertain what it refers to – words (if so, which language) or concepts (if so, which and what – colloquial, scientific or philosophical and from what culture, science and philosophy). I will try to sort out some of these problems at the outset. First of all, I will mention that the concepts are more interesting to me than the words, so I will try not to name the concepts that lie in the scope of my interest. When I evaluate the problem in a discursive way, I will try to limit myself to philosophical concepts (within the anthropocentric trend, especially Kantism) and general scientific (methodological) concepts with an emphasis on linguistics. The target problem here is to establish the applicability of the concepts of quality and quantity within linguistic research. However, this does not mean that both common-sense images and analyze nomenclature in various languages in the conceptualisation framework will not be used.

Linguistic problems of understanding quantity and quality

With reference to Germanic or Romance languages, both the key terms “quality” (*Qualität* / *qualité* / *kvalitet*) and “quantity” (*Quantität* / *quantité* / *cantidad* / *calidad* / *kvantitet*) are derived from Latin and come from the pronouns *quālis* and *quantus*, whereas in Slavic languages, these terms are regarded as either borrowings from Latin (*kwalita*, *квалитет*, *квантита*) or calques from Greek or Latin based on native pronouns (*какий* / *jak* / *kaki* – *колико* / *kolik* / *ile*). That proves that the idea of measuring and

counting particular objects and their sets and having certain features and properties arose in these languages much earlier (these concepts of quantity and quality are one of the earliest categories of human thinking) than the abstract notions of quality and quantity themselves. I assume that they result from a specialized intellectual effort based on the generalization of these common-sense ideas and a philosophical detachment from empiricism. It is worth mentioning that the linguistic or common-sense approach to these names proves that quantity is a general concept of the properties of an object of thinking, derived from the procedures for counting and measuring it. At the same time, quality is a property derived from establishing all its other relations to other objects. I would like to define this kind of understanding as cognitive or colloquial.

It is difficult to consider these concepts in the sphere of linguistics, because, in many languages, the word *quality* is often replaced with the words *feature*, *characteristic*, *attribute* or *property*; and the word *quantity* – with the words *amount*, *sum*, *volume* or *number*. In this case, it may indicate the vagueness of concepts (leading to synonymy) and become the reason for confusion of concepts in terms of their meanings (resulting from homonymy). This proves that in everyday life, as well as in many other areas of experience (discursive spheres), the notions of quantity and quality in their philosophical understanding are somewhat absent, and these words have the meanings of ‘quantity/numerical volume’ (*quantity*) or ‘property/feature’ (*quality*).

An additional problem is the use of attributive *quantitative* and *qualitative* concepts in science and philosophy (e.g. *quantitative* or *qualitative analysis*, *quantitative* or *qualitative research methods*, *quantitative* or *qualitative characteristics/parameters/features*, etc.). They show a certain incompatibility of these concepts’ colloquial (linguistic) differentiation simply as numbers/volumes or properties/features. First of all, qualitative analysis does not have an effect on the process of examining the features and properties of the examined object. A critical component of qualitative research is the determination of the essence of the examined object (which is not a set of features and properties). On the other hand, such features as *countability/uncountability* or *extension/non-extension*, referring to the counting or measuring procedures, are almost strictly qualitative properties. Quantitative research quite often uses the notion of a quantitative feature or property. Multiplicity, parity, sequence, and other quantitative characteristics can become constant characteristics and properties of many objects. All this approach requires abstracting from *strictly* linguistic definitions of the concepts and making an attempt to conceptualize the given issue.

In both everyday and scientific or philosophical languages, the word *quality* (*Qualität*, *qualité*, *kvalitet*, *quality*, *качество*, etc.) is often used in-

terchangeably with the words “property or feature”. It can be observed that the majority of encyclopedic definitions of the notion of quality come down to descriptive constructions like „feature/characteristics of a thing/object” and include the juxtaposition of quality and quantity. For example, if the notions of red, squareness, smoothness and silkiness are considered features of a particular scarf, „distinguishing it from others and determining its specificity in a given respect”, as suggested by S. Dubisz’s Dictionary [Dubisz 2003/1: 1265], or its characteristics are revealed, as suggested by the Dictionary of Philosophy edited by A. Aduszkiewicz [Aduszkiewicz 2004: 258], or for features that make it „some (such and not different)”, as proposed by the Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy [Winiarczyk 2004: 172]. Beyond any doubt, these statements confirm that these are regarded as certain qualities of a given scarf.

There is a distinction between their quantities and qualities. The latter, in its turn, is a particular different thing, and it also can be regarded as a size, which can be relatively arbitrary for each such kind of item.

It becomes complicated when the term “quality” gains the meaning of “the essence of the object which determines its identity” in the spheres of philosophy and methodology. For example, the *Russian Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary* defines *quality* (качество) as „the essential definition of an object by which it is more precise, as compared with other objects” [Качество 1983: 252]. Such an understanding of the notion of *quality* also begins to penetrate the dictionaries of the standard language. For instance, in Dubish, quality begins to be defined as an *essential feature*).

At the cognitive level (i.e. common sense or the typical image of the world), there is no significant difference not only between phenomenal and conceptual features but also between quality and quantity. Let us ask: would the property of this scarf be its quantity (in case of one scarf) or its four angles and one-meter-long sides too? Undoubtedly, it is. First of all, this characterizes a given scarf as a comprehensive object, distinguished from a set of identical objects. Secondly, we can apply these evaluation criteria to each of the properties mentioned above: red and smoothness can be of greater or lesser intensity, squareness can be measured in centimeters, and silkiness can be assessed as a percentage. As we can see, in all these cases, quality is not opposed to quantity, but conversely tangent with it in a cooperative relationship (*Nexus*¹), assumes it, and predicts its presence, although they are diverse. From the linguistic point of view, such attributes as *large, small, square, thick, thin*, etc., combine both attributive (qualitative) and quantitative features.

¹ I use Kant’s nomenclature in the brackets [see: Kant 2006: 284].

According to Kant, the intensity of red as a quantitative concentration (*Coalition*) of sensory impressions can only exist within this quality, which serves as a limit to this intensity from the sense of sight. However, length and width (as well as thickness) *de facto* are the result of an analytical procedure, based on the idea that we understand the surface of this object as three-dimensional. Silkiness (as an attribute) results from an evaluation of the relationship between the concept of this object and the concept of the material it was produced from. None of these so-called *qualities* (as uncountable or immeasurable properties) is a quality in a metalogical (ontological or even epistemic) sense. Even red is not a purely sensory quality (property), as it results from a conceptual analysis of colour differentiation in the consciousness of a person who can distinguish red from other colours. Moreover, a person who does not perceive various shades of red in the conceptual grid, may not notice differences in terms of perception of the object's colour. In Kant's works, all such features/attributes/properties are regarded as products of applying dynamic categories of pure intellect and result from the relation of „substance – incident“. Nevertheless, in everyday language and scientific or philosophical discourse (especially in metaphysical currents), *qualities* are almost universally called attributes of concepts, which are identified with features of individual phenomena or (even worse) with immanent features of things themselves as objectively existing beings.

In the spheres of philosophy and science, at least two completely various concepts with the same name quality coexist. There is the attributive notion of „essential property/feature“ derived from the commonplace and the methodological concept of „essence“ (ignoring Kant's metalogical concept of quality as a phenomenal boundary).

How do these three different objects relate to each other?

The most relevant one to human experience is the cognitive concept of quality as a property, trait, characteristic, or attribute. It is a colloquial concept used in attributing objects and the fundamental object of scientific or philosophical research. As I have shown above, it does not coincide with the Kantian category of quality, which as a mathematical category of pure mind, should be applied primarily to phenomena (energy material beings). In contrast, the cognitive concept of quality has no such limitations.

Metalogical, scientific and colloquial understanding of the so-called “quantity” and “quality”

The linguistic perspective shows that the synonymous equivalence of words with the meaning of a countable quantity or feature (in the ranks presented above) proves that the exact mechanisms of evaluation of reality were at the roots of the meanings of all these words. Those show the possibility of space-time parceling and at the same time the ability to determine the perception or comprehension of objects of that space-time. The idea of parceling seems more evident as it is quite general and formal. It does not require establishing the essence of the parceled space or the essence of the separated object. Nevertheless, there is a difference between counting or measuring energy objects and counting/measuring information objects, e.g. information, knowledge, feelings, emotions, will manifestations, axiological assessments, etc.

Even at the level of common sense thinking, we understand that counting/measuring physical things (which requires mental-sensory parceling of reality) is not the same as *strictly* speculative counting/measuring conceptual images, the separation of which in the intelligible subject field has no sensible bases, e.g. estimating feelings or measuring knowledge. It becomes clear that Kant introduced the so-called mathematical categories of pure intellect – *quantity* and *quality* as mechanisms of the primary ordering of phenomenal (sensory) experience [Kant 2006: 172].

They are not simply concepts in their usual cognitive or psychological understanding (or elements of the world image). They are rather models of thinking. For example, the category of quantity serves as a way to divide the space of perception into fragments and give them a general shape within the opposite of unity and multiplicity. In contrast, the category of quality establishes features in these separated fragments by limiting their reality or unreality by the senses. Oleg Leszczak proposed to call them *metalogical categories* because they do not belong to the everyday (cognitive) conceptual network or any specific philosophical or scientific system of concepts [Leszczak 2015]².

These are the primary mechanisms of human reality exploration; without them, no concept would arise, including cognitive, philosophical or scientific concepts of quality and quantity. At the same time, these are universal categories, as I will show later, they can be used far beyond the empirical explo-

² On the status on metalogical categories [see: Leszczak 2016; Leszczak 2018; Leszczak 2019].

ration of space-time, although not directly, but through the mechanisms of analogy. It should be understood that informational units, especially conceptual abstractions, may have qualities in the form of their essence (defined by Kant as a substance) and their manifestations (accidents). At the same time, the quantity of such intelligible objects of the intellect “is quite relative and requires justifications of methodological nature.” [ibid. 2015: 41].

At this point, I would like to make this kind of justification. Let us focus on two issues: the differentiation of the cognitive/philosophical and *strictly* metalogical understanding of the homonymous terms *quality* and *quantity*, as well as the differentiation of the cognitive (social, everyday) and logical (methodological) understanding of the concepts of quantity and quality, especially on the example of the concepts of qualitative and quantitative research, and the concepts of quantitative and qualitative difference.

According to Kant, every object (especially an object experienced through the senses) as a whole (*Allheit*) has quantitative dimensions: it is both unity (unit) and a multitude (class and field), and it also has a number of qualitative features, resulting from filling a separate quantitative form with sensory impressions. Qualities as phenomenal features containing an internal quantitative framework of gradation (gradation, intensity) of sensory impressions. Therefore, the metalogical categories of quantity and quality can and should be applied primarily in a phenomenal aspect, that is, in relation to the objects of sensory experience, as Kant indicated, describing them as *mathematical categories* (*mathematischen Kategorien*). These are primarily used to order phenomena as objects of experience, that is: a) the emergence of the whole from the contact of the unity of being (*Einheit*) with its multiplicity (*Vielheit*) and b) the mutual limitation (*Limitation*) of the reality of being (*Realität*) and its negation (*Negation*).

Considering that the mechanisms of intellectual shaping of experience allow us to distinguish phenomenal information from conceptual information at the level of reflection and meta-reflection, it makes sense to look for markers of metalogical quality and quantity primarily in descriptions of physical (energy material) things. The process of shaping the conceptual grid finishes when one reaches the level of substance-accident relations (*Der Relation: substantia et accidens*) and cause-effect relations (*Der Relation: Ursache und Wirkung*), and he enters the *strictly* conceptual domain, i.e. one no longer deals with ideas in terms of phenomena, but uses concepts while talking about them, and assigns modality to both concepts and phenomena, i.e. one evaluates objects from the point of view of their necessity or randomness, existence or non-existence, as well as possibility or impossibility.

Kant describes this level as linking to the existence of objects of apperception in relation to each other and reason (*entweder in Beziehung aufeinander*

oder auf den Verstand; [Kant 2006: 176]), and the categories that shape it – as *dynamic (dynamischen Kategorien)*. Thus what Kant calls *quantity* and *quality* cannot be directly applied to generalizations and abstractions which are used by us in everyday life, as well as in particular sciences or philosophy (apart from ontology). Both of these categories are rather fundamental and determinative against all other concepts about the objects of our experience and thinking. The first one (quantity) allows to distinguish objects from each other (thus, it acts as an analytical mechanism), and the second one (quality) serves to define the limits of the manifestation of quantitative characteristics.

It is also worth mentioning that Kant himself used two terms to describe the category of primary space-time parceling – *quantity (der Quantität)* and *size (der Größe)*, the latter is used much more often than the former one. While he always used the term *quality (der Qualität)* for the concept of filling space with matter (or quantitative images with sensory information). In all cases, when he meant simply the features or properties assigned to concepts (called *attributes* above), Kant uses two completely different terms – *Eigenschaft* and *Beschaffenheit*. Furthermore, when he talks about the conceptual essence of objects of reflection and their conceptual properties, he uses, as I noted above, the terms *substance (Substanz or Subsistenz)* and *accident (Akzidens or Inhärenz)*.

When thinking of the world's image, non-formal (in various spheres of everyday life), scientific or philosophical, one always deals with concepts, i.e. a person does not have direct access to phenomena. Looking at something, hearing something, touching something, feeling its smell, taste, and temperature, one cannot disregard the fact that he consciously or unconsciously recognises the object according to the conceptual framework he already has. Furthermore, this means that one no longer deals with the categories of quantity and quality with the help of which he observed this phenomenon, but with the help of the concepts of things and their features, which derive from the relationship of substance and accidents, cause and effect. At this level, a person comprehends the object as a whole, as a particular entity with many representations of both a qualitative and quantitative nature. Instead of the phenomenal quality, there is a quantity pair, which is an object (substance) – attribute (accent) relation, where both quantitative and qualitative features can become an attribute. The issue becomes much more complicated when one starts to create abstract, speculative concepts.

When transferring the idea of the division of the phenomenal world and the fact that phenomena possess qualitative traits (related to the operation of the senses) into the world of intelligible objects, one makes a kind of speculative leap because he identifies phenomena with concepts, so both quantity

and quality are identified with the accident of a particular substance, which is imperceptible by the senses. Even in the case of such a seemingly phenomenal concept, which is the concept of a tree, we cannot talk about its strictly phenomenal qualities because green as a color, belongs to a specific leaf, and the latter is black, brown, grey or white, to a certain fragment of a branch. When one says and thinks that a tree is green and its branch is brown, he makes a mental shortcut, because this particular tree, (let alone the tree as such kind of a generalized concept), does not have such qualities. As a phenomenon, the tree is not a single object since it is alike, in general, many objects (in Kant's language, an *aggregate*).

Nevertheless, a person thinks about this object as a whole entity, ascribing to it numerous qualitative and quantitative attributes – size, age, colour, type of leaves, way of vegetation, and usefulness, which go far beyond our sensual perceptions. Generalizing the vision of the environment surrounding this tree, he perceives it as a forest that is no longer a phenomenon and, according to Kant's metalogical categories, cannot have quality and quantity. However, generally, man perceives the forest as a comprehensive substance of an agglomeration (i.e. an aggregate of various consistency), and attributes to it both quantitative and qualitative features. In this way, various abstract and generalized concepts arise about non-existent beings that only exist in person's consciousness. At this point, it does not matter at what level of generalization one deals with these concepts – colloquial, scientific or philosophical. These are all concepts of the pictures of the world perceived by humans. Therefore, this is where the fundamental difference lies between, on the one hand, quality and quantity are regarded as metalogical categories and mechanisms for shaping experience and creating concepts, and on the other hand, these are regarded as concepts within the world image.

However, why is it common for us to correlate the attributes (substance accidents) with quality and quantity? I think the reasons lay within the relational nature of the „sensuality-cognition” system, which is a feedback loop. At the level of the world image, we are not able to abstract a phenomenon from a concept as they constitute the following feedback function: when one thinks of a tree, he imagines some real objects (or finds it with his eyesight) and, conversely, when perceiving a particular phenomenal being, he automatically perceives it as a tree, transferring phenomenal features and properties to a concept, and cognitive features and properties to a phenomenon. At the same time, he does not notice the fact that he sees or touches not the tree as a whole being but only its parts (we cannot see the tree from all sides at once, we do not see it from the inside, we do not see its roots, and we cannot feel it all at once by touch). Thus, neither the tree, its branches, limb, nor its bark is a phenomenon humans perceive. It is only that fragment

of the energy belonging to material reality that we perceive when reacting to the stimuli of our sensory organs. According to Kant's concept which I most agree with, the process of perceiving reality is two-sided: on the one hand, the senses react to external stimuli, and on the other – they do it in harmony and under the pressure of our conceptual network. When one sees a twig moving outside the window, he automatically thinks about the tree and the wind, which he cannot perceive with his senses.

Shifts between phenomenal and conceptual objects are so common that they are imperceptible not only in everyday life but also in philosophical and scientific experiences. When a person says he or she has seen the Atlantic Ocean, visited London, or looked at themselves in a mirror, they completely ignore that all these activities involved only a tiny part of what they perceive as the Atlantic, London or themselves. The same applies to temporal objects: when someone says, „We spent the summer at the seaside”, „Autumn was warm this year”, or „I was sick for the last two years”, he or she forgets to specify whether they were at the seaside all summer (three months) or just a part of it; whether every day of fall was warm or not, or maybe just most of the days (while the evenings and nights were rather cold); finally whether their illness was worrying them for two years or several periods in the last two years. Unlike simple substantial objects, such as a piece of paper, or a stone, which seem easy to be counted and measured, such complex objects as tables, trees, and buildings are much more difficult to subject to phenomenal quantitative procedures (it is impossible to separate the whole of the table from its complexity). The subject aggregates some concepts such as city, forest, river, continent, ocean, atmosphere, and outer space that are even harder to be segregated. What quantitative parameters, according to Kant, can a city or an ocean have?

In both cases, man perceives them as a multitude of buildings, streets and squares (city) or a multitude of water reaching the horizon (ocean or sea). One cannot see or touch the city or the ocean. *De facto*, the objects man deals with in the practical experience are visible parts of buildings and streets (walls, windows, pavements, signboards) or visible parts of the shore and water surface. Generalizing the knowledge about them, one creates abstract concepts of cities and oceans. Human sensory organs, however, deal not with windows, signs, or banks and water (these are also generalized concepts) but with certain phenomena someone perceives, which are elusive in terms of their worldview. Therefore, the Kantian categories of quantity and quality have nothing to do with concepts with identical names that one uses in everyday or public life, nor those technical concepts of quantity and quality used in various philosophical or scientific descriptions of reality.

Summarizing the above considerations about metalogical categories of *quantity* and *quality*, we should separate them from the concept of quantity, as an object attribution, determined in the processes of counting and measuring, and quality as an object attribution arising in the processes of distinguishing its parameters or its relationship from others objects. Moreover, the indicated attributive concept of quality should be fundamentally distinguished from at least two more concepts called *quality*: quality as the essence of the object, and quality as an axiological assessment (which I will discuss below). On the other hand, when defining and describing the concepts of quality and quantity, philosophical dictionaries and encyclopedias commonly combine all these fundamentally different concepts with the code words *Quality* or *Quantity*, assuming that the name is a sufficient basis for conceptual identity. It is presumed that Kant, when speaking of quantity and quality, means the same as Plato, Aristotle, Locke or Descartes; and that what the philosophers understood by quantity and quality is the same as what is understood by these names in various sciences and everyday language.

What is worse, this judgment later affects those who compile encyclopedias, textbooks, and sometimes also scientific monographs, and, while reviewing the research on objects of their interest, Kant conceptually equates metalogical terms with their homonymous philosophical, scientific or informal terms (derived from the use of language). This creates the illusion that when we talk about quantity or quality, we always a) talk about the same thing and b) know what we are talking about.

Unfortunately, linguistic traditions, both on the cognitive and logical level, do not reflect not only this distinction of concepts but also the distinction between common (anchored in language) and philosophical-scientific concepts. On the one hand, the word *quality* (*качество*, *quality*, *Qualität*) denotes both the properties of objects perceived by the senses and the entirely speculative properties of various types of abstract beings (referred to above as *intelligible objects of the intellect*). This principle transfuses all spheres of experience and all discursive spheres. Thus, qualities are temperature, taste, colour, smell, volume, and size (reduced to the senses), as well as price, shape, benefit, belonging, value, importance, etc. (derived from mental speculation). From the Kantian perspective, it would be much more correct to call these features *properties* or *features* because we *de facto* commonly refer to *qualities* as accidents (i.e. properties of concepts about various types of objects). Such nomenclature (in science or philosophy, of course) would be convenient enough to call only objects' immeasurable and incalculable features and therefore the properties should be called as *qualities*.

A more critical issue is that the notion of the quantity that we use in science and philosophy is borrowed from everyday life, where it has been meta-

phorically transferred from the field of sensory empiricism to the sphere of conceptual speculation. Thus it began to be treated as a characteristic of abstract beings (man counts concepts, measures images, divides, shortens or duplicates content, etc.). Researchers forget that this transference is based on a relatively weak analogy. When they try to parcel the information as if it were spacetime and fill selected fragments of the text with information as if it mattered, they make a radical change of concepts. Moreover, when counting conceptual objects and measuring their attributes, researchers apply the whole system of categories of quantity to them as if they were series or aggregates, sets of objects, or collectives of beings. Besides, they also apply these quantitative procedures to processes (as temporal cause-and-effect relations), counting and measuring activities, presenting activities as units (acts, deeds) or continuous (states, relations), multiple and regular (acts and activities) or as processual multiplicities (events). Such application of the quantity category is strictly informal and cognitive. A commonsense-linguistic level of thinking primarily characterizes it, but it also penetrates scientific and philosophical research.

In scientific (mainly technical and natural) and philosophical reasonings, we find such phrases as *pollen quantity and quality*, *water quality*, *enhanced voltage quality*, and *the quantity and quality of human nuclear and mitochondrial DNA* (which are primarily about the attributive characteristics of objects) as well as *types and qualities of knowledge*, *sensory qualities*, *qualities of the unreal*, *Gestalt-qualities*, *quality and qualities of information*, etc. In phrases like *quality and qualities of information*, it can be noticed that the English consider the word *quality* as singularia tantum, which conceptually differs from the word *quality* (having a number paradigm) in the sense of an attribute. There is a homonymy of terms, which should be avoided in scientific considerations. It is necessary to differentiate not only the metalogical categories-mechanisms of quality and quantity (discussed above) from logical (scientific-philosophical) and common-sense (cognitive-linguistic) concepts with the same name, but also to distinguish the latter from each other.

Therefore, paying attention to the notions of quantity and quality as fragments of the world image, let me ask the following question: what is the purpose of these concepts (i.e. generalized ideas about the parceling of the object field and the features of conceptualized objects) as elements of the everyday world image and the relevant concepts of scientific or philosophical thinking used to deal with other concepts during meta-reflection? The concepts of the first type are used in everyday and public life (socio-political and economic), as well as in art and the field of naive worldview. These are used to describe the objects of our activity, i.e. for the practical purpose of

differentiating them from other analogous or similar ones. That is a relatively loose application of the idea of parceling experience as countability/measurement and the idea of object attribution as assigning a property/characteristic to it. These procedures have a high degree of vagueness, mental reduction, and syncretism.

Quality as an axiological category: a pragmatic perspective (conceptual linguistic digression)

As I have already noted, in the broadly perceived everyday life, the idea of quality as property or feature is often generalized and transferred from object to subject. In this case, quality ceases to be associated with the object's properties as such and begins to be used as a method of measuring the object's usefulness, especially for evaluating the subject. In this way, the concept of quality is transformed into an axiological category. When one evaluates several objects relating to one concept, he considers it to be *good, appropriate, authentic*, and the other less *good, appropriate, and authentic*. Applying *strictly* colloquial ideas about a bird e.g. as a flying animal, he concludes that an eagle is a *good, suitable and real* bird, and a penguin or an ostrich is not. Moreover, the *small, sick and old* eagle is not considered a *good, suitable and real* eagle than the *big, healthy and young* one. This is how the concept of a prototype arises, associating the concepts of *proper, appropriate and standard* with an eagle.

Thus, one more concept and another homonym of *quality* in the sense of value (that is, a quantitative gradation of properties) arise, allowing us to talk about *high or low quality*. It is a typically axiological concept that should also be separated from the strictly logical (essential and ontological) concept of quality. Nevertheless, this concept has become one of the basic sociological categories. It contains a wide range of information that has become the subject of research in various disciplines in the last 50 years. It is about such conceptual categories as the quality of life, quality of education, quality of production, quality of health protection, quality of negotiations, quality of democracy, etc. In this sense, the concept of quality is strictly subjective (emotional-volitional) and pragmatic. It doesn't concern the characteristics of the conceptualization object itself. It generally concerns the assessment of the subject's satisfaction with these characteristics. Moreover, it is also utilitarian, as it primarily concerns consumption and ideological values. In this sense, the concept of quality does not correlate with the concept of quantity.

Nevertheless, many scientists use phrases like *a clear distinction between the quantity and quality of disclosure, tradeoffs between quality and quantity of life, water quality and quantity, meat quality and quantity, or educational quality and quantity*, which can create an impression that these terms correlate with each other in some way. However, it creates an illusion, because one of them (*quality of disclosure, of life, of water, of education*) refers to the researcher's evaluation of the object as „good”, „suitable”, and „useful” for people. The other term (*quantity*) refers to specific volumes of an object (*water, meat*), its duration (*life*) or the number of certain entities, tangentially connected to the object, but not directly related to it. In the case of the *quantity of disclosure*, it refers not to how many times the information was disclosed or how long such an opening lasted, but to the number of parameters and information data disclosed. In the case of *educational quantity*, it is not about the exact amount of education (because education itself cannot be measured or calculated as a sphere of life). However, it can be about the length of teaching time, the amount of information provided to students, or the number of classes conducted. These are plain rhetorical devices based on the stereotypical phrase of quantity and quality, not on the meaning of an utterance.

The frequent use of the „quantity – quality” quasi-opposition is rather ideological, and usually, it aims to point out for your vis-a-vis that quality (value) is more important than the quantitative factors. I call this juxtaposition a *quasi-opposition*, because one does not exclude the other. For example, objects' number (number/size/volume) in no way contrasts with their positive or negative evaluation. Oppositions create the object's substantive (qualitative) and formal (quantitative) characteristics. It is infrequent that the template structure *quantity and quality* directly applies to the same object and means differentiating its substantive (substantial) and formal (measuring) properties.

For example, José-Alain Sahel [2011] analyzes bibliometric indicators of scientific research quality, juxtaposing *research quality* and *quantitative analytical tools (quantitative indicators)*, using the title *Quality versus quantity: assessing individual research performance*. The author's intention to protest against the quantification of scientific research is understandable and suitable; however, from a methodological or even logical point of view, juxtaposing these two parameters is wrong. As in the cases discussed above, the category of quality is not perceived objectively by Sahel (e.g. as a description of the substantive side of scientific research), but subjectively, as an assessment of social importance of the research -teaching, mentoring, participation in collective tasks, and collaboration-building, carried out by experts” [Sahel 2011], as well as a degree of conceptual and technological innovation.

The problem is that the parameters, mentioned above, have nothing to do with science as cognition. As the transfer of knowledge (*teaching, mentoring*) or participation in its formation (*participation in collective tasks, collaboration-building*) which are regarded as important factors, are still secondary to the process of cognition. They involve the dissemination of knowledge or the design of conditions for its creation. However, evaluating scientific research innovation degree by experts is a quantitative procedure that requires a measurable criterion of innovation (which is entirely impossible in the case of conceptual innovation). Moreover, this procedure condemns the assessed research to a protectionist attitude from experts (it is enough for the expert to be a supporter of a research concept or methodology). *De facto*, the quality of scientific research, artistic or philosophical work (as a feature constituting this type of activity) can only be perceived by an appropriate recipient, when getting acquainted with the product of creativity. The emphasis here is on the word *appropriate*, because the wrong recipient of these substantive qualities of the work will simply not notice. The same applies to the quantitative characteristics of the creative activity (number of pieces, volume, size, length, etc.). Thus, the quality of concepts or theories is not so important, instead, their contents, quantities and the forms of their presentation have lots of significance. Another thing is the assessment of creative activity as the subject's attitude to the substantive or formal features of the work of a scientist, philosopher or artist. Substantive evaluation is a challenging task: someone may be comfortable with how an object is perceived and analyzed by one scientist and not at all with the way how another researcher proceeds. What seems innovative and valuable in a cognitive sense to one expert, may be assessed by the other as banal and trivial. The problem is that quality as an axiological and pragmatic category cannot, by definition, be an objective criterion for evaluation. However, the logical fallacy in approaching the quality versus quantity opposition is that the concept of quantity is not applied to the research itself. It concerns neither the number of proposed concepts or theories, their volume, the number of cognitive procedures that led to their creation, the number of postulates or concepts created by the research subject, nor the volume of classifications or descriptions made by them. After all, these parameters could be called quantitative characteristics of a study or research work. It is not even about the number of publications published by the author or their volume in the published pages.

The bibliometric characteristics of the scientific output include the citation index and the publication impacts factor, which depend on circumstances that have little connection with science as a cognitive activity. It is hard to disagree with Sahel who mentions that „sometimes articles can have a considerable number of citations for various reasons that might not relate

to the quality or importance of the scientific content” [Sahel 2011], and „articles published in prestigious journals are privileged as compared with those with equal quality, but published in journals of average notoriety” [ibid.]. Summarizing the reflections on the axiological category of quality, we can say that man does not perceive quality as an objective category and does not associate it with the category of quantity in a correlated way, which, by definition, cannot be a subjective or axiological category.

Let us return to the common-sense concept of quality as a feature or property of the examined object. In science, it should be divided into two categories. On the one hand, one can talk about an object’s internal features and properties that are revealed in sensory experience (i.e., quantitative qualities), such as temperature, taste, colour, smell, volume, size, shape), and on the other hand, about the features and properties that indicate the external connections of a given object with other objects that one establishes through cognitive procedures of the mind (i.e. strictly qualitative qualities: character, belonging, origin, function, benefit, value, price, importance). George Bealer proposes to call the former as *qualities* and the latter – *Cambridge properties* (meaning their pseudo-qualitative nature):

It would seem that man experiences colours, smells, sounds, hot and cold, inner feelings, the conscious operations of the mind, etc. But Cambridge properties cannot be experienced by us [Bealer 2002: 178].

Apart from the fact that including „inner feelings” and „the conscious operations of mind” to quantitative qualities (i.e. primary and immanent properties) is highly questionable, they, as well as secondary (external), qualities can be counted and measured (e.g. we can talk about the degree of importance or belonging, the dimension of benefits or prices, the multiplicity of functions or origin, heterogeneity of character). As we can see, the logical categories of quantity and quality differ from the informal ones, anchored in the language: *one poem, the fifth soldier or one hundred dollars* in common understanding are quantitative characteristics, while *a long poem* or a *romantic poem*, a *tall soldier* or a *Polish soldier*, a *crushed dollar* or *my dollar* indicate the quality (features and properties) of these objects. However, from the scientific point of view, all these informal „quantities” and „qualities” are quantitative or referential characteristics, characterizing specific examples of the discussed objects.

On the other hand, qualitative characteristics will be such, as a *syllabic poem*, an *infantry soldier* or the *US dollar*, because they define the subspecies of the object and represent its qualifications. Furthermore, here, we can formally agree with Bealer, who believes that not all the features of an object

should be called *quality*, but only the totality of its essential features that determine its qualifications:

Why an object is the particular kind of object and why it must be explained in terms of its qualities and connections. And why an object continues to be the same thing, which had to be earlier explained in terms of continuities and changes in its qualities and connections [Bealer 2002: 179].

However, I have to interpret this postulate in an opposite way to its author. The author, being an epistemological realist, believes in „the objective, nonarbitrary categorization and identification of objects” [ibid.]. But I do not believe in such purely empirical categorizations and identifications, because I consider them to be cognitive and mental procedures, which are only coupled with sensory empiricism. Certainly, „colours, smells, sounds” are sensory features, but they have no direct relation to the identification of the objects to which they are assigned, and they have less relation to their categorization. Thus, it’s important to answer the following question, „Why is an object the particular kind of another object?” For answering this question, one has to look not at the observation of the quality of the object as its properties and features, but at the categorization and qualifying capacity of the human mind and at the existing conceptual grid, thanks to which man distinguishes the essence of one object from another.

Quality as a property (feature) vs quality as the essence:
methodological perspective

Thus, this is not the end of the homonymous stratification of word forms of the notions of *quantity* and *quality* in science and philosophy. Both of these types of notions- quantitative and qualitative attributes, should be distinguished from the concept of the notional essence of an object, i.e. what Kant called a *substance*. This intelligible subject is also often referred to as *quality* in the sciences of philosophy and methodology. Quality, understood in this way, does not refer to a *strictly* phenomenal (metalogical) quality, or to the quality in common sense as an uncountable attribute, or individual qualitative features or properties of the examined object. It is the quality in *strictly* methodological terms. This concept becomes necessary, when establishing the fundamental (significant) differences between objects, when differentiating them from others or identifying them with other objects or when establishing the essence of a single object when qualifying it. These are strictly methodological procedures (sometimes

called *phenomenological* procedures). Interestingly, from a linguistic point of view, the word *quality* in the sense of the essence of an object also has grammatical limitations. When one says that *the quality of an object has changed* or that a *new quality has arisen*, he does not mean a change in colour, weight, size, affiliation, character, price or importance. *Quality*, as a being, is always one. The quoted statements differ from those, where the word quality is used in the plural and means the attribute: *The object's qualities have changed*, and *The object has acquired new qualities*. Regarding research methodology, quality is not related to describing the properties of a single exemplification of the given object, but to establishing its unchanging essence, which integrates everything that makes this object itself, regardless of its exemplification.

In turn, the concept of quantity in methodological terms covers not only its features, resulting from calculating and measuring the exemplification of an object or their strictly quantitative quality, attributed to an object during its common-sense and linguistic conceptualization, but also all characteristics of an object's exemplification, depending on their functioning and connections with other objects. All exemplifications of the object studied always have features that can be described in quantitative terms.

At the beginning of these considerations, I gave an example of the attributes of a particular scarf: red, square, smooth and silk, each of which can be treated as a quantitative or original quality (which, according to Bealer, should prove that this object is a shawl). However, none of those mentioned above features of a shawl seems significant (a shawl can be blue, rectangular, coarse and woolen) and does not constitute the identity of this particular shawl as belonging to a certain species. The scarf can be dyed; its shape can be changed, and its texture can change after years of use. At the same time, the scarf will remain, but not the same. Whereas quality, in terms of methodology and philosophy, is what makes the headscarf: a) the headscarf as such, and b) that headscarf. Moreover, these are not the properties or features of the given physical object as a phenomenon, but its essence and substantiality, which are ascribed to them by us, creating in mind the genre notion of "scarf" and the individual notion of "this scarf".

When speaking of qualitative differences or qualitative research, scientists and philosophers do not limit the concept of quality only to phenomenal features (as in Kant's). They also do not extend the concept of attribution to the cognitive scope (as in common thinking). Instead, they focus mainly on the essence of the studied objects and on the differences between their exemplifications, which constitute this essence. Qualitative research in science or philosophy is the determination of parameters and characteristics, which are significant for the object and their clear differentiations (it is both

the object's ontology and phenomenology). At the same time, quantitative research describes the research object in terms of the degree of presence or manifestation of the parameters and characteristics, distinguished in qualitative research.

In other words, qualitative analysis in a particular field of sciences should involve the determination and explanation of the essence of the studied objects as such, the essence of their functions and should qualify their typological features. In comparison, quantitative research should focus not only on the description of the dimensions and number of systemic, structural and attributive relations of these objects (which is obvious and results from the name itself) but also on the examination of individual exemplification of the studied objects and their manifestations in specific circumstances. At this stage of consideration, it can be concluded that nomothetic research (i.e. examining the principles of the existence or functioning of an object) or theoretical or conceptual nature should be a kind of qualitative research. In contrast, empirical and material research is regarded as quantitative research.

The problem of quantity (size), dimension and number

Apart from the qualitative attributes, determined by the senses or assigned to each object in the conceptualization process, each object has a strictly quantitative property. It is a **dimension**. In contrast to qualities (as a particular type of property), such as colour, smell, composition, origin or affiliation, a dimension may refer not only to the object itself (as a whole being) but also to its qualitative attributes (parameters). The scarf, as such, has only one dimension: it is an overall object of an aggregation character. Each of its qualities can have its dimension. The dimension may have its shape (a square with a specific size of sides), its red colour (intensity of red), its smoothness (intensity of sensations to the touch) or composition (percentage of materials used in production). In addition, a dimension may have its origin (e.g. number of years) and its affiliation (may be wholly owned by one person or jointly owned by many people).

The quantity (or size) of an object may be generalized, e.g. *much – little, large – small, far – close, wide – narrow, high – low* (Kant calls it *quantorum*) or specific (*quantitatis*). The measure of a given quantity of a whole object is a number, treated by Kant as a pure scheme of a certain quantity. The scarf as a single substantial object in the numerical dimension is one. However, it is one in terms of two perspectives. Firstly, thousands and millions of other scarves are not this scarf. Secondly, this scarf is a combined aggregate of

many features – material, size, colour, shape, etc, thus representing a unity. As I mentioned before, each separate scarf is a scarf, on the basis of being an element of the class (which in Kant's terms can also be considered a concentration (*Koalition*). This time not of sensual impressions, but notions about single scarves. It does not change the quantitative essence of the object as such. It is still one – one class of scarves. The situation is more complicated, when the objects that man evaluates turn out to be not uniform and not unitary in terms of their essence, e.g. they include various types of field collections – ranks, agglomerations, collections, collectives and systems (i.e. they are what Kant calls *connections – Nexus*), e.g. a set of furniture, a host, a herd, a street, a salad, a triptych, a trimester, a week, etc. In these cases, talking about qualitative characteristics, one should take into account, on the one hand, the properties of a given set as a whole and, on the other hand, the properties of its components. The numerical dimension of such an object also becomes dual: on the one hand, this single set is a unit and/or class of analogous sets. On the other hand, it is a set, consisting of several components. The study of both of these aspects is the main challenge of quantitative analysis.

Thus, the difference between quantity and quality is hardly noticeable or unnoticeable in everyday life (since both qualities and quantities in common thinking are perceived as two types of attributes – uncountable or quantifiable, unmeasurable or measurable). However, it becomes relevant in philosophical considerations or scientific research, not based on juxtaposing the countability/measurability of a property/feature, but on contrasting the gradual/intensity of the feature's manifestation (accidentality) and the significance/relevance of the features possessed by the object (its substantiality). So when we ask what a sign is, we can or maybe cannot attribute substantiality to it. Firstly, it is a qualitative decision, because we can consider a physical or spiritual phenomenon as a sign. Secondly, we perceive a sign as a relation between certain objects. In the same way, qualitative features are the considerations of the ontological essence of the sign. We consider it a physical being, a physiological being, a psychophysiological being, a psychic being, or even a spiritual (metaphysical) being. It's necessary to consider the difference between synthetic and analytical signs, verbal and non-verbal signs, linguistic signs and speech signs or nominative signs and predicative signs; as well as to differentiate signs from models, language from speech, language from dialect and English from Polish has the nature of quality.

On the other hand, the descriptions of English or Polish texts, lexical or grammatical systems of a language or dialect, phonetics of Polish or English, etc. are quantitative issues, as they do not concern the essence of the studied objects, instead of it they only describe them, according to some early estab-

lished principles, i.e. qualitative assumptions. Differentiating the scientific and informal understanding of quality and quantity from other concepts is very important for linguistics, because it is a discipline that deals with two levels of thinking – linguistic-cognitive (as an object of study) and scientific (as a research tool) and two linguistic units – linguistic activity as an object of research and linguistic metalanguage as its instrumentation. Moreover, the specific of the linguistic activity itself can be both present in terms of cognitive quantity and quality, as compared with the content, which is verbalized while using linguistic tools (e.g. as semantic of quantifying units), and quantity and quality as logical forms that shape units of language and speech (occurring at the level of the structure of form or semantics of language and speech units). It means that during linguistic research, we must observe the notions of language and speech as quantitative and qualitative attributes, as well as the essences and accidents of individual lingual units. In order to avoid ambiguity or homonymy in linguistics, the former could be called as *quantitative (quantitative attributive)* and *qualitative (qualitative attributive)* [see: Нобис-Влязло 2017]. On the other hand, the terms *quality (qualitative)* and *quantity (quantitative)* should be used in their instrumental (methodological) meanings, referring to the essence (qualifications) and the number/volume (quantification) of the studied objects. In the case of the need to explain the way of shaping cognitive concepts and lingual attributive meanings as well as formal categories of quantity and quality, the Kantian terms *quality* and *quantity* can be used, each time adding the term *metalogical category* to them.

Quantity/quality as linguistic categories vs quantitative/attributive as lingual categories

In the beginning, I would like to point out the differentiation between *linguistic* and *lingual* terms. The first one has a relatively transparent internal form and refers to linguistics as a science. The second term is relatively new and not very obvious. Conceptually, it refers to linguistic activity as a comprehensive object of linguistic research (Saussure's *language*). Supposing it were possible to perform mathematical activities over information entities. In that case, it could be said that *lingual* = *linguistic* (systemic, competence, invariant) + *speech* (utterative, performative, current) (justification for using an analogous Ukrainian term – *лінгвальний* – when applied to Saussure's *language* we can find in work by O. Prosiyanuk [Просяник 2018: 45–46]). After this explanation, it becomes clear that quantitative/attributive

ones are linguistic conceptual categories (referring to language and speech units, studied by linguistics as their objects), and quantity/quality are instrumental linguistic categories (used as research tools). Firstly, let us consider the quantitative and attributive categories and see how they are influenced by the metalogical mechanisms of quantity/quality.

We find it completely impossible to directly apply the metalogical categories of quantity and quality to the objects of linguistics, because linguistics as a humanistic science has practically no relation to phenomenal beings. None of the objects of the linguistic system has the nature of a phenomenon by definition, because language is a system of invariant semiotic units and rules of language communication (both are psychic functions, as they do not exist anywhere, except the mind). One could look for phenomena in language, at least in its phonetic segment. However, the only phenomenal object in the flow of speech is the sound of speech, which is not the subject of a *strictly* linguistic study. It is of sole interest to researchers in applied experimental phonetics. Even a phone, i.e. an acoustic-articulation unit as a representation of a phoneme in speech, is a purely informational entity and can be a subject to quantitative analysis only through qualitative analysis. It means that without realizing what phoneme this or that phone represents, we cannot analyze its quantitative dimensions in any way. We can only do this with sounds as physical entities. As for quantifying a phoneme as a unit of the phonological system, it is impossible to carry it out without establishing its essence in the course of a prior qualitative analysis, since no phoneme can be sensually perceived. The same applies to the analysis of morphs, morphemes, words, lexemes, word connections, sentences, texts, utterances, and their meanings or forms – all these lingual functions should be firstly defined as qualitative entities, i.e. as certain beings (or essential functions). Then it will be possible to talk about their quantitative characteristics or quantitative characteristics of their components.

Therefore, we need only to talk about the indirect application of quantity and quality metalogical categories to lingual functions. However, their most prominent applications may refer to the strictly cognitive component of linguistic activity, i.e. the attributive qualitative and quantitative concepts of the world image, which are reflected in semantics, as well as lexical and grammatical, linguistic and speech.

Directly, qualitative (qualitative attribution) manifests itself in the categorical meanings of attributive lexical units (adjectives, numerals, most pronouns, some nouns, participles and some adverbs, etc.) and attributive syntactic units (attributions, subordinate parts of expressive connections, and after reaction, subordinate parts of attributive sentences, etc.), as well as some grammatical forms (possessive genitive) or derivative forms (modification morphemes and some mutational morphemes).

On the other hand, the category of quantity is most often expressed in the categorical meanings of numerals and the lexical meanings of some nouns, pronouns and adverbs, less often adjectives and verbs. In addition, it can be verbalized through the grammatical categories of number, degrees of comparison of adjectives and adverbs, derivative categories of verb quantitateness, diminutive or augmentation, etc. An important manifestation of the metalogical category of quantity is the shaping of the meanings of words in terms of unity – multiplicity (politics, parties, singulatives, collectives, aggregates, agglomerates, etc.). It is worth mentioning that from a linguistic point of view, the semantics of quantity and quality can sometimes go beyond the category of an attribute, completely substantiating itself. It is about the concepts and meanings of mathematical numbers or such abstract concepts as content, meaning, information, good, evil, truth, etc.

We should call quantity as a cognitive-lingual category and a **formal-logical category of quantity**, which also reflects metalogical mechanisms. The most logical category of quantity appears in morphemics and syntax, where there are linear combinations of elements in lingual forms. Firstly, this applies to all kinds of syntagmatic relations: from syllables and morphemic sequence, word connections, parts of a simple sentence and the structure of complex sentences to the linear structure of a text. However, one-sided serialization („einseitig wie in einer Reihe” [Kant 2006: 180]) is not the only categorical quantitative metalogical form manifesting in the structure of language and speech. The second such kind of form is an aggregate with its mutual complementation of the field by components („wechselseitig als in einem Aggregat bestimmen” [ibid.]). In this way, texts are organized as semantic spaces and various semantic fields. The most evident manifestations of the logical category of quantity concern formal units, such as sounds (phons), syllables, bars, phrases, forms of morphs, words, word combinations, sentences, texts (when it comes to speech units), as well as phonemes, morphemes, and morphemic series, words, phrases, phraseologisms, precedent statements and texts (when it comes to language units).

The most implicit ones are the manifestations of logical quantity in semantic structures, such as the meaning of the lexical unit, the content and sense of the utterance (including text), as well as various types of invariant semantic structures of the language system (onomasiological and grammatical classes and models).

As for the logical category of quality, its role in shaping lingual (primarily linguistic) units is fundamental. It defines the essence of the unit, determines its identity and allows the unit to separate one unit from another, even when it becomes fused into ranks and aggregates and mixed with other units

in speech. Thanks to the logical category of quality, a person can identify even distanced analytical components of one-word form, complete elliptical constructions, notice forms with zero expression, differentiate homonyms, detect pleonasm, and determine the error. The degree of intensity of logical quality (and hence – the role of qualitative features and the importance of qualitative analysis) increases with the following flow: firstly, from speech units to language units, secondly, from formal to semantic level and thirdly, from phonetic/phonological units to grammatical units and derivative to syntactic. That is why quantitative linguistic research should always be subject to qualitative research.

Thus, these conceptual considerations can be summarized as follows:

- 1) the terms quantity and quality are homonymous,
- 2) there are at least four types of these terms: informal (linguistic), scientific (specialist), philosophical-methodological and metalogical (transcendental),
- 3) at the metalogical level, these are a priori categories that familiarize the way of the primary experience of phenomena by the senses – analytical (quantity) or gradational (quality), and they also determine all analogies of understanding, the essence or attribution of objects and units of experience in various areas of life,
- 4) on the informal level, these are the countable (quantity) and uncountable (quality) characteristics of all objects (both physical and informational),
- 5) on the scientific level, these are variable, gradational (quantity) or constant (quality) features of the study objects,
- 6) on the methodological level, it is the essence of the object (quality) or its manifestation (quantity),
- 7) being important for science, quantitative and qualitative research are related primarily to methodological understanding and, to a lesser extent, to strictly scientific understanding,
- 8) in a linguistic activity, the source of which is primarily colloquial thinking, quantity and quality (in their colloquial terms) have a semantic (lexical or grammatical) implementation in the form of qualitative or quantitative categories,
- 9) moreover, in the units of language and speech, logical categories of quantity and quality can be revealed through qualitative analysis, which is anchored either in the form of linguistic signs or in their system-structural relations.

The lack of a clear conceptual differentiation of the terms quantity and quality, at the level of common sense, science and philosophy (as well as their methodology) and at the level of logic, can cause (and already causes) many theoretical and conceptual misunderstandings. In turn, differentiat-

ing the quantitative/qualitative and quantity/quality categories from other categories in linguistic research can aid to carry out more subtle analyzes of language and speech units.

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Conceptualization of the Terms *Parole* and *Discours* in the Autograph Texts of Ferdinand de Saussure

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Abstract. This paper aims to analyze all textual uses of the terms *parole* and *discours* in non-canonical but authentic (as opposed to “Course of General Linguistics”) materials written by Ferdinand de Saussure in “Écrits de linguistique générale” [Saussure 2002] and edited by Simon Bouquet and Rudolf Engler. The publication includes the manuscript of the monograph “De l’essence double du langage”, drafts of lectures and articles, as well as several diary notes of Saussure. My task is to conceptually verify the terminology of the Swiss linguist in comparison with the traditional use of these terms and their translations into Ukrainian, Russian and Polish languages.

Differentiation of the concepts of *parole* and *discours*

The concept of speech as an actual processual being within language activity (*langage*), fundamentally separated from the concept of language as a static systemic form of being of semiological information in language activity (but not opposed to it), was mistakenly attributed to single volitional acts of oral speech –*parole*. This misunderstanding probably arose in the process of the compilation of “Course in General Linguistics” compiled by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, who ignored the whole group of conceptually significant terms that Saussure (as evidenced by his manuscripts) used to denote speech as a communicative act within the language activity. This includes the term *discours*, the derived adjective *discursif/discursive* and the noun *le discursif*, which originated as a result of the substantivization of the adjective.

In Saussure’s handwritten works, I found 25 uses of these terms (I ignored those cases where the form *discours* was part of the cliché *partie du discours* “part of speech”). This may seem to represent a small quantity compared to the frequently used terms *langue* and *langage* but it is quite significant if we compare it with the 33 cases of the use of the term *pa-*

role. Herewith, 11 uses of the terms *discours*, *discursif/discursive* and *le discursif* occur in the manuscript of the above-mentioned monograph and notes found in 1996. The term *parole* in these materials occurs 10 times, which indicates the parity interpretation of these terms by Saussure. Thus, researchers of the scholar's manuscript heritage have been able to note that Saussure himself, when discussing the problem of the use of language as a tool of interpersonal communication and expression of intentions by individuals, used not only *parole* but also *discours* and *le discursif* regularly. Therefore, it is difficult to explain why neither R. Godel in 1957 nor R. Engler in the critical "Course" paid due attention to this terminological peculiarity of Saussure's conception.

However, in one article, V. G. Kuznetsov noted that "the word *discours* occurs in the manuscript sources of the "Course". In the 2nd course of lectures, *discours* is defined as a 'speech chain' and opposed to one's 'internal thesaurus, memory' [Godel 1957: 259]. Preparing the "Course", its publishers replaced *discours* with *parole*. Saussure used the adjective *discursif* to mean 'syntagmatic' (2nd course), in the collocations 'discursive order' (1st course) and 'discursive units' (2nd course) [Кузнецов 2006: 114].

The very use of the terms *parole* and *discours (le discursif)* does not yet indicate their conceptual distinction. In some cases, the terms are used in one sequential line, which could indicate their categorical similarity (in which case one complements or specifies the other) or their synonymy (in which case such usage should be a simple rhetorical figure of strengthening, which is unlikely given Saussure's predisposition for subtle conceptualization). In addition, one should consider Saussure's skeptical attitude toward synonymy:

Si la linguistique était une science organisée comme elle pourrait l'être très facilement, mais comme elle n'est pas jusqu'à présent, une de ses affirmations les plus immédiates serait : **l'impossibilité de créer un synonyme**, comme étant la chose la plus absolue et la plus remarquable qui s'impose parmi toutes les questions relatives au signe [Saussure 2002: 265].

Thus, it is unlikely that Saussure, who put so much effort into clarifying the conceptual nuances that distinguish language activity from language, language from speech, sign from phonetic figure, states from events or semiological phenomena from physiological ones, would unconsciously use the terms *parole* and *discours (le discursif)*. Moreover, he considers these concepts separately – the concept of *parole* in Chapter 17 of the monograph "De l'essence double du langage" *Parole effective et parole potentielle* and in the note *Langage – Langue – Parole*, and *le discursif* – in the note *Le discursif, lieu des modifications – Divisions de ce livre*.

In the second note, we find the following passage (distinctions are mine – O.P.):

Toutes les modifications, soit phonétiques, soit grammaticales (analogiques) **se font exclusivement dans le discursif**. Il n’y a aucun moment où le sujet soumette à une révision le trésor mental de la langue qu’il a en lui, et crée à tête reposée des formes nouvelles (par ex. calmement [...]) qu’il **se propose, (promet) de «placer» dans son prochain discours. Toute innovation arrive par improvisation, en parlant**, et pénètre de là soit dans le trésor intime de l’auditeur ou celui de l’orateur, mais **se produit donc à propos du langage discursif** [ibid. 95].

In this fragment alone, we have several important conceptual aspects:

- 1) discursive sphere (*le discursif*) is a place of innovation,
- 2) it coincides temporally with the procedure of speaking (*en parlant*),
- 3) It is a source of input for new information into the mental repository of the language (*le trésor mental de la langue*),
- 4) Such input into the language system with speech innovations applies equally to the speaker (*l’orateur*) and the listener (*l’auditeur*),
- 5) discourse (*discours*) is the target field for the use of these innovations by participants in future communication; finally,
- 6) the sphere of discourse is directly related to the processual and action aspect of the language experience, i.e., to *langage discursif*.

It is easy to see that the described discursive sphere has, *first*, a processual character; *second*, an interactive character; *third*, a correlation with the language both in terms of cause-and-effect (as a source of innovation) and as a target (as a sphere of language realization).

Instead, if we read carefully the fragment of the monograph on *parole*:

Nous appelons syntagme la parole effective,
 – ou la combinaison d’éléments contenus dans une tranche de parole réelle,
 – ou le régime dans lequel les éléments se trouvent liés entre eux par leur suite et précédence.

Par opposition à la parallélie ou parole potentielle, ou collectivité d’éléments conçus et associés par l’esprit, ou régime dans lequel un élément mène une existence abstraite au milieu d’autres éléments possibles [ibid. 61],

we have to admit that this is not so much about the sphere of actual linguistic being (as was the case with *discours* or *le discursif*), but about a specific act of expression that actually takes place in the here and now (*parole réelle*) and is realized in the form of syntagms, i.e., linear structures (*parole effective*), built on principles of mutual sequences of elements (*par leur suite et précédence*). And this real act of expression is clearly set in opposition to the so-called

parallelism (abstract systemic relations) dominant in the language and so-called potential expressions (*parole potentielle*), also referred to as linguistic models of expressions.

Therefore, it seems rather strange that, developing the scheme of Godel-Slyusareva, O.S. Kubryakova proposed adding additional speech acts, not only as specific manifestations of speech as such (*discours*) but also as an independent element. In addition, in Kubryakova's proposal, language activity ceases to be the unifier of all forms of language experience but rather becomes a metaphysical entity opposed to speech acts based on the opposition between "what is not directly observed" and "what is directly observed" [Кубрякова 1986: 8]. The scheme proposed by the Russian scientist has a rather strange appearance:



It seems that the opposition "language-speech" (like social and individual) has an identical relation to both language activity and speech acts, and this leads to very significant consequences of a conceptual character:

- first, speech here can be interpreted as an individual form of language (i.e., as that very language, only an individual one, an idiolect);
- second, language understood as a purely social essence rather than a spoken one, acquires a metaphysical essence (and can exist outside a human being);
- third, if speech continues to be interpreted as a processual function, rather than an invariant system, it turns out that speech is something fundamentally different in its nature than speech acts (and Kubryakova herself notes that speech "consists of individual acts of communication");
- finally, in the same case, it will turn out that speech, along with and on par with language, is a factor in the emergence of speech acts, and, therefore, must be a substance that does not arise as a result of speech acts (contrary to the Saussure's concept).

Moreover, the opposition of language activity and speech acts removes the latter from *langage*, which is strikingly contrary to the views of Saussure himself. This interpretation turns Saussure into a Hegelian or Marxist-metaphysician because it equates unknowability with the inability

to observe in a sensory experience. According to Saussure's conception, it is impossible to observe the informational side of speech activity; it is only possible to directly observe physical signals. In this way, language becomes a substance that is completely hidden from observation but can be studied through its manifestations in speech (i.e., in expressions- *parole*). Language activity is a panchronic function both in time and space: the human experience of language communication, therefore, can neither be observed nor known in its entirety. This does not change the fact that this integral function is a full-fledged object of linguistic research: the inability to cognize language activity does not mean it cannot be studied. It must be studied through various methodologies, each of which provides its own picture of the object.

Paradoxically, after the introduction of such a tetratomic construction of human language experience, Kubryakova equates speech and language activity (*langage*, in traditional terminology-*речевая деятельность*), referring to the L.V. Scherba's understanding of this term, resulting in the following picture:

речевая деятельность is, in our opinion, such a set of speech actions and speech operations on the part of the speaker who creates speech (speech act) and the listener who perceives it, which is caused by certain needs, sets a specific goal and is carried out in specific conditions [ibid. 10].

Thus, speech acts are identified with speech, and speech, with speech activity, in the process of which (according to Kubryakova) "language is used." As a result, only speech and language, as its source, remain from the Saussurean scheme (since speech activity is "not so much the use of language as the appeal to language and its inexhaustible possibilities" [*ibid.*]). The problem of socialization or, moreover, historical development practically disappears and the problem of language as a factor in language activity, in general, is taken out of individual experience. In fact, this is a dualistic model of a metaphysical pattern, since, at its center, lies the permanent process of creation and perception of expressions (individual processualism), and the role of the background is performed by the metaphysical language system to which speakers, from time to time, "turn to" (social substantialism). One can only assume that individual (separated in time and space) speech acts are mechanically formed into a holistic speech activity due to this metaphysical nationwide source. However, such a picture has nothing to do with Saussure's understanding of language as a psychic function of the socialization of a specific human personality. This interpretation is most likely the result of unfamiliarity with Saussure's manuscript heritage.

Therefore, it is necessary to turn to the source and consider the contexts in which Saussure used these terms to understand what he called *parole*, and what he referred to as *discours* (*le discursif*).

Conceptualization of the term *parole*

The most important characteristic of *parole* in the conception of F. de Saussure is the acoustic-articulatory nature of this function of human language experience. Let's consider several contextual uses of this term in Saussure's manuscripts. The following fragment is about the ability to pronounce, to articulate speech sounds:

À supposer même que **l'exercice de la parole constituât chez l'homme une fonction naturelle**, ce qui est le point de vue éminemment faux où se placent certaines écoles d'anthropologistes et de linguistes, il faudrait encore absolument soutenir que l'exercice de cette fonction n'est abordable pour la science que par le côté de la langue ou par le côté des langues existantes [Saussure 2002: 146].

The term *parole* is used here in the context of considering the natural obligatory nature of articulatory signaling (which Saussure denies), which provides for other possibilities (such as gestures), but these other methods are not *parole*. Therefore, the use of the Russian *речь*, Ukrainian *мовлення* or Polish *wypowiedź* as equivalents of *parole* is problematic because in these languages it is quite possible to use the constructions *письменная речь/письмове мовлення/вypowiedź pisemna*, and for Saussure such combinations were impossible. He discusses the same problem by considering the linear nature of the sign as a form. Comparing the articulated sign with the written one, Saussure writes:

Difficile seulement parce que en revenons à la parole sans nous en douter, quand on offre un autre sémisme [ibid. 111],

that is, the linearity of the form is peculiar only to the articulatory-acoustic sign; the sign of *parole* as a specific oral expression. In Saussure's notes, there is a fragment in which, when discussing methodological differences from the school of comparative studies, Saussure clearly uses the term *parole* to emphasize acoustic-articulatory expression as opposed to written language. In his opinion, the transition (of neogrammarians) from *assemblages de lettres* and *papier* to *parole* and *sujet parlant* was the first step towards the emer-

gence of systemic linguistics, and, although it was not yet the linguistics of language activity, it was already the linguistics of speech as such [*ibid.* 130].

The clearly defined signaling nature of *parole* is also discussed in contexts where this concept is directly related to the semiology and psychophysiology of articulation. This demonstrates that for Saussure, *parole* meant primarily oral expression:

De même, si l'on avait pu non pas photographier mais **phonographier** au jour le jour dès l'origine tout ce qui a été **exprimé en parole** sur le globe...¹ [*ibid.* 157];

Il est de simple évidence que le mouvement ineffectif (non perçu) qui **se produit dans la parole** [*ibid.* 256].

It further emphasizes the processual function and active nature of *parole* as an expression that leaves behind products:

Le style dépend de la lettre, et la stylistique se place de préférence hors de la lettre, **dans la sphère de pure parole** [*ibid.* 272].

“Pure” (i.e., oral) expression here is opposed to the written form of communication.

Analyzing the problem of phonetic and morphological changes, Saussure draws attention to the fact that the first of these phenomena *représente le côté physiologique et physique de la parole* [*ibid.* 159], i.e., “belongs to the physiological and physical aspect of speech”, and this once again emphasizes acoustic-articulatory nature of *parole*.

When Saussure defines the subject field *la théorie de la chaîne sonore* (“sound sequence theory”), he writes about the sequence of elements in expression (*quelconque d'éléments dans la parole*) (*ibid.* 239). In Note 3305, he reproaches some English and Norwegian scholars for paying less and less attention to the sequence of speech sounds in a particular act of speech (*la juxtaposition des phonèmes dans la parole* [*ibid.* 245]); in other words, he recognizes the oral nature of *parole*.

These examples convincingly show that the term *parole* in Saussure's conception means **the act of oral speech** (expression) as a basic form of human speech signaling.

The second typological feature of *parole* is its specific individual character. The specificity of the phonetic units of *parole* (as an oral expression) is discussed in the fragment:

¹ The Russian translation emphasizes the phonetic nature of the concept of *parole*, where the word is translated as *говoreние* [Сосюр 1990: 140].

Les faits de parole, pris en eux-mêmes, qui seuls certainement sont concrets, se voient condamnés à ne signifier absolument rien que par leur identité ou leur non-identité [ibid. 32].

Also interesting is the word combination in which *langage* and *parole* are distinguished “in general” and “in particular” (while *langue* and *parole* are opposed rather as “in the system” and “in use”): *chaque élément du langage et de la parole* [ibid. 76].

Only in superficial reading does the phrasing seem illogical: from a formal-mathematical point of view, what is in *parole* should automatically be in *langage*). The general context shows that not only is each element of generalized language activity subject to different visions and interpretations, but each element of each individual speech act (expression) is also.

Parole as a volitional act of a particular individual is opposed to language as a passive accumulation of socialized information:

La langue est consacrée socialement et ne dépend pas de l'individu. Est de l'Individu, ou de la Parole : a) Tout ce qui est Phonation, b) tout ce qui est combinaison – tout ce qui est Volonté [ibid. 299].

We have previously considered the social status of language in the sense of sanction and its imposition on the individual (in society it appears through synergetic, passive convention, and in the individual through traditional sanctions imposed by the environment), but *parole* is a single act of a speech expression of will. In this note, we come across a dual distinction between language and the act of speech as *passivité sociale and volonté individuelle* [ibid.], i.e., as social passivity and individual expression of will but not as social and individual being.

Finally, it is worth quoting those passages equally well-known as the phrase about the need to study language “in itself and for itself”:

Dans le langage, la langue a été dégagée de la Parole, elle réside dans [...] l'âme d'une masse parlante, ce qui n'est pas le cas pour la parole [ibid. 333]
Quand on défalque du Langage tout ce qui n'est que Parole, le reste peut s'appeler proprement la Langue et se trouve ne comprendre que des termes psychiques [ibid. 334].

Here it is very important to correctly interpret the rhetorical figure used by Saussure for visualization of the difference between the socialized passive system of language and the multitude of individual acts of speech. Only inattentive reading (or ignoring) of Saussure's autograph texts can lead to the interpretation of these phrases as a statement that language activity structurally consists of two independent parts – *langue* and *parole* – which can be

separated from each other or attached to each other as things. The formulation about the purification of language or the subtraction of speech, in this case, cannot be interpreted in any way other than as an abstraction because it is not about homogeneous physical things. Instead, it refers to, *first*, two diverse information functions – system-static and processual, and, *second*, two ontological beings – psychic and psychophysiological (acoustic and articulatory). In this latter sense, the Saussurean pair *langue* and *parole* is very similar to the Baudouin pair of *cerebration* and *phonation* [Бодуэн де Куртене 1963, I: 144].

It is worth noting a certain problematic character of the concept of *parole*. It may seem that it lacks the function of perception (acts of listening – *auditioning*). However, in Note 3335 we find not only the expression *chaîne de parole acoustique* (“chain of acoustic expression”) but also the discussion of several problems related to the perception of oral expression. This is not the only place where the receptive side of the act of speech is considered. In his monograph and notes, Saussure describes the phonetic sphere (adjacent to semiological speech) as *le domaine de l'acoustique, ou de la physiologie* [Saussure 2002: 20; 26], *le terrain physiologico-acoustique* [ibid. 23], and among its units he distinguishes *acoustiquement l'impression* [ibid. 27], *impression acoustique* [ibid. 241; 244; 247–248; 325], *image acoustique*² [ibid. 248; 330], *sensation acoustique* [ibid. 248], *effet acoustique* [ibid. 140; 238–241; 326], *identité acoustique* [ibid. 32], *entité acoustique* [ibid. 32], *unité acoustique* [ibid. 142; 243; 249; 326], *série d'actions (physiologico-acoustiques)* [ibid. 197], *fait acoustique* [ibid. 238–239; 249; 253], *figures acoustiques* [ibid. 249; 256], *chaîne acoustique* [ibid. 325]. It functions not only in articulation procedures but also in *la transmission acoustique* [ibid. 112], and it must be considered within *de la physiologie et de l'acoustique* [ibid. 27], *discussion physiologico-acoustique* [ibid. 24], *au point de vue physiologique et acoustique* [ibid. 27], *d'après des caractères physiologiques et acoustiques* [ibid. 182], as well as within the auxiliary discipline of linguistics – phonology. All Note 3283, devoted to phonology, actually considers speech both in terms of its physiological and acoustic realization in the form of signals. Thus, although Saussure interprets this whole sphere as non-linguistic and non-semiotic, this is

² It should be emphasized that the term *image acoustique*, which due to its use in the „Course” has become one of the most popular terms in the so-called „Saussure’s theory of sign” (you can even say a conceptually basic one), is used by Saussure only as one of many terms and very rarely. In all published manuscripts we found only 3 cases of its use, which can not even be compared with much the more commonly used terms – *impression acoustique*, *effet acoustique*, *fait acoustique* or *unité acoustique* – not to mention the conceptually key term for Saussure’s theory – *figure vocale* – which combined both sides of phonation – acoustic and articulatory).

the necessary signal substrate in which speech is realized. For Saussure, both aspects of speech signaling – active (physiological) and receptive (acoustic) – were quite balanced, and both are directly related to acts of speech (expressions) – *parole*. In addition, in Note 3303, he clearly states that they must be obligatorily combined into a phonological whole (as none on its own is relevant to speech):

ni le fait mécanique ni le fait acoustique, situés chacun dans leur sphère, ne représentent le fait phonologique, dont nous sommes obligé de partir et auquel il faut revenir; mais que c'est la forme continue de leur corrélation que nous appelons fait phonologique [ibid. 238];
 Dans la conception qui nous guide constamment, ce qui est phonatoire s'oppose aussi bien à ce qui est simplement mécanique qu'à ce qui est simplement acoustique. C'est la correspondance [d'un mécanisme et d'un acoustème] [ibid. 250]³.

In Saussure's conception of speech acts (expression), unfortunately, there is no parallel to what in modern linguistics is referred to as internal speech; in other words, there are no processes of semantic coding and decoding. In any case, this is not explicitly stated. However, such a claim cannot be made unambiguously, as there is a fragment in the notes that clearly shows that Saussure considered the sentence to be a unit of both *discours* and *parole*: *la phrase n'existe que dans la parole, dans la langue discursive* [ibid. 117], and he interpreted a sentence as a grammatical (syntactic) and semiological unit. Thus, for an expression (*parole*) to contain a sentence, it must, *first*, be the product of grammatical language and semantic (and not just phonetic) coding, and, *second*, it must be of grammatical and semantic value (have a meaning).

Conceptualization of the term *discours*

In the context of Saussure's *parole*, it is difficult to speak of such an effective linguistic function as the text because expression is a single act of speech, and the text must be a coherent and meaningful set of such acts and their products important not only for the speaker but also for the recipients. This not only refers to written text but also to oral text (speech, story, longer remark in a conversation, etc.). It is unlikely that Saussure, who

³ Again, we can draw a parallel with the views of Baudouin de Courtenay, who saw in each phonetic fact two sides – *acousme* and *kineme* [Бодуэн де Куртенэ 1963, II: 199].

attached so much importance to the social aspect of *langage* and insisted on the empirical and social origins of language as a system, did not understand that a language system without grammatical-semantic interaction would not facilitate communication or that communication could not be reduced to the production and perception of single external oral expressions (*parole*). In my opinion, this gap should have been completely filled by the term *discours*, and it is this term and not *parole* that should be translated into Russian as *речь*, Ukrainian as *мовлення*, and Polish as *мова*.

In Saussure's works *le discursif/discours* (in isolated cases *langage discursif* and *langue discursive* are also used) is presented as a sphere of proposals and grammatical forms and opposed to the system where words exist in invariant integrity:

Tandis qu'il faut une analyse pour fixer les éléments du mot, le mot lui-même ne résulte pas de l'analyse de la phrase. Car la phrase n'existe que dans la parole, **dans la langue discursive**, tandis que le mot est une unité vivant en **dehors de tout discours** dans le trésor mental⁴ [Saussure 2002: 117];

Donc le mot n'a pas pour premier mode d'existence d'être un élément de phrase, il peut être considéré comme existant «avant» la phrase, c'est-à-dire indépendamment d'elle, ce qui n'est pas le cas pour les éléments du mot vis-à-vis de l'unité du mot. Au reste, même **dans le discursif**, il y a cent cas où on est amené à prononcer un mot, non une phrase (tous les vocatifs entre autres) [ibid.].

Le discursive is a sphere of human socialization and the internalization of language as a system. It is clear that we are speaking about communication and social interaction, that is, speech:

toute la langue entre d'abord dans notre esprit **par le discursif**, comme nous l'avons dit, et comme c'est forcé. Mais de même que le son d'un mot, qui est une chose entrée également dans notre for intérieur de cette façon, devient une impression complètement indépendante **du discursif**, de même notre esprit dégage tout **le temps du discursif** ce qu'il faut pour ne laisser que le mot [ibid. 118].

As we can see, in all these fragments *le discursif* is where both sentences and other semiologically meaningful units function, and therefore, this is the sphere in which grammatical and semantic functions are realized along

⁴ In the Russian translation [Соссюр 1990: 159] B. Narumov creates both redundant synonymy and homonymy of terms, using *дискурс* or *речь* as an analogue of *discours/discursif*, while in other places of the work he uses the term *речь* as an equivalent to *parole*. In this way, the translator introduces unnecessary terminological chaos into the text, while reinforcing the prevailing myth in linguistics that Saussure himself did not decide on his terms.

with phonetic functions. It is also not difficult to notice that here the sphere of speech (as a semiologically meaningful interaction) is separated from the language system (as a semiologically meaningful potential).

In Note 3327.2, Saussure speaks of the phenomenon of paronymy, which causes ambiguity in the understanding of units in discours:

Et il faut cette inélégance plantureuse, profonde, volontaire du terme pour que soit supprimée enfin toute voie à la paronymie perpétuelle faisant **dans le discours** l'équivoque [...] [ibid. 258].

In this case, *discours* is clearly understood as communicative interaction because it is difficult to imagine that the similarity of sound was problematic for the speaker because he knows what he means. The problem of paronymy can arise only because of the similarity of the form of semantically non-identical units in the recipient. In other words, *discours* is, first, speech as communication, and *second*, speech as the operation of semantically and grammatically meaningful units.

Discussing the problem of speech, as opposed to the language system, which includes reproducible lexical signs, Saussure asks:

À quel moment ou en vertu de quelle opération, de quel jeu qui s'établit entre eux, de quelles conditions, ces concepts formeront-ils le DISCOURS? [ibid. 277].

This shows that, *first*, he distinguishes the processual sphere of speech, which he calls *discours*, from the state of language, and *second*, he anticipates the participation of meaningful units of language in its creation. He concludes his reflections with an explicit distinction between speech (*discours*) and language (*langue*), given the principle of combining meaningful units into series in speech and the absence of such combinations in language (using modern terminology, it is about predicative and semi-predicative relations between lexical units in the text and their actual nominative properties in the language system):

C'est la même question que de savoir ce qu'est **le discours**, et à première vue la réponse est simple : le discours consiste, fût-ce rudimentairement, et par des voies que nous ignorons, à affirmer un lien entre deux des concepts qui se présentent revêtus de la forme linguistique, pendant que la langue ne fait préalablement que réaliser des concepts isolés, qui attendent d'être mis en rapport entre eux pour qu'il y ait signification de pensée [ibid. 277].

Of course, it would be an exaggeration to say that Saussure thought through absolutely every use of his terms. In manuscripts we occasionally

come across semantically irrelevant contexts in which both the term *parole* and the term *discours* could be used equally:

La difficulté qu'on éprouve à noter ce qui est général dans la langue, dans **les signes de parole** qui constituent le langage...⁵ [ibid. 265];
Notamment elle comporte deux parties: l'une qui est plus près de **la langue**, dépôt passif, l'autre qui est plus près de la **parole**, force active et origine véritable des phénomènes qui s'aperçoivent ensuite peu à peu dans l'autre moitié du langage [ibid. 273].

In these cases, we have the usual opposition of the system to the process of communication and expression of intention, thereby confirming that, from the ontological point of view, *parole* and *discours* are not two fundamentally different entities, but rather the same. They should not be divided on the principle of "phonetic – semantic" because, just as *parole* may include semiological units (forms of words and sentences), the speech sphere also includes actual phonetic units – *phonetic figures*, *aposemes*:

Je crois que **dans le discursif** on peut parler d'aposemes (de figure vocales)⁶[ibid. 105],

that is, the units that generally have nonlinguistic, nonsemiological character.

The difference between these concepts is only quantitative. If *parole* is a single act of speech, then *discours* is a speech act that connects such acts into the integral unity of actual language communication.

Thus, the term *parole* should be translated as *усне висловлення* or *мовленневий акт*, and *discours* as *мовлення* because the concept of speech must anticipate communicative-expressive interaction, and it is present in the meaning of the term *discours* as a conversation. *Parole* is only a one-sided and one-time act of will. For this reason, Saussure insisted that its nature

⁵ Compare the Russian translation «Трудность, возникающая при выделении общих особенностей языка, общих особенностей знаков речи, которые образуют язык (language) ...» [Соссюр 1990: 199]. It is necessary to emphasize the conceptual error of the Russian translator. In this case, the point is that both the specifics of language and the specifics of speech together constitute language activity. Here it is absolutely impossible to translate language as *язык* because the phrase becomes illogical.

⁶ In Russian translation «Я полагаю, что в дискурсивном ряду можно говорить об апосемах (фонетических фигурах)» [Соссюр 1990: 149] introduction of the term *дискурсивный ряд* is generally conceptually permissible but introduces additional meaning into the semantic field of the Saussurean text. In such cases, it is necessary to indicate the original term in parentheses so that readers understand that it is a speech space, i.e., *le discursif*.

is individual, which is not the case with *discours* as a clear social interaction; in this case, we always mean either influence or a response to influence, i.e., the bilateral nature of lingual contact is always anticipated. It is important to point out the difference in the regularity and multiplicity of procedures in *discours* and the singularity and detachment of *parole*. It can be assumed that the Russian translators of “Course in General Linguistics” made a mistake, but, paradoxically, correctly solved the problem of the global structure of *langage*. Why and how did it happen? Most likely, they were influenced by the fact that *langue* is a static system, *parole* is the dynamics of language use in communication, and together they should give a general empirical social activity – *langage*. If we understand *parole* in a purely Saussurean way, we actually lose communication, intercourse and interaction. Hence, translators could have hypothesized that conceptually the role of the second aspect of *langage* should not be separated from expressions (speech acts) or some completely non-communicative aspect, but rather the purely expressive speaking process, a certain holistic communicative phenomenon. That is why the usual Russian word *речь* appears in the translation. It not only carries the semantics of procedurality, but also sociality, i.e., communication, intercourse; it has integrity and regularity. So instead of the word *parole* in the Russian translation of the “Course” there is *речь* – wrong in terms of translation, but accurate in conceptual terms. Ironically, Russian translators were more far-sighted than Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye. They introduced into scientific circulation the idea according to which *langage* is structured into *langue* and *parole* – and it “stuck”. But, reading, for example, the note “Note sur le discours”, we can say with equal success that, according to Saussure’s theory, *langage* is a combination of *langue* and *discours*:

La langue n’est créée qu’en vue du discours, mais qu’est-ce qui sépare le discours de la langue, ou qu’est-ce qui, à un certain moment, permet de dire que la langue **entre en action comme discours**? [ibid. 277].

In his structuring of speech, Lev Scherba went one step further and divided the holistic essence “речь” into “речевая деятельность” (purposeful and regular activity) and “языковой материал” (text, expression as a resultant phenomenon) [Щерба 1974]. However, reading the “new” Saussure, it turns out that he understood the internal structure of speech (and language activity as such) differently than not only Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye but also Scherba. Distinguishing between individual and socio-holistic aspects of language use in the processes of semiological interaction, he used *parole* for individual acts of oral expression and *discours* for holistic interactive function, structured not only by individual procedures but also by texts

(speech structures) in their communicative interaction. Therefore, it is possible to assume that the first to introduce the word *discours* into French scientific circulation as a term to denote speech in its social dimension was not E. Benveniste, as it is sometimes suggested, but Ferdinand de Saussure himself. It is worth noting that Saussure used the term *parole* primarily to emphasize the acoustic-articulatory, phonological nature of speech acts, while to emphasize the semiological, and therefore grammatical and semantic integrity of communication, he used the terms *discours/le discursif*.

The last aspect to consider when examining the concepts of language (*langue*) and speech (both in the aspect of *discours/le discursif* and in the aspect of *parole*) is their temporal nature. Whenever Saussure emphasizes the temporal nature of language, he speaks of idiosynchronicity, systematicity, state or parallelism, but he always presents speech as an event, process, and its temporal status as diachrony or sequence/following (*identités transversales*). The reason for this distinction is the acoustic-articulatory nature of speech acts, in the process of which phonetic units follow each other in time, creating phonetic figures or acoustic chains, as well as larger syntagms – *parole effective*. Speech, even in its integral dimension – as *discours/le discursive* – cannot be removed of this property. As phonetic units must follow one another, so semiologically related signs (word forms) and their combinations (sentences) must, according to Saussure, be subject to the same principle. However, the grammatical and semantic aspects of *discours/le discursif* and *parole* can only be understood from the standpoint of idiosynchronic systemic relations prevailing in language. Thus, even when we want to study sentences or texts, we must do so from the perspective of language as such (*point de vue de l'état de langue en lui-même* [Saussure 2002: 21]). If we are interested in the purely phonetic (acoustic-articulatory) flow of speech, devoid of semantics (both lexical and grammatical), such research should take place from the diachronic (i.e., purely phonetic) side – *point de vue des identités transversales, non différent du point de vue diachronique, non différent du point de vue phonétique (...), non différent aussi du point de vue des éléments isolés* [ibid.]. And since all changes in language appear only in speech, diachronic research as a type of study of speech acts has been confused by the compilers of the “Course” with historical research. Unfortunately, due to the misinterpretation of Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, the differences in linguistics between the ideosynchronic nature of language (semiological systematicity) and the diachronic nature of speech (phonetic sequence) – which, according to Saussure, should be studied by a systematic or diachronic method – the stereotype of two types of language research has gained a foothold and we now refer to synchronic (study of the current state) or diachronic (study of historical change) research. It is difficult to

understand why none of the “Course” researchers noticed that there are two sections in the paper – one on diachronic linguistics (devoted to phonetics) and one on retrospective linguistics (devoted to the history of language)⁷.

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⁷ For more on the analysis of this and other aspects of Saussure’s concept, based on the handwritten of the scientist, [see: Просьяник 2018, Prosianyk 2021], whereas for the problems of translation of the considered terms into Polish, [see: Лещак 2010а; Лещак 2010b].

The Limits: Conceptualization of Limit/Inherent Limit in Philosophy and Linguistics

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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to analyze the interpretations of the philosophical concept of limit (in general) and the use and understanding of the concept of inherent limit in linguistics specifically, as well as its representation in Russian, Ukrainian and Polish verbal nouns with the meaning of action or process. We will define and compare the structure of the concept limit in philosophy and linguistics, and show how this concept is manifested in this narrow fragment of the language system.

Introduction

The focus of this section is the concept of a *limit* (*inherent limit, endpoint*). This concept is universal and seemingly simple, but is very ambiguous and multilayered, including many interpretations that are defined differently in various scientific fields and schools. A *limit* is often used in various discourses as a presupposition. That does not contribute to the quality of scientific dialogue. Here we analyze and unify the main approaches and interpretations of limit in the linguistic research field by conceptualization of the notion, rather than proposing a definite solution to the question.

In the classic work of Langacker [1990], conceptualization is defined as “cognitive processing” of information associated with the formation of meanings (“meaning is equated with conceptualization”) [Langacker 1990: 2–3]. Concurrently, it is the result of construction procedures (an individual concept or a set of concepts). That is, “objects, concepts and other entities that are assumed to exist in some subject area, as well as relations that are defined between them”, a learned knowledge in a maximally structured and detailed form [ФЕДОТОВ 2014]. Given this definition, we will begin with a brief analysis of the conceptualization of the notion of limit in the field of philosophy for use as a general scientific methodological foundation. We will

then consider how limit is conceptualized in linguistics – in the universal-semantic and in the aspectological sphere. Finally, we will show how this concept manifests itself in a narrow fragment of the system of language – in verbal noun-formation.

Conceptualization of the limit in philosophy

The *limit* belongs to the basic philosophical categories. This is not surprising, since without this concept in the world of ideas it is impossible to separate one entity from another. The concept of limit and its derivatives date back to the works of ancient philosophers. Aristotle identifies four variants of the meaning of limit. In the following, we cite his rather large quotation in full, because each part of it is valuable:

‘Limit’ means (1) the last point of each thing, i.e. the first point beyond which it is not possible to find any part, and the first point within which every part is; (2) the form, whatever it may be, of a spatial magnitude or of a thing that has magnitude; (3) the end of each thing (and of this nature is that towards which the movement and the action are, not that from which they are – though sometimes it is both, that from which and that to which the movement is, i.e. the final cause); (4) the substance of each thing, and the essence of each; for this is the limit of knowledge; and if of knowledge, of the object also. Evidently, therefore, ‘limit’ has as many senses as ‘beginning’, and yet more; for the beginning is a limit, but not every limit is a beginning [Aristotle, Ross & Smith 1910: 2319-2320].

In his definition of the limit, several crucial ideas emerge at once. These, subsequently, formed the basis for the modern philosophical understanding of the limit and for narrower scientific directions, in particular, for aspectology.

I. Kant, speaking of the limit, compares it with the notion of the boundary and contrasts them; the limit in his understanding is something negative, which affects a quantity, so far as it is not absolutely complete”, in contrast to the bounds “(f)or in all bounds there is something positive...(b)ounds... always presuppose a space existing outside a certain definite place” [Kant 1977: 86–88]. Thus, according to Kant, these two notions are hardly separable and represent limitations that specifically define a thing. Apparently, in his view, the limit focuses our attention on the thing itself, while the boundary outlines the location of the thing.

In Hegel’s definition, a limit is “the negation of the other”. A boundary becomes a limit if, “the something must at the same time transcend it in

itself – must refer to it from within as to a non-existent...And inasmuch as the limit is as restriction in the determination itself, the something thereby transcends itself” [Hegel 2015: 104]. Distinguishing between limit and boundary, he drew attention to their non-identity. A limit, unlike a boundary, is inseparable from a self-being. If something is defined as a limit, we have thereby already exceeded this limit. The limit indicates the immediate exit of the self to its otherness, to its unboundedness; the otherness of some limit is precisely the exit beyond this limit. Hegel distinguishes between the actual limit (“restriction”) and the boundedness (“ought”) as the ability of a thing to have a limit that is realized under certain conditions. Hegel develops the concept of limit with the help of the category of quality, quantity, and measure. This is achieved in his dialectical law of transition of quantitative changes into qualitative ones, according to which every measure of things has its limit point and, at the transition of which, (with further increase or decrease) quantitative changes cause the transition of things into a new quality [Hegel 2015: 104].

Let us turn to modern philosophical attempts to define the concept of limit. According to D.V. Pivovarov’s definition, a limit “is: 1) an extended or temporal boundary of something; 2) the thing that restricts by itself something (examples: time limit, the limit of perfection, the limit point)” [Пивоваров 2016: 155]. That is, a limit can be a temporal or spatial boundary, or something broader than a boundary – some type of limiting essence.

O.V. Borovkova reflects in the same direction. She proposes two meanings of the notion of limit: typological and ontological. Typologically a limit is understood as “an external part of a boundary, a fixed contour denoting a thing here and now, its location among other things”. Ontologically (the limit as an inner part) it “reveals the ‘nature of a thing’, the ‘essence of a thing’, the possibilities of its existence”. In other words, the limit determines “the content of a thing and its arrangement among other things” [Боровкова 2007: 40].

E.N. Struk grants the limit the status of a category and defines it as one of the most important tools for studying the world. She places the limit among the general philosophical categories, with the development associated with change and the measure, which she defines as “the boundary conditions within which there can be a balance between quality and quantity within the limits of the old form.” [Струк 2013: 1081]. She also notes that to clarify the essence of this category requires its consideration in connection to the laws of dialectics and its categories: movement, formation, etc. For us, it is interesting that for the successful comprehension of the category of limit this author considers it necessary to include in the research field social issues, various cultural and historical realities, and subjects (i.e., language) [Струк 2013: 1077–1082].

Thus, the philosophical understanding of the concept of limit can be presented as follows:

1. Limit is something that restricts or defines a thing (phenomenon), an outline, a boundary. It is a negation – in the sense of an exit of itself (a thing) to something else.
2. Limit is comprehended as something holistic and complexly organized, having different variants of representation and/or definition.
3. Limit can be represented as an external part (contour), outline of a thing or as its internal boundary, revealing and/or defining its essence, as a goal or as the beginning of action, or both simultaneously.
4. Limit can be spatial and temporal.
5. Limit is closely related to the boundary but is often identified through it and rarely with it.
6. Limit is related to boundedness (the potential for a thing to have a limit).
7. Limit is connected to the measure (the boundary conditions), in which a thing can exist in its old form. Otherwise, their changes cause the transition to a new quality and the exceeding of the limits.

Conceptualization of the *inherent limit* in linguistics

Understanding of the notion of *inherent limit* in linguistics can be conditionally divided into two directions: universal-semantic and aspectological (the focus of this study). In the universal-semantic branch there are narrowly focused studies of semantics and functions of separate fragments of the linguistic system, which are in one way or another connected with the inherent limit. These are, for example, superlative degree of comparison [S.O.Kartsevskii, V.V.Vinogradov], limiting adverbs of measure and degree [i.e., absolutely, completely, entirely, etc.] [Yu.D.Apresyan, K.Z.Chervenкова], syntaxemes with meaning of temporal limit [N.V.Petrash], etc. The components of the concept of inherent limit are found in the semantic study of various lexical and grammatical phenomena. An interesting attempt in holistic study of the natural-language (common-language) concept of the inherent limit in the universal-semantic (semantic-evaluating) plan is undertaken in the dissertation of S.L. Popov [Попов 1995]. In that study, the system of linguistic means, forming and expressing the concept of limit in Russian is considered in detail¹. The author defines the common-language concept of limit as an extreme quantitative point of measure of an attribute (wherein a direct reference to Hegel can be seen). The meaning of the limit as an extreme point

¹ We believe that the proposed system of tools can be used as a model for the analysis of the concept of inherent limit in other languages.

of measure is revealed at the lexical-phraseological and grammatical levels of language. To express it, language has limit-semantic means, which the author divides into potential and real. Potentially limiting means are qualitative adjectives and adverbs, verbs, and feature nouns. They are determined by the means of the real limit, to which the author refers to, absolutist lexical-phraseological means: synonyms of the concept “inherent limit”, generalized limit adverbs (*совсем* ‘altogether, at all’, *совершенно* ‘totally, completely’), adjectives, idioms and prepositions. At the periphery are adverbial limit indicators with phraseologically related meanings (*до дна* ‘to the bottom, to the ground’, *начисто* ‘clean’), adjectives with limit semantics (*полный* ‘full, complete’, *абсолютный* ‘absolute’, *последний* ‘last’), limit idioms and phraseological combinations (*до мозга костей, в доску* ‘to the bone’, *по ушам* ‘up to the ears’; *до конца* ‘to the end’, *до самой смерти* ‘to the death’) and comparative lexical and grammatical markers of the superlative degree: derivational (*архи-*, *ультра-*, as well as *наи-* and suffixes *-ейш/-айш-*, analytical forms with the indicators *самый* ‘the most’ and *наиболее/наименее* ‘the most/least’, comparative + lexical quantifier of generality (*важнее всего* ‘most important’, *больше/меньше кого бы то ни было* ‘more/less than anyone else’), comparative + negation (*нет милее* ‘there’s no nicer’, *лучше не скажешь* ‘there’s no better way to say it’, *хуже не бывает* ‘it can’t get any worse’), comparative turnover with lexical quantifier of generality (*сильный, как никто другой* ‘strong, as nobody else’) [Попов 1995]. The author establishes that in the common-language consciousness there is a universal idea of the limit, but there is no idea of true infinity; only the finite can be true within the consciousness. At the same time, the inherent limit in the common language consciousness is a multilevel and semantically complex concept. The difficulty of defining the common-language concept of inherent limit is also due to the fact that the empirical perception of the limit of a measure can vary greatly (a classic example is the limit of the measure of fullness/emptiness of a glass).

The importance of the concept of inherent limit for the Slavic linguistic picture of the world is crucial to develop. E.V. Petrukhina argues that the concept of limit is the semantic dominant of the Russian linguistic picture of the world, i.e. the idea, which is characterized by frequency and diversity of forms of expression in language and also affects the functioning and compatibility of linguistic units in speech [Петрухина 2014: 689]. The main lexical identifier of this concept in the sphere of nouns is the lexeme *предел* “limit” (as well as its derivatives –*предельность* ‘boundedness’, *беспредельный* ‘unlimited, limitless’ etc. and synonyms – *начало* ‘beginning’, *конец* ‘end’, *граница* “boundary”, *межа* ‘border’). Analyzing the function of this base lexeme, E.V. Petrukhina concludes that the lexeme *предел* ‘limit’ serves

to designate the following: 'spatial or temporal border of something,' 'end, completion,' 'critical point, extreme degree of manifestation of any property or quality,' 'measure, norm, boundary of something'. In contrast, the understanding of the limit in aspectology (i.e. at the level of grammatical semantics of the verb and verbal derivation), concerns reaching the limit, generally understood as the exhaustion of a situation, in the sphere of nouns reaching the critical point can be interpreted as the beginning of a destructive process. The complex of prefixal means (*транс-, супер-, пост-*, etc.), which in particular form new prefixal structures in Russian in recent years (*транскультура* 'transculture', *трансгендер* 'transgender', *гиперреальность* 'hyperreality', *постчеловек* 'posthuman', etc.), is directly related to the linguistic existence of the concept of limit. They, in the author's opinion, are markers of going beyond the essential limits of substances and phenomena and changes in the corresponding conceptual areas. E.V. Petrukhina comes to a curious conclusion that the explicit expression of negation and violation of temporal and ontological limits of substances, qualities and phenomena (which is fixed in new productive derivational models) gives new meaning to the property of reality and prepares corresponding changes in the Russian conceptosphere. In other words, the linguistic conceptualization of the concept of limit undergoes changes at the lexical and derivative levels, and these changes have cognitive significance for the Russian linguistic picture of the world [Петрухина 2018, 195].

Despite the great expressive potential of linguistic means of different levels (nouns with certain semantics, special prefixes, etc.), the limit concept is most systematically expressed in the grammar of the perfective, the lexical meanings of terminative verbs. The limit ways of verb action affects the functioning and combinability.

The concept of inherent limit lies at the base of aspectuality – one of the central functional-semantic categories of the Slavic languages. According to Y.S. Maslov, the real basis or semantic basis of the opposition of perfective & imperfective in Russian and other Slavic languages "is the opposition of attainment & non-attainment of the internal endpoint (telicity) of the verbal action" [Маслов 2004: 33]. An inherent limit (endpoint) (according to Y.S. Maslov) is a natural boundary conditioned by the nature of a situation in each way of its representation; a point of entry into a new situation (includes an endpoint – "leap into the new") [ibid. 260]. A.A. Kholodovich, the scientist who first introduced the concept of terminative/non-terminative verbs, defined the limit as "the natural result of processes with one degree of freedom" [Холодович 1963: 8]. Let us add that the natural result of an action is an internal endpoint, upon reaching which the action is exhausted and a change in the subject or object of the action occurs.

At the grammatical level, the inherent limit (endpoint) is usually spoken of as a semantic feature behind perfective semantics. According to V.V. Vinogradov, “the main function of the perfective form is to limit or eliminate the idea of the duration of action, to focus attention on one of the moments of the process, on its endpoint” [Виноградов 1972: 394]. Academic Russian Grammar defines the inherent limit of an action as a certain critical point to which the action gravitates; when this point is reached, the action ceases, having exhausted itself [Шведова 1980]. However, this idea is not supported by everyone. In particular, V.V. Gurevich objects to the inherent limit as an invariant feature of perfective. In examining the example *Он уже пришел* ‘He’s already come – *Он уже приходил* ‘He’s already been here’, the researcher concludes that both actions undoubtedly reach an “inner boundary” and therefore this attribute cannot be distinctive, but only a particular meaning of the perfective. Sequentiality, the ability to express a chain of consecutive alternating actions (the property of expressing the relationship “to the prior and subsequent action (point in time)”), is proposed as an invariant value of perfective [Гуревич 1974: 74]. The idea was later developed in the works of A. Barentsen [Бернтсен 1995, 2015].

Now, even if we take as axiomatic the interpretation of the inherent limit as a certain universal semantic feature present in all perfective verbs and in all languages with some or other aspectual indicators, this research step does not clarify the situation at all.

The conceptualization of the term of inherent limit in linguistics is directly related to the search for the invariant of the verbal perfective. This search, which has been going on for several decades, has not yet led to a satisfactory result. Too different definitions of the perfective invariant², the nonequivalence of the perfective forms in different languages, and attempts to single out a “special Slavic type”, all shows that there is no single semantic sign, universal for all languages, at the core of the perfective. The intrinsic heterogeneity of the sign of the endpoint has led to further attempts to find the semantic basis of aspectual oppositions.

For example, M. Guiraud-Weber writes of the unsatisfactory choice of this attribute to describe the aspectual system: “the term ‘endpoint’ itself becomes ambiguous: is it the critical point towards which certain actions are

² Here is a far incomplete list: „integrity” [L.P. Razmusen, F. de Saussure, Y.S. Maslov, N.S. Avilova, A.V. Bondarko], „looking at a situation from outside” [B. Comrie], „change of situations”, „sequentiality” [A. Barentsen], „alteration” [F. Antinucchi, L. Gebert, E. Paducheva], „singularity [single occurrence] of a denoted situation” [G. Zeldovich], „history” of a fragment of the world [successive „scenes”] [I.B. Shatunovsky], limitation of action by an endpoint [R.O. Jakobson, Y.S. Maslov, V.V. Vinogradov], boundary-limited holistic action [A.V. Bondarko, N.S. Avilova], etc.

naturally directed and which terminates their course in time, or an external boundary which has nothing to do with the type of action or state". As an alternative, the attribute "alteration" is offered but, symptomatically, the definition is again carried out through the concept of inherent limit; alteration is a semantic attribute of the verbal situation, which "denotes a certain modification concerning the subject or object of action, caused by reaching the endpoint of action (the letter-spacing is ours – E.P.) and, therefore, its completion" [Гиро-Вебер 1990: 103-105].

In English-language aspectological studies, the prevailing view is that the endpoint is the "right" inherent limit of an action, its natural goal (telicity). There is an approach according to which the limit cannot be regarded as a linguistic concept at all, since it has an exclusively ontological nature; for linguistics (as a linguistic concept) only the term *telicity* (as a property of the predicate, which in principle cannot have any endpoint) is applicable [Borik 2002: 32]. It is difficult to argue with the fact that the endpoint of real actions or processes is ontologically related to extra-linguistic reality though, simultaneously, it is impossible to do without the concepts of limit or endpoint in the study of verbal semantics. The problem is eliminated if the extra-linguistic reality and its reflection/interpretation in linguistic space are clearly separated, and if the meaning and relation of terms and concepts are clearly defined. In this regard, the approach consistently developed by the Leningrad School of Aspectology by Y.S. Maslov seems productive: The semantic sphere of aspectuality is not homogeneous as there are many aspectual oppositions, differing formally and semantically in different languages. B.A. Serebrennikov writes: "The complexity of the problem of determining the grammatical aspect consists primarily in the fact that, unlike the category of tense, this category has several foundations, far from being identical in nature and essence (...) the category of verbal aspect relies on a known sum of action characteristics, each of which requires special attention" (cf [Маслов 2004: 24]).

On the other hand, the idea expressed by E.V. Petrukhina: "the definitions of the categorial semantics of the perfective existing in aspectology ('reaching the endpoint', 'completion', 'result', 'situation change', 'new situation emergence', 'new situation beginning', 'integrity') reflect a different interpretation of one concept which has a categorial status for the Russian aspect – the concept of inherent limit as a temporal endpoint of action" Interacting with the verb word formation structure the perfective can express different limiting moments of action: initial (*занеть* 'to begin singing', *захлопать* 'to begin clapping', *побежать* 'to begin running'); initial and finite of a continuous action (*поработать* 'to do some work', *побежать* 'to run a little'); initial and finite endpoint of an action perceived holistically, as a single quantum

(*прмелькнуть* ‘to flash by, to fly by’, *прозвучать* ‘to ring (for a certain time)’); finite endpoint of an action unrelated to the result (*отшуметь* ‘fade away, die out’), etc. But in all cases, we are talking about the actualization of the action’s boundary [Petrukhina 2008].

These statements do not contradict each other, but rather are complementary; The semantics of inherent limit lie at the basis of aspectual differences (or, more broadly, aspectuality), but is realized in different semantic variants.

Typological works have repeatedly raised the question of the existence of different Semantic types of action boundaries in different languages. Summarizing the typological features of resultant constructions in different languages, V.P. Nedyalkov and S.E. Yakhontov point out 3 types of the inherent limit of action:

- transition from one state to a new state or acquisition of quality (*сесть* ‘to sit down’, *забыть* ‘to forget’, *созреть* ‘to mature’)
- corresponding causatives (*посадить* ‘to plant’, *повалить* ‘to fall’, *сломать* ‘to break’)
- a purposeful action that cannot be continued after the goal is achieved (*сварить* ‘to boil it up’) [Недялков 1983: 6-7].

V.A. Plungian, considering verbal categories from a typological perspective, proposes that instead of searching for an invariant, to use the concept of a “universal grammatical set”, which includes all the meanings grammaticalized in at least one of the verb systems one must explore the semantics of perfectivity. This is very heterogeneous in different languages, and so he identifies three semantic features relevant to this area:

- instantaneity/brevity (punctativity)
- reaching a natural endpoint (completivity)
- embedding into a more extended time interval (in V.A. Plungian’s terminology – limitativity).

Punctual perfectivity indicates a very short duration (brevity) or an almost complete absence of duration (as in the verbs *стукнуть* ‘to hit’, *курнуть* ‘to take a puff’). This semantic description corresponds to the aspectual class of situations, which are usually called “events” (“*achievements*” according to Vendler). Perfectives of the second type (completive) also denote an event, but one that in itself is always part of another continuous situation – some critical point within the situation. This may be the moment of completion (as in *построить* ‘to build’) or the point of the beginning of the situation (an inchoative variant of the type *зацвести* ‘to come into bloom’). It is worth note that it is this semantic type, according to V.A. Plungian, that is the main one in Slavic languages. The third type (“limitative”) is based on the semantic feature of embedding into a more extended interval. Essential to it, is the

fact that the situation began and ended during a certain background interval of time; The very presence of the temporal boundaries of the situation (as in *посидеть* ‘to sit for a while’, *прогулять (весь день)* ‘to go for a turn (for a whole day)’), rather than its aspectual characteristic, as in the first two types, is important. The test context for diagnosing this type is the compatibility with circumstances of duration such as *целый день* ‘whole day’, *три часа* ‘three hours’ etc., e.g., *прогулял целый день* ‘to walk for a whole day’. In languages, all three of these types of meaning are usually present, but in different proportions [Плунгян 1998: 375–378]. This classification closely correlates with the varieties of semantics of perfectivity in Russian described by M.A. Shelyakin [see below].

The idea of the heterogeneity of the semantics of the verbal action inherent limit (endpoint) is also heard in other works, one way or another, concerning the category of aspectuality in different languages. V.G. Gak, in analyzing the semantics and means of expressing finality in Russian and French, points to the differentiation of perfectivity values. He notes that in different languages completeness can be realized in different semantic variants and proposes the following oppositions within this general concept:

- the time assigned to the action has expired (*поработать часок* ‘to work for an hour’)
- the goal of the action has been reached (*решить задачу* ‘to solve a task’)
- the subject itself is depleted (*истребить дичь* ‘to hunt the game down’).

Comparing the corresponding grammatical tools (verbal forms in Russian and French of *passé simple* and *passé composé*), the researcher points out that in Russian “the idea of the internal completion of the action, the achievement of the desired result” is expressed, while in French “the concept of its external completion (...) the limited time available for its existence” is expressed first of all [Гак 2002: 52–53].

V.G. Gak and V.A. Plungian both write about non closely-related languages, for which such a state of affairs (significant differences in the content of the concept of endpoint) seems generally natural. However, aspectual semantics prove to differ even within Slavic languages. Aspect, as a specific Slavic verb category in Slavic languages, is semantically heterogeneous in the Slavic language space. One of the first observations on this subject belongs to S. Ivančev. In his 1961 work, he pointed out noticeable differences between the Western and Eastern Slavic aspect. He particularly demonstrated that in the Western Slavic languages (Czech, less frequently in Polish and Slovak) the imperfective can express action sequences, for which in the Eastern Slavic the perfective verbs are usually used [Иванчев 1961]. In other words, perfective verbs in different Slavic languages can express different types of boundaries!

The idea of a mismatch of the semantics of the perfective in the Slavic languages is developed in the works of the Amsterdam research group led by A. Barentsen (see, for example: [Barentsen and oth. 2015]). Speaking about different types of inherent limit, he emphasizes the importance of such factors as the durative or instantaneous nature of the initial/resulting situation, as well as the action itself [Барентсен 1998: 47]. Inherent limit, broadly understood, is “the incorporation of the notion of certain boundaries (delimiting points) into the very notion of action. Barentsen sees the distinction between different types of inherent limit in the degree of ‘extensibility’ of the situation:

- action may allow for the representation of some duration...development, a constant accumulation of some quality...when a finite endpoint is reached, action ceases and a new state comes into being (*выздоровливать* ‘to recover’)
- continuous action once the endpoint is reached continues to evolve, the moment of the endpoint is related to quantitative rather than qualitative changes. The moment “is perceived as an endpoint only because for such a comparison it is necessary at that moment to ‘stop’” (*из бочки уже вытекло пол-литра вина...* ‘half a liter of wine has already flowed out of the barrel...’)
- the action has “no signs of temporal extensibility and internal development... the perfective verb is perceived as denoting a ‘jump-like’ transition” (*очутился* ‘to land somewhere’) [Барентсен 1995: 5–9].

The invariant meaning of the aspects in the different Slavic languages “is not exactly the same (...) telicity and totality are represented in the meaning of the perfective in all Slavic languages, and the difference lies (...) in the representation or character of the third feature – the sequent relation” [Барентсен 1995: 24].

S. Dickey differentiates the content of the perfective in the Slavic languages. For Russian and other East Slavic languages the main point, in his opinion, is temporal definiteness of action, and for West Slavic it is the totality [Dickey 2000].

The Italian researcher R. Benacchio’s works provide further confirmation of this idea. Studying the use of the verbal form in the imperative in the modern Slavic languages, R. Benacchio found a regular expansion of the perfective and a narrowing of the imperfective sphere of use from East to West to express politeness, especially to express the iterative (and usual) meaning. This is due to “a reduction in the use of the imperfective in the South and West Slavic languages as compared to the languages of the East Slavic group (...). The expansion of the perfective is maximized in Slovenian and Sorbian, in all likelihood due to close contacts with the German ‘aspectless’

language”. The researcher also sees the reasons for this phenomenon in the purely grammatical evolution of the system of the verbal form in the East Slavic languages [Benacchio 2010: 181–183].

The works of E.V. Petrukhina from different years contain interesting observations on the distinction in the use of perfectives to describe usual iterative actions in Czech and Russian; the sphere of perfective use in Czech is much wider and is not connected with the contextual limitations typical for Russian [Петрухина 1978: 57–60]. In a later work, she says that in Russian the idea of a temporal boundary is important, while in other Slavic languages it is the point (the quantization) of the action. According to her observations, the category of temporal boundary, which is represented through the aspectual forms, Aktionsart, lexical means, etc., is especially important for Russian speakers when denoting events and processual phenomena. This is confirmed, notably, by the fact that in Russian there are many verbs of those ways of action which explicitly express the temporal boundary of action [Петрухина 2014].

N.Y. Shvedova distinguishes between the internal endpoint of the verbal action, which is characteristic of verbs with an endpoint base, and the temporal endpoint. The internal endpoint of an action is defined as a certain critical point to which the action aspires, upon reaching this point the action stops having exhausted itself. Only endpoint verbs can possess this feature (reaching this endpoint or striving to reach it). The temporal endpoint characterizes unpaired perfective verbs, the action of which is limited only by external temporal boundaries (the beginning of an action (*занеть* ‘to begin singing’), the end of an action (*отговорить* ‘to stop talking’), the time period of its proceeding (*полежать* ‘to lay for a while’), the limitation of an action to one act of its commission (*прыгнуть* ‘to jump’), and is expressed by affixes which are added to the non-transitive stem [ШВЕДОВА 1980].

M.A. Shelyakin, analyzing the semantics of Russian perfective verbs, distinguishes three semantic types of verbal action endpoint: productive (achieving a natural result due to the nature of the action itself: for example: *переходить* – *перейти* ‘to cross’), single-act (action is performed “in one step”, “through one movement”: for example: *булькнуть* ‘fall with a plopping noise into the water’, *вздрыгнуть* ‘to shudder’) and quantitative-temporal (action is limited by a certain external, temporary boundary: for example: *посидеть* ‘to sit for a while’, *закричать* ‘to begin screaming’, *продудеть* ‘produce a pipping sound’). It makes sense to distinguish two types: result-targeted action and quantitative (temporal or intensive) endpoint [ШЕЛЯКИН 1983: 161]. This classification correlates well with the typological varieties of the semantics of perfectivity in multi-structural languages as defined by V.A. Plungian.

A.V. Bondarko, describing the peculiarities of the telicity, distinguishes two types of this category: tendentive and non-tendentive. Tendentive telicity is connected to an internal endpoint – the directionality of action and “the real achievement of that and only that endpoint to which the action is directed (“natural result” by a process with “one degree of freedom”, according to A.A. Kholodovich)” [Бондарко 1991: 200]. The internal endpoint (tendentious telicity) can be potential and real, explicit and implicit, absolute and relative. A.V. Bondarko also speaks about controllable and uncontrollable tendentious telicity, and how, in the sphere of controllable telicity, its conative and non-conative variants can be distinguished. The non-tendentive telicity is determined by factors external to the action. When “an endpoint is fixed which does not assume as a premise the goal of its achievement”, such a telicity “is connected with a ‘leap into the new’ in the absence of any indication of the process leading to it”. The non-tendentive telicity is less characterized. Its content appears “impoverished”, it occupies a peripheral position in the sphere of the telicity, and its result is a grammatical meaning of a “formal” character. Temporal endpoint characterizes unpaired perfect verbs, the action of which is limited only by external time frames of the beginning of action (*занеть* ‘to begin singing’), the end of action (*отговорить* ‘to fall silent’), the time interval of its occurrence (*полежать* ‘to lie for a while’), and the limitation of action to one act of its commission (*прыгнуть* ‘to jump’) [see: Бондарко 1991: 197–203]. In conclusion for this section, let us note that the most complete and consistent representation of the concept of inherent limit as a linguistic concept today is the functional-semantic field of limitativity, presented in the works of A.V. Bondarko and his scientific school.

Let us summarize the information about the conceptualization of the notion of inherent limit in linguistic research:

1. Inherent limit in the broadest linguistic understanding is an extreme quantitative point of an attribute measure, after reaching which the situation (phenomenon, attribute) can stop or shift to a destructive phase.
2. The concept of inherent limit is formed by a system of linguistic means of different levels (lexical, grammatical, derivative).
3. The concept of inherent limit is most regularly expressed at the level of the verbal system (lexical semantics of verbal classes, category of aspect, Aktionsart).
4. In the aspectological field, the inherent limit is either a certain boundary determined by the nature of the situation in a given way of its representation, or a point of entry into a new situation.
5. The inherent limit in the verb domain is semantically heterogeneous: it can be internal (tendentive: potential and real, explicit and implicit, ab-

- solute and relative) and external (non-tenditive: controlled or uncontrolled, conative and non-conative); and also resultative, instantaneous (punctual) and limitative (temporal boundaries).
6. Limit can express the moment of completion of a situation, the point of the beginning of a situation or an event viewed as an inseparable whole, as well as can be connected with the fact that the action is exhausted, the object of action is exhausted, or the time allotted for this action is exhausted.
 7. In the verb systems of various languages, even closely related ones, the relation of the types of limit may differ considerably (totality, temporal definiteness or something else may be the primary type).

The semantic types of inherent limit in verbal nouns

Let us recall: “conceptualization is a way of organizing thought work that allows one to move from material...to more and more abstract constructs that reflect...the underlying picture of the vision of the segment of reality under study” [Федотов 2014]. In the last part of this section, we will present one version of the conceptualization of the *inherent limit (endpoint)* at the level of grammar object of research a narrow fragment of the system of language – nouns with the meaning of action or process formed from the verbs of certain classes. The question is: if the verb system most consistently expresses the concept of inherent limit in language, what happens to it when a verb is transpositioned into a noun? Can the verbal noun express nuances of the semantics of the limit just as consistently? To answer this question, we will need to determine the type of inherent limit of a particular verb or its derivative noun. But how can we determine the type of limit in a grammatical construction, a particular verb or a noun derived from it? In our opinion, the correct instrument of analysis here may be the so-called aspectual classes – Aktionsarten. This is due to the fact that in verbs of morphemically characterized Aktionsarten, the type of inherent limit is expressed explicitly in most cases for example, semelfactives express the single-act type of limit, delimitatives express the quantitative-temporal type of limit (by M.A. She-lyakin) or limitative (by V.A. Plungian).

When analyzing the corpus of Russian derivatives, the first thing that stands out is the noticeable prevalence of action nouns motivated by imperfective verbs. For example, there are about 1,100 singular action nouns derived from imperfective verbs (such as *ловля* ‘catching, hunting, fishing’) and about 80 singular action nouns derived from perfective verbs (such as

завоевание ‘conquest’). It could be assumed that the conceptualization of the notion of limit in the languages under study at the grammatical level can be connected only with a verbal action, but by no means with a noun (even with a verbal one). However, the direct “form-driven” approach in this case, yields no result: some verbs of the perfect form motivate action nouns (e.g., *переделать* ‘to redo, to fix’ – *переделка* ‘alteration, revamping, fix’, *прочитать* ‘to read over/through’ – *прочтение* ‘reading’), while others do not (e.g.: *перечеловать* ‘to kiss (everyone)’ – \emptyset , *повспоминать* ‘reminisce for a while’ – \emptyset , *просидеть (полчаса)* ‘to sit (for half an hour)’ – \emptyset , *застучать* ‘to begin knocking’ – \emptyset , etc.). What is relevant in this case is not the presence of the limit attribute in a verb’s semantic structure per se, but its semantic type.

The resultative type of inherent limit is realized in Russian verbs of special-resultative Aktionsarten, which denote the action aimed at achieving the result inherent in their qualitative nature and serving as a limit for them. A quantitative analysis of the productivity of verbs of special-resultative Aktionsarten shows there are no strict semantic restrictions on the formation of action nouns from them. For example, 76 verb nouns were formed from 62 prospective verbs (*подготовка* ‘preparation’), 167 action nouns were formed from 225 reproductive verbs (*переписывание* ‘rewriting’), etc. Virtually all verbs of the productive-annulative, completive-partitive, separative-partitive, insufficient-normative, excessive-normative and other special-productive modes of action have correlative noun formations (*подкармливание* ‘feeding’, *отвинчивание* ‘unscrewing’, *подсыпание* ‘pouring in (secretly)’, *доливка* ‘refilling’, *пересол* ‘over-salting’, *недолив* ‘underfill’, *отвоевание* ‘reclaiming’, *дезорганизация* ‘disorganizing’, etc.). In other words, the productive limit of an action is relevant to the action noun.

The second semantic type of inherent limit, single-act, is most explicitly expressed in the verbs of single-act Aktionsart (and deverbatives formed from them), which denote one microsituation in relation to a set of repeated similar situations. Formal indicators of the single-act meaning in Russian are the suffix *-ну-* as well as the prefix *вз-*. Note that 3/4 of multi-act verbs in Russian have correlative single-act formations such as *булькать* ‘to bubble’ – *булькнуть* ‘fall with a plopping noise into the water’, *кричать* ‘to scream’ – *вскричать* ‘give a shout’. But from 200 single-act verbs only about 50 action nouns³ (*взмах* ‘a swing’, *вскрик* ‘a screech’) are formed. At the same

³ The small number of single-act action nouns in Russian can be explained by stylistic reasons. The fact is that a large percentage of single-act verbs have an additional emotional-expressive meaning in their structure and belong to colloquial or proverbial styles, while the Russian verbal action noun, on the contrary, is characterized by a tendency to bookishness. Perhaps this contradiction is the main factor preventing a wider derivation of single-

time, the nominal suffix *-ok* appears, which aspectually marks the action as single-acted: *глоток* 'a sip', *хлопок* 'a clap'. Interestingly, single-act deverbatives are sometimes formed even from verbs having no single-act form: *звонить* 'to call, to ring' – *звон* 'a ringing, a clanging' – *звонок* 'a call, a calling' (there is no such a verb as «*звоннуть*» 'to call for a while'); *гребсти* 'to paddle' – *гребля* 'a paddling' – *гребок* 'a paddle' (there is no such a verb as «*гребнуть*» 'to paddle for a while').

The third type of inherent limit is quantitative-temporal or temporal definiteness, these that indicate the quantitative-temporal boundary of an action. It is a temporal boundary of a certain duration of an action, a temporal boundary of the beginning or end of an action, an ultimate boundary of intensity, or an ultimate boundary of repeatability of an action. The results of the quantitative analysis of the productivity of verbs of these *Aktionarten* turned out to be very convincing: none of the verbs containing the attribute of quantitative-temporal limit in the explicit form produce action nouns (*пробежать (всю ночь)* 'to run (for a whole night)' – \emptyset , *отстоять (три часа)* 'to stand (for three hours)' – \emptyset , *пробубнить* 'to mumble (for a certain time)' – \emptyset , *досидеться* 'lead to unpleasant consequences as a result of staying up late' – \emptyset , *выгуляться* 'to go for a walk' – \emptyset). Delimitative verbs are one of the most productive verb formations, explicitly expressing the semantics of quantitative-temporal limit of action. The delimitative (limiting) meaning characterizes the manifestation of an action in short limited intervals of time. It includes monoaspectual verbs with prefixes *по-*, *про-*, *при-*, *вз-*, *пере-*. The analysis of over 300 Russian verbs with the prefix *по* with a limiting meaning, for which this is the only one (like *позубрить* 'to notch for a while', *покипеть* 'to boil for a while') showed that they do not form verbal nouns. The exceptions are a few nouns of the type *посиделки* 'a get-together', *постой* 'staying overnight', which do not possess the verb delimitative meaning (*посиделки* 'a get-together' \neq *посидеть* 'to sit for a while'), because they are nouns representing entire situations. This means the semantic structure of which lacks the emphasis on temporal boundaries and, accordingly, the meaning of the quantitative-temporal limit of action is absent. If, however, the verb expresses a resultative meaning (for example, we found 40 such verbs with *по-*), the action noun is usually formed, but only from the resultative verb: *погашение* 'extinguishing', *погром* 'pogrom', *погрузка*, 'loading', *порезка* 'cutting', *построение* 'building' etc. A check on

act action nouns. Indicative in this respect is the fact that most single-act verbs, which lack the nominative single-act form, have a correlative verbal-interjective derivation: *шмыг* 'sniff', *треск* 'crack', *хруст* 'crunch', which is more characteristic of the emotional sphere of language. In general, it may be argued that the single-act type of action limit does not semantically prevent the derivation of nouns from verbs containing this feature.

the use of such nouns in the national corpus of the Russian language gave a negative result.

We have analyzed the same verbs and the nouns formed from them in Ukrainian and Polish. Since, in these languages, action nouns are a much more productive class than in Russian and are formed from the vast majority of verbs, for the present study we chose those verb groups which, according to the above hypothesis, should not form action nouns. In this case, the object of our analysis are delimitative verbs. The model with the prefix *по-* and delimitative meaning in Ukrainian is very productive, in colloquial speech delimitatives can be formed from almost any verb. As a result of a continuous dictionary sampling from the academic dictionary of the Ukrainian language we found 515 corresponding verb lexemes (such as *посмакувати* 'to taste for a while', *побавити* 'to play with someone for a while', *пограти* 'to play for a while') and only 10 action nouns derived from them (*погуляння* 'being on bash', *побрехеньки* 'tale telling', *побрідки* 'a walking (for a while)', *пошум* 'continuous noise', *пожданки* 'a waiting process', *посиденьки* 'get-together', etc.). However, just as in the case of Russian *posidelki*, these action nouns do not inherit the meaning of the temporal limit from the verb and, accordingly, do not express this semantics in speech. Checking the use of such action nouns in the delimitative sense according to the data of the Corpus of Ukrainian texts gave a negative result; In none of the uses such an action noun does not express the temporal boundary of the action. The following observation concerns that of symptomatic behavior. If a verb combines delimitative and resultative meaning, the action noun is usually formed, but only from resultative variant: *пограбувати* 'to mug, to rob' (resultative and delimitative meaning) – *пограбування* 'a robbery' (only resultative), *побрататися* 'to fraternize' (resultative and delimitative meaning) – *побратання* 'fraternization' (only resultative), etc.

The analysis of the Polish material was of particular curiosity to us, because the Polish system of verbal action nouns differs significantly from the Russian one. First of all, it concerns the regularity of derivation; In Polish, action nouns are considered to be formed from almost any verb and are more actively used in speech, retaining many verb properties and grammatical meanings, in particular, reflexivity, aspect, voice, and some others. However, despite this, the nominalization ability of some semantic types of Polish verbs, as well as the complete semantic identity of verbs and derived action nouns, raises some doubt.

In Polish, just as in Russian and Ukrainian, a very productive verb group are delimitatives. These verbs are formed with the prefix *po-* and indicate a situation occurring in a limited period of time (*Pobawił na wsi przez całe lato* 'spent a whole summer in the countryside'). C. Piernikarski argues that they

are formed from the vast majority of verbs with few restrictions and are one of the most regular verb classes [Piernikarski 1969: 116-118]. The high productivity of the model is evidenced by the presence of a significant number of such verbs in the vocabulary of new words and meanings, as J. Stawnicka demonstrates [Stawnicka 2009: 109]. Thus, delimitatives in Polish are formed by the productive derivative model and are often used by speakers and, at the same time, contain the semantic feature of the quantitative-temporal limit of action (which, let us recall, categorically prevents the formation of deverbatives in Russian and Ukrainian). Therefore, this group of Polish verbs was chosen to check the regularity of the derivation of action nouns from them, and, given the presence of nominative forms in the dictionary, their frequency in the corpus.

For convenience and formalization of the dictionary search for Polish verbs with delimitative meaning, we took into account the presence in the dictionary of adverbial indexes *jakiś czas* 'some time' or *pewien czas* 'certain time', e.g. *pogadać pot.* «*spędzić pewien czas na gadaniu, rozmowie, porozmawiać swobodnie przez jakiś czas*» <...> *rzecz. pogadanie* 'to chat "to spend some time talking, conversing'. A continuous sampling was made from the dictionaries of S. Dubisz [2004] and W. Doroszewski [2000] of a total amount of 236 verbal lexemes. As it turned out, eight of them have no correlative action nouns (*poboleć I* 'to hurt for a while', *poboleć II* 'to be ill for a while', *pobyć* 'to stay', *pochorować* 'to be ill for while', *pokropić* 'to rain for a while', *poszaleć* 'to fool around for a while', *poszumieć* 'to make noise for a while'). Thus, according to the results of the analysis of dictionary entries, the majority of delimitative verbs have correlative nominative derivatives.

Next, we checked the identified "delimitative" deverbatives for their presence in the National Corpus of the Polish language. The result confirmed our most daring expectations: 143 deverbatives of this group are absent in the corpus. These are, for example, *pobadanie*, *pogadanie*, *poigranie*, *pohasanie*, *popykanie*, *pobeczenie*, etc. Note that their prefixless variants (such as *gadanie* 'a talk', *badanie* 'a research', *beczenie* 'bleating (of a sheep)') may be quite popular in speech, e.g. the action noun *badanie* – about 37,000 entries.

The remaining action nouns (85 units) have a varying number of entries in the corpus (from 1 to several hundreds), but the analysis of the contexts revealed that these deverbatives and the verbs they stem from are not semantically equal. We identified three possible variants: narrowing (reduction) of verbal meanings, semantic drift towards substantive, and occasional use of the deverbative to create a stylistic effect. Let us consider them one by one.

The most widespread scenario is the narrowing of the verb semantics. If an action noun is derived from a multivalent verb, one of which has delimita-

tive meaning, it is unlikely to find in the corpus appropriate entries with such aspectual semantics; Among the realized meanings, delimitative is almost never found (there are about 50 such deverbatives in our sample). At the same time, there seems to be no restriction on the realization of the resultative, distributive, repetitive, attenuative and other aspectual components. For instance, S. Dubisz's dictionary [2004] contains two articles describing the verbs *ponosić I* (resultative verb) and *ponosić II* (delimitative verb). In both entries, the nominative form of *ponoszenie* is given. The corpus gives 4,808 occurrences of this derivative, while in no case does its meaning correspond to the delimitative *ponosić II*. Note that the dictionaries do not indicate the limited semantic range of such action nouns. A typical example:

- (1) *Pogorszenie sytuacji środowiskowej musi doprowadzić do ujawnienia się barier fizycznych (np. (...) braku wody), co wywoła poważne perturbacje gospodarcze i konieczność ponoszenia dużych kosztów na naprawę strat środowiskowych* (S. Kozłowski, Ekorozwój: wyzwanie XXI wieku 2000) ('Environmental degradation should lead to physical limitations (e.g., (...) water scarcity), which will lead to a serious economic crisis and the need to incur large costs for environmental restoration').

The second option is semantic drift toward substantive. As a rule, this occurs as a result of the loss of actual derivational-semantic connections of "delimitative" deverbatives with the original verb. In S. Dubisz's Dictionary such lexemes are presented in separate dictionary entries, because in modern Polish their semantics is much closer to a noun than to a verb; They can acquire subject meanings, indicate stable states, denote whole situations like *posiedzenie* 'meeting' or *poruszenie* 'enthusiasm'. A good example in this sense is the legal term *pożycie* (over 1100 occurrences), which is formed from the verb *pożyć*. The dictionary describes three meanings of this verb: 'to live a certain time', 'to live some time in a certain way', and 'to live with someone for some time'. In the corpus we find exactly a terminological lexeme, which in the dictionary is presented as a noun in a separate dictionary entry (and not as a nominative form of a verb): *wspólne życie z kimś (...), obcowanie fizyczne dwojga ludzi, zwłaszcza w małżeństwie* ('living together with someone (...), the physical cohabitation of two people, more often in matrimony').

- (2) *...duża różnica wieku nie stanowiła dla nich żadnej przeszkody we wspólnym pożyciu* (B. Zalot, Tygodnik Podhalański nr 49 1997) ('the big age difference was not an obstacle for them to live together').

We have also found a few occasional uses of action nouns with a meaning close to the delimitative (of a short-lived state or process). Interestingly, in most cases, this word is taken in quotation marks, which indicates its unusu-

alness or unaccustomedness to a native speaker. We believe that such rare forms are rather means of linguistic play:

- (3) *Ostatnio na sprzedaż w domu aukcyjnym w Teksasie został wystawiony fotel bujany, kiedyś należący do Kennedy'ego. Ten stary mebel to prawdziwa gratka dla kolekcjonerów. Chociaż za «pobujanie się» na nim trzeba zapłacić ponad 100 tys. dolarów, chętnych do jego kupna nie brakuje (Super Express 2006)* ('a rocking chair that once belonged to Kennedy was put up for auction... Although it was necessary to pay more than 100 thousand dollars for "rocking" on it, there was no lack of those willing to buy it').

Although, in Polish, deverbatives could be derived from a huge number of verbal lexemes and form "aspectual" oppositions almost without any restrictions, there remain groups of Polish verbs whose aspectual semantics systematically prevents nominalization (see: [Пчелинцева 2014]). Deverbatives correlating with them are most often recorded in dictionaries, but are not actually used in speech, which is confirmed by the continuous analysis of corpus data.

Let us briefly summarize the results of the study. In philosophical and linguistic discourse, limit is one of the basic concepts and represents a multilevel notion. Conceptualization of limit in philosophical discourse is a result of the formation of ideas about the real world (limit & infinity, limit & boundary, limit & measure, limit & boundedness). In linguistics, the notion of inherent limit is conceptualized based on generalization of research results of different language spheres and represents the complex phenomenon showing itself in various substantial types and variants. Philosophical conceptions of the limit and linguistic conceptions of the inherent limit partially correlate and mutually complement each other. In language, the concept of inherent limit is represented at the lexical, grammatical, and derivational levels, but it is most regularly expressed with the help of aspectual means. This concept is one of the basic in the language. This is evidenced by its direct and indirect influence on the formation and functioning of linguistic means of different levels.

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Principles of Typologization of Russian Folklore Sayings
(by the Material of Sayings with the Concept of Bird)

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Abstract. The chapter is devoted to the principles by which I establish a typology of lexical representations of the concept of bird. A bird was chosen as an object, as it plays an essential role in the organization of human relations (everyday, economic and socially significant) within the framework of everyday macro discourse. The work aims to analyze the lexical representations of the concept of bird based on Russian folklore and identify the principles of typology of the verbalized concept of bird, the speech form of which consists of different components (both nominative and predicative). The chapter describes the linguo-semiotic mechanism of functioning of the conceptualized notion of bird in the cognitive space of folklore. After analyzing the structural characteristics of birds in the linguistic and cognitive aspects, I proposed the justification for folklore sayings as a genre of folklore with the pragmatics of belief, omen or superstition, explored the ways of lexical implementation of the concept of bird and the logical relationships within this concept. The functionality of the verbalization of the concept of bird studied in the chapter allows to trace how folklore sayings serve specific customs from the folk tradition. The result of the research is the four universal criteria for the typology of lexical representations of the concept of bird proposed: structural (essential, formal semiotic), functional, semantic and pragmatic, as well as the typology of the genre of folklore sayings, which is a peculiar way of organizing and interpreting reality.

Introductory Remarks

When considering examples of paroemia and other folklore texts (classified as small genres of folklore) containing the notion of bird, which can be expressed in various ways of lexical implementation (*птица, птичка, птаха, птичий*, etc.), it has been established that the difference between Russian beliefs and omens and superstitious sayings is conditional. Mainly, it is noticeable in the form of statements expressing beliefs and prejudices regarding birds, which is essential in the organization of various relations of everyday macro discourse (everyday, economic and socially significant).

Beliefs and omens sayings and superstitious sayings are considered within the boundaries of one genre since we are talking about the study of ways of lexical implementation of the notion of bird, the cognitive analysis of which allows us to place examples in the typology and makes it possible to explore the logical relationships within this concept.

In the case of the belief that “a bird flying into the house is a sign of trouble”, the bird (subject) that flies into the house (cause) leads to trouble (consequence), the reciprocity significant for mythological reality arises. This causes certain emotions and mental states and leads to certain prognostic generalizations of a quasi-magical nature (esoteric knowledge) and can be expressed by a judgment based on experience: “A bird that flew into a house indicates trouble.”

This superstition in the folk tradition is continued in the custom/ritual, which implies the following reaction-action of the subject of everyday discourse: *Надо успеть поймать ее и сорвать голову, сказав: „Прилетела на свою голову!“ – тогда беда обойдет стороной надо успеть поймать ее и сорвать голову»* [Грушко, Медведев 1995: 388–389].

For folklore experience, the paroemic component – the Russian saying *Прилетела на свою голову!* – is especially important here. In pragmatic terms, it performs a magical role. In functional terms, it represents the actual precedent component of the folklore language code.

This work aims to highlight the criteria and principles for the typology of folklore sayings. It includes defining structural characteristics in the linguistic and cognitive aspect, substantiating folklore sayings as a genre with the pragmatics of belief, omens or superstition (hereinafter in the text, *beliefs* and *omen-superstitious sayings*), based on language material selected from dictionaries of speech folklore units. For this study, we used texts of omen-superstitious sayings containing notions of birds verbalized in the speech form of words. The main task of the undertaken research is the subsequent description of the principles of typology of the categorical notion of bird based on folklore texts, an attempt to describe the linguo-semiotic mechanism of the functioning of the concept (conceptualized notion) of bird in human experience. Such a description is possible due to the processes of intuition and reflection when perceiving information. The attempt to typologize the notion of bird based on beliefs and superstitious sayings is valuable for describing the interaction between individual and collective pictures of the world, including the notion of bird, which we described earlier [see: Клименко 2018: 130-139].

First, we are interested in folklore signs (both linguistic and speech) in this work. According to Oleg Leszczak, in a functional framework in linguo-semiotics, both the depicted and the semiotic object itself (as an energy-ma-

terial phenomenon, for example, sound) are secondary or the background and substratum of the actual semiotic phenomena: “The depicted object (...) **is not yet a sign**. A semiotic object that affects feelings and arouses information about what is being depicted **is no longer a sign**” [Лещак 2008: 85].

For us, only the folklore signs are relevant as semiotic units of a meaning (content) relevant to the mythological picture of the world and a form (primarily lingual) relevant to the folklore tradition. Ordinary discourse is characterized by its inherent signs, which in their semantics and pragmatics are similar, on the one hand, to the magical activity of primitive society, and on the other hand, to the symbolic activity of social life:

Social life, from the point of view of semiotics, is a symbolic activity. This is how it differs from the ordinary, which in this respect is a mythological activity. A symbol is the second level of the analytical development of a sign. The first such level was a myth, the initial separation of the word/thought from the thing. In magical activity, they are not yet separated. At the level of the primitive magical mind, the thing, the idea of the thing, and the word that the thing is called by are one. On the other hand, it is already clear at the mythological level that the word «key» does not open the door. Nevertheless, at this level, there is a correlative identification of three entities: things, concepts and names. A symbol is something completely different. It is for sure a semiotic formation, that is, two-sided and detached [Leszczak 2010: 184].

Considering the above, suppose we see a bird in its natural environment, for example, a white bird in flight. From the perspective of the quoted fragment, the bird as such is not yet a sign. The knowledge that it is a bird, i.e., the notion of bird, is the result of a cognitive-recognition procedure. This is also not a sign. Also, when a person engaging in the process of communication produces sounds [пт'ицъ] with the help of the articulatory apparatus – this is no longer a sign but a signal that represents the sign in speech. It does not matter if one does it out loud or only to themselves. Thus, we can assume that the basis for the sign is a certain cognitive-psychic and, at the same time, linguo-semiotic state, which can be conditionally represented as a kind of psychological correlation of not-yet-sign and already-not-sign.

The situation regarding iconic signs of the optical and/or pictorial dimension is complicated. This refers to the relationship between a specific visible object and how we react to this object semiotically. It is not just the recognition reaction that is implied. If we look at an image of a bird (a photograph or a painting) and identify the depicted object as a bird (i.e., correlate it with the notion of bird), it represents a cognitive recognition procedure. However, the object itself – the image – is not identical to the animal observed in reality. Their identification requires a special effort from us, i.e., carrying out the

procedure of incomplete and conditional analogy, which is indeed a semiotic procedure. Therefore, the image of a bird is an iconic sign. However, can the very image of a bird we observe in nature be an iconic sign? Suppose we see a bird and understand that it is a bird, perceive its movement in space as flying, and recognize its color as white. In that case, the incoming information serves merely as recognition only since this procedure does not include semiotic actions. We directly correlate this object's image with the concept of bird that already existed in our country.

When, then, does such conceptual and perceptual information becomes (might be defined) as semiotic? The answer is obvious: the image of a flying bird can become a semiotic function (iconic sign) at the time when we while observing the actions and/or attributes of a bird, begin to understand something other than just the set of information contained in the statement *Летит белая птица*. The same happens when we perceive the bird that we are observing as the soul of a deceased person or a mythical messenger of supernatural/otherworldly powers. This kind of semiotic procedure requires a magical or mythical way of thinking. This type of thinking underlies authentic, living folklore, i.e., folklore, that has not yet become an art.

Folklore occupies an intermediate place between actual practical magic, which is realized in objective and partly semiotic manipulations (magical actions), mythology, which can be interpreted as devoid of esotericism and socialized magic (functioning primarily in the form of everyday activities and socially significant texts of an ideological nature) and art as an artistic activity based on the category of beauty, a sense of aesthetic taste, a detached form and the desire to generate an aesthetic experience.

The semantics of folklore is rooted in the magical picture of the world¹, while the pragmatics is directly tied to mythology (folklore serves the everyday life of a natural community); although it may partly coincide with elements of magical rituals, from the point of view of form, folklore is much more similar to art². However, folklore is not yet art. The purpose of art is

¹ Many researchers try to present folklore as the basis for myths, but from a functional-pragmatic point of view, the origins of folklore should be sought in everyday life and primary magic: "(...) the roots of any form of virtual experience must be sought in myth and primal magic. Folklore can be regarded as one of the first forms of the aestheticization of myth and, thus, the first form of art" [Leszczak 2010: 327].

² O. Leszczak emphasizes the significance of form for folklore as the first and most natural manifestation of aesthetic activity:

The myth needs only faith in the unity of content and form. Folklore requires taste, the ability to distinguish between form and content, and the talent to assess the quality of the structure of both form and content. A myth does not need a complicated (complex) form and stratified (symbolized) semantics. On the contrary, it is best for a mythological message when the form is easy to understand (standard), and the content does not force you to think. The recipient of

to obtain aesthetic pleasure; whereas the purpose of folklore is to aestheticize life in all its manifestations – work, rest, weekdays and holidays. The semantics of folklore, namely the logic of the representation of objects, is especially problematic. The question remains: what is more in folklore texts – a conditional analogy which is the basis of metaphor, and therefore art, or a direct transformation and transsubstantialization of meaning, underlying metamorphosis, and therefore magic and myth³.

Consequently, folklore operates with some specific, culturally significant images and notions (i.e. concepts). This suggests that when we are looking at the white bird – whether it's flying, sitting, or pecking something – through the eyes of a person who shares the folklore, we begin to understand the hidden, supposed meaning of what is happening, i.e. that the white bird represents the pure soul of a deceased person bringing some message to the relatives of the deceased (when flying) or conveys the will of supernatural beings (when pecking). When we are able to perceive the acts of a bird in a folklore way like that it means we have created a mythical cognitive-semiotic unit (concept, conceptual judgment, sign-image) – a *mytheme*. This term refers to knowledge not just of a conceptual but semiotic nature, which occurs when, through the dynamic image of a particular bird (a certain type of ordinary category), one begins to actualize in his mind meanings that are not directly related to the observed object and event and which refer him to a completely different cognitive space, not represented in the field of experi-

a work of art should be aware that it is a work of art. The recipient of the myth should be sure that it is life or the Truth itself [Leszczak 2010: 327].

³ The logic of metamorphosis, typical for myth, differs from the logic of metaphor, typical for art. The sign in the folklore system should be interpreted not in terms of metaphorization (representation of one as if it were another) – such logic is more characteristic of artistic discourse – but in terms of metamorphosis (one turns into another or one is another). As Leszczak noted, the semiotic basis of myth is not a metaphor (as in a fairy tale) but a metamorphosis (the logic of metaphor - the similarity of non-identical objects, the logic of metamorphosis - their identity). When comparing myth and fable, one must not use categories of hierarchy or degree of complexity. The essence of myth as an activity lies in the lack of fragmentation, the syncretism of rational and emotional, real and binding. At the same time, a fairy tale is a form of ludic and primary aesthetic experience in which all these oppositions already exist. Both the sender and the recipient of the folklore message know that a fairy-tale character is not a real subject but a certain conventionality, an effect of imagination and a product of semiotic embellishment." [Leszczak 2010: 327]. However, one cannot agree with the last statements. What has been said about a fairy tale should refer primarily to fiction (including literary fairy tales). If a fairy tale is an authentic folklore text, and while it performs its direct function as a source of folk wisdom, then the metaphorical way of artistic thinking in it is significantly inferior to the mythological logic of metamorphosis. On the other hand, one can agree that in the modern world, folk tales have ceased to be perceived in their folklore function and have turned into ordinary anonymous works of art and/or precedent texts of a purely artistic nature.

ence. Since these meanings are not directly related to the cognitive space of the ordinary notion of bird, it replaces *the concept of a bird* with the term *mytheme of a bird*. If the mythical conceptual information is fixed in the language code as a sign or model and starts being actively used in folk art, it becomes an element of folklore. It should be added that in the cognitive space of folklore, the mytheme and the notion of a bird as an animal combine and form a single whole.

Along with the term *mytheme*, the term *mythologeme* occurs. These signs can be distinguished according to the intentions of the discourse subject and the specifics of the macro discourse itself, in which the designated units function. By a *mytheme*, I mean a unit of everyday discourse that assumes that its subjects unconditionally and intuitively believe in the concepts and images behind the mythical sign. While the term *mythologeme* is appropriate when describing socio-political or public discourse, involving that the active subjects of discursive activity introduce certain mythical signs into the consciousness of its passive participants, who take it on faith, intuitively, without reflection. These concepts are always ideologically significant. A fully socialized mythologeme can become a mytheme. In this case, public discourse begins to acquire the features of everyday discourse, and the mythemes included in people's creativity become elements of post-folklore.

Functional-pragmatic analysis of folklore sayings

The mytheme of bird and the lexical sign *bird* in a folklore text have a common semiotic substratum in the form of a referential field of practical observations of the behavior of birds in nature. Mastering such a substrate in everyday mythological activity and practical experience made it possible to comprehend it as the basis of various beliefs, omens, superstitions, interpretations, divination, etc., which are widely expressed in the subject matter of folklore texts. The folklore sayings mentioned above can be considered a semiotic set of various manifestations of folk culture, expressed through speech with the help of clichéd units of folklore (complex clichés⁴ by G.L. Пермяков [Пермяков 1970: 7]).

Switlana Leszczak distinguishes language clichés and understands these units as, on the one hand, figurative analytical nominative linguistic signs

⁴ The author believes that the most suitable tool for studying this problem is semiotics: "and, perhaps, only it can comprehend the general that is contained in all compound (complex) linguistic signs, which are used in speech phraseological, paremiologically and other colloquial folklore clichés" [Пермяков 1970: 7].

(phraseological units) and, on the other hand, as something more than just free phrases as speech nominative signs [С.Лещак 2007: 9]. Along with clichés as analytical nominative signs, she proposes to single out precedent predicative signs in the language system (for example, proverbs or precedent texts). Representatives of the Moscow ethnolinguistic school designate the units under study as small folklore texts characterized by communicative and extralinguistic ritual functions (including clichés nature and the stability of a speech sign understood by it) [Толстая, Цивьян, 1993: 3].

Short forms of folklore are part of folklore narratives: fairy tales and legends. Such texts are implemented in colloquial form. O. Leszczak and P. Bednarska indicate that small forms of folklore provide an important social-play or ritual-ceremonial need of the individual. Therefore, scholars emphasize the significance of these precedent texts:

Although some texts of this kind are often thematically and stylistically related to the colloquial style (for example, works of post-folklore), they are not used in everyday communication as the actual construction material of everyday and, more broadly, everyday communication. However, above all, they satisfy the individual's aesthetic, social game or ritual-ceremonial needs. We also refer to the same precedent texts in various kinds of rhymes, riddles, poems, prayers, oaths, and incantations, even if they are separate sentences in form. Unlike precedent statements, all such units, like precedent texts, have complete cultural and civilizational autonomy [Лещак, Беднарска 2021: 10].

V.E. Gusev mentions the original classification of folklore genres by Charlotte Sophia Burne, who combined different genres of folklore into three main groups with further thematic divisions: I. Beliefs and actions; II. Customs; III. Prose, singing, and sayings [see: Гусев 1967: 98–99]. The first performs a prognostic function based on myths for the cultural chronotope, the second organizes human activity, and the third performs a secondary nominative function and is close to linguistic units.

This principle of folklore organization affects mainly everyday and social, economic and aesthetic discourses. Belief can be considered as a mental component of the action, and the action of the bird itself (or the action of the subject with the bird) as a semiotic object (landmark, sign, medicine, etc., for example, the flight is a sign of God's will, fate, imminent death). Placed in the first place, they emphasize the linguo-semiotic function of the language, which is necessary for the transfer of experience, the continuity of which led to the emergence of verbal-effective syncretic genres of folk tradition – customs and, ultimately, purely speech genres of sayings. In other words, any folklore saying serves a specific custom from the folk tradition and consists of different components (both nominative and predicative).

A bird as an iconic sign and a semiotic object (i.e. a bird we observe in nature), being conceptualized (culturally comprehended) in the ordinary mythological experience of beliefs, causes different feelings and thoughts, manifested in folklore-colloquial sayings, the meaning of which can be determined in such functions of everyday and economic human experience, such as: observing and explaining the behavior of birds, describing craft and fishing activities with birds, explaining the purpose of objects associated with them, as well as in the functions of magical experiences, such as omens and predictions of the future, depicting contact with the other world (including transfiguration), dream interpretation, divination, verbal healing, magical prohibitions and advice, etc.

According to the previously mentioned classification of folklore by Burne utterances or superphrasal units representing precedent information of this type can be divided into thematic areas, through which it is possible to designate the theme and functionality of the verbalization of the concept or the notion of bird:

- 1) earth and sky (observations, prediction of the future);
- 2) flora (observations, forecasts);
- 3) the world of animals (observations, forecasts, explanations of the behavior of birds);
- 4) human existence (prediction of the future, descriptions of customs);
- 5) artefacts (description of handicraft and trade activities, explanation of the purpose of items);
- 6) the soul and the other world (predictions, descriptions of signs, representations of transfiguration as a form of contact with the other world, beliefs);
- 7) superhuman entities (representation of the transfiguration of sacred entities, predictions, signs, beliefs);
- 8) cognitive activity (predictions, interpretation of dreams, divination);
- 9) magical activity (prohibitions/advice, amulets, invocations, incantations, dream conjuring);
- 10) diseases and healing (healing sayings, description of treatment).

We have significantly corrected the presented picture since we had to exclude the objective actions and cognitive foundations. Actions, knowledge or beliefs are not texts or statements, meaning they do not belong to folklore but myth or magic. However, this typology is correct if actions, knowledge and beliefs are interpreted as narratives, descriptives, deliberatives or prescriptives in texts or individual statements. Folklore is primarily a text, and in Burne's classification, we are talking about the subject matter of folklore.

Notes on language material

Beliefs, superstitions are social both causally and teleologically. On the one hand, they arise as a reaction to social circumstances that arise in everyday life, and on the other hand, they serve to solve certain problems that arise in the public sphere of everyday life. A person trusts beliefs not only because other people in this society also trust these beliefs, but also because most of them have been tested over centuries of experience and, as such, beliefs perform predictive, explanatory, therapeutic and other functions useful for satisfying vital needs.

A significant problem associated with the selection of folklore material is the modern actualization of the texts collected in the past. All these texts are fragmentarily removed from real folklore discourse or have already been rethought or transformed under the influence of more modern discursive forms. It should also be taken into account that in the era of romanticism, quite often, the collectors of folk tradition either inaccurately recorded the material, collected the material randomly and unsystematically, or even came up with plausible examples themselves⁵. In general, the beginning and the first half of the 19th century are characterized by the lack of a clear methodology in the humanities and social sciences, including folklore, ethnography, literary criticism and linguistics. In modern times, dialect material is collected through technical recording (transcriptions or video/audio recordings to hear how respondents respond and speak). Therefore, the question of which speech material is really folklore texts, which has transformed the ethnographic collection, and which is completely invented, is subject to closer analysis and remains open.

Materials for our analysis were collected from the examples of the collections of V.D. Kulmatov and T.V. Kulmatova *Russian folk signs and beliefs* [Кульматов, Кульматова 1999] and the *Dictionary of Russian superstitions*,

⁵ The intuitive technique of collecting material, for example, by V.I. Dahl, is characterized by a high level of interference and generalization. At the moment, it is impossible to separate examples in his dictionary entries that were written down from the words of vernacular speakers, from the author's „as if” imitation of Russian vernacular, as well as from phonetic and morphological transformations of the original material, which casts doubt on his examples of the use of folklore in cultural and language space. According to the works devoted to the Explanatory Dictionary, inaccuracies indicated by the term neoplasms are considered insignificant [Дейкина 1993: 18] and are defined as innovative [Виноградов 1977: 224]. It should be mentioned that in addition to his passion for the dictionary of V.I. Dahl also made money from dictionary entries he collected. V.V. Vinogradov cites letters from Dahl and members of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who stopped buying them after the first thousand words [ibid. 224].

spells, signs and beliefs by E.A. Grushko and Yu.M. Medvedev [Грушко, Медведев 1995]. The material collected by the authors is fragmentary and represents an incomplete description of the folk tradition, considering different subjects of folk culture. Moreover, the compiled eclectic language material is taken from the collections of folklore collectors, including V.I. Dahl. All this, of course, significantly reduces its exemplification ideographic value. Nevertheless, this material may serve as a typological and classificatory reflection source.

Terminological remarks

The description of predicative folklore material requires clarification of the terminology. First of all, it is necessary to distinguish **folklore speech signs** (statements, superphrasal units and texts) from the **mythical** (or **magical**) **judgments** as cognitive culturally significant units underlying them. The category of judgment is understood as a thought (idea), which should not be confused with statements expressing it. The same judgment can be expressed in different statements or even texts. If a judgment becomes a meaningful and reproducible part of the human mind (or many minds of members of the same collective), it becomes a **conceptual judgment**. If a conceptual judgment is built on the logic of a myth, it can be called a *mythical judgment*, but if it serves as a magical effect on reality, it can be called a *magical judgment*. The speech presentation of such judgments can be various more or less culturally significant statements or texts. For instance, the same mythical judgment can be expressed by statements *Если птица влетит в открытое окно, быть беде, Птица залетает в дом – к беде* or *Когда птица залетает в дом через окно, случится несчастье* and the like.

All these statements, as speech signs, are pragmatically and semantically based on the same mythical judgment. They are formally short figurative forms, which allows them to be defined as **folklore sayings**. Folklore sayings that verbalize the same mythical proposition are synonymous or variant units of folk art. Verbalizing magical judgments is not so free because a magical ritual often requires precise wording. Therefore, many folklore sayings that verbalize magical sayings become precedent statements and move from the category of speech signs into the professional language of people involved in magical rituals.

There is no doubt that beliefs and omen-superstitious sayings similar to them in terms of pragmatics are folklore material. However, the question

arises whether they can be considered equally linguistic material. S. Leszczak notes that:

(...) sentences, supra-phrasal units (SPU) or texts are not linguistic but speech signs [...]. The elements of the syntactic level of the language (as a component of the grammatical system or the internal form of the language) are not phrases and sentences (as is usually represented in formal descriptive linguistics) but models of syntactic speech production (grammatical models of sentences and phrases). Sentences and phrases themselves are not linguistic signs. These are speech signs – produced according to the indicated models [C. Лещак 2007: 13].

The speech units are to be interpreted as units taken from a specific speech practice associated with a specific speech situation, which, in turn, can be associated with a culturally significant event, in our case, those that we heard directly from the subject of folk tradition, using them in folklore discourse. If such a unit is closely related to the situation of its occurrence, then we consider it a direct quotation of speech. It is a different story when the unit becomes a repeated, conventional text or a statement reproduced precisely, applied to a similar but completely different situation. In that case, we deal with a linguistic unit since it exhibits invariant properties and is included in the system of signs of a specific folklore code. Thus, we certainly deal with a **linguistic folklore sign** (precedent statement or precedent text). Leszczak and Bednarska [Лещак, Беднарська 2021: 43–44] emphasize that a set of linguistic signs form a lexicon, which includes linguistic units: synthetic (words), analytical (linguistic clichés and phraseological units) and predicative, the main task of which is the semiotic verbalization of conceptual judgments or agglomerates of such judgments with the help of precedent statements and precedent texts. According to the researchers, “(...) the precedent statement is strongly associated with the lexical system of the language, which cannot be said about simple speech statements (sentences and supra-phrasal units), which correlate only with the system of syntactic models of speech production” [ibid. 2021: 43-44].

The studied folklore material represents a list of folklore sayings that verbalize cognitive precedents – mythical judgments, which are not reproduced precedent statements. Thus, they can hardly be classified as proverbs, sayings, sayings or paroemias. It is incorrect to call precedent statements **folklore genres** since a genre should be understood as a particular type of speech or a specific model of a culturally significant statement/text. Paroemias are petrified statements used in various forms of speech behavior and discourses. They are not formed according to the genre model but are reproduced from the language stock. In a speech as a process and result of expression or

communication, there are no models as such; all models are localized either in the language or in the view of the world. That is why by *folklore sayings*, we will understand speech statements formed according to genre models and pragmatically performing a folklore-ritual function.

The components of some folklore sayings can be precedent, paroemic in nature and be part of the folklore language code. For example, the phrase *Прилетела на свою голову* uttered during one of the mythical rituals underlying one of the omen-superstitious texts. Such units are more recognizable and easier to identify with folklore since they are reproducible and relevant today. Let us compare two units. A fixed phrase scheme: *приехал/спросил/что-то сделал на свою голову*, where *на свою голову* – is a phraseological unit. The expression *Прилетела на свою голову* is a precedent statement that can be defined as a by-word (saying). Oksana Labashchuk emphasizes that by-words (Укр. *примовки*) have a form of verbal formulas, most often acting as a verbal commentary on the calendar rites and family rituals [Лабашчук 2004: 37-38]. In the west of Ukraine, when seeing a magpie, people say *Сорока – моя новина* (an example from the oral message of Oleg Leszczak). Labashchuk emphasizes that ritual and spell by-words are typical not only for calendar and family rituals but for non-ritual situations of everyday life [ibid. 38]. During a culturally significant event, certain words must be pronounced throughout a sequence of actions corresponding to a magical ritual function, for example, the evil eye protection sayings. The researcher believes that, unlike incantations addressing things directly, by-words have an ethical function as a hint and a reference to a behavior model. The subject of a traditional society, which shows knowledge of such texts, demonstrates his knowledge of the norms of behavior and communication typical for a particular situation in a given cultural environment [ibid. 34]. Therefore, such sayings should be considered linguistic signs, not just speech products.

Bases for the typology of folklore sayings containing the concept of bird

In search of a way to verbalize information about a bird as a significant folklore concept, we often use linguistic means that, using a synthetic or analytical form, express a specific nominative meaning (words, language clichés, phraseological units). We form speech utterances and texts if we want to verbalize a particular judgment or a series of judgments about birds as folklore concepts. The basic principle of the typology of language or speech

units is to determine universal criteria, which, firstly, consider the structure of the verbalization unit (concerning the corresponding unit of the cognitive plan); secondly, its macro functional properties (within its structural class); thirdly, they consider the pragma-semantic functions of its components (i.e., its semantic structure); fourthly, they address the pragmatics of the verbal implementation of the concept or judgment under study (i.e., the speaker's practical and active intentions). When typifying lexical realizations of a concept, it is crucial to consider all four universal criteria: structural (essential, formal-semiotic), functional, semantic, and pragmatic.

The basis of the idea of a bird is a language map of the concept implementation, which is interconnected with a cognitive map, understood as a cognitive space for the functioning of birds and their significance for ordinary mythological human life. In the centre of this thematic space, there is a core, the notion of bird. The critical task of this work is to determine the principles for highlighting the main elements of the verbalization of these maps through folklore sayings.

a. structural criterion

This criterion allows specifying the type of information verbalization [see: Лещак, Лещак 2005: 151–167], (i.e.) to determine the formal-semiotic character of a lingual unit depending on what kind of cognitive unit it denotes. Without it, it is difficult to proceed to a typological analysis of the functional plan. In the structural analysis of the means of verbalization, it is necessary to consider the temporal nature of the signified (static-conceptual vs dynamic-thinking) and the temporal nature of the signifier (potential-linguistic vs factual-speech). The former will allow us to separate nominative units (verbalizing concepts) from predicative ones (verbalizing judgments), will allow us to separate the models of putting meaning (verbalization) and the signs themselves, and subsequently to separate linguistic signs from speech ones. Considering the nature of the object, it is possible, firstly, to differentiate the lexical realizations of concepts (the words *пташка*, the cliché *певчая птица* or the phraseological unit *важная птица*) from the verbalizations of judgments (the precedent statement *Видно птицу по полету* or the folklore saying *Чужой птицы не считай – сглазишь*), and secondly, to differentiate linguistic signs (*пташка*, *певчая птица*, *важная птица*, *Видно птицу по полету*) from speech ones (*Чужой птицы не считай – сглазишь* or *Чужую птицу не считают, можно сглазить* or *Не надо считать чужую птицу, а то сглазишь*). The verbalization of a concept can be represented in the form of lexical units from a linguistic (*пташка*, *певчая птица*, *важная птица*) or speech perspective (*птица*, *птицы*, *чужую птицу*), while the verbalization of a judgment can be presented in the

form of speech utterances (*Чужой птицы не считай – сглазишь. Чужую птицу не считают, можно сглазить. Не надо считать чужую птицу, а то сглазишь*) or in the form of linguistic precedent units (*Видно птицу по полету*). In addition to the symbolic units, let us take a look at units that have the character of a model, for example, models of statements, which help to express one thought (judgment) with various statements (as such folklore sayings: *Чужой птицы не считай – сглазишь // Чужую птицу не считают, можно сглазить // Не надо считать чужую птицу, а то сглазишь*). Models of this kind can be called syntactic (if one model can be used to build very different statements) or lexico-syntactic (if a number of models serve to verbalize the same judgment). Clearly, in our case, we are talking about lexico-syntactic models.

Cognitive conceptualization of information as a mental process when someone thinks of information as a notion should be distinguished from the cultural conceptualization of notions, images or judgments. This last procedure is usually a part of some particular type of activity (scientific, aesthetic, economic, ideological, mythical, etc.). In folklore texts, we deal with this latter type of activity, in which the verbalization affects not only the notions and judgments, but also concepts and conceptually significant judgments, in which, as a rule, several concepts and judgments are interconnected by similarity or contiguity. Therefore, we should distinguish linguistic lexical units from their direct or conceptualized implementation in folklore statements or texts of various types (genres). The lexical realization of a conceptualized notion is often determined by the genre of the utterance or text it is used in. For example, in the study of the implementation of the concept of bird, it is necessary to distinguish textual genres (fairy tales, legends, songs) from non-textual ones (a statement or a short sequence of statements that do not form a complete text).

b. functional criterion

The genre function of speech determines how the lexical implementations of the concept of bird are used in folklore. Thus, to investigate how this concept functions in speech utterances or texts, we should look at ways of verbalizing this concept typical for a particular genre of oral folk art. In this case, we will no longer have to focus on individual utterances (defined as *folklore sayings*) but on this genre as a model for constructing a speech unit. The semasiological framework of linguistic research (from texts or statements to their content and from it to meaning) may reveal that there are various folklore texts about, say, a cuckoo or a rooster, but there are no such texts about seagulls (this approach, however, implies studying the texts in which the words *cock* and *cuckoo* are used, but the word *seagull* is not

used). With such an approach, there is a risk that some objects will not be considered since there are no texts about them. Based on the idea that the text is secondary, while what we want to talk about the object in the text is primary (i.e., with the onomasiological approach), the source material is not a speech form but a concept or judgment. The object of the verbalization study is not the sign but the model of sign formation. The model indicates the fundamentally important content aspects and semantic shades of the verbalized notion or judgments containing this notion.

The models regarding the construction of the whole types of statements or texts that are united thematically and functionally (by the type of activity implementation), rather than not separate statements or texts, can be either open or closed. A closed model is a model with a highly narrowed topic, pragmatics, and a limited type of activity implementation. It can also be called a *genre*. Any model subject to a particular canon can be called a *genre*. Folklore sayings as statements or relatively free sequences of statements are formed according to such closed models. In their structure, sayings are close to precedent statements (for example, riddles, proverbs, aphorisms) or precedent texts (for example, oaths, commitments, ritual texts). However, the sayings are not precedent (neither from the lexical composition point of view nor the syntactic structure). They can vary quite widely. Nevertheless, their **genre model** is indeed of precedent character: superstition, sign or mythical conclusion are guessed and recognized relatively easily, even if someone hears them for the first time.

The studied folklore sayings, which are formed according to a specific thematic model, differ from ordinary precedent statements in that, like texts, they are very clearly tied to genres. In comparison, precedent statements are not always connected with genres. Proverbs, sayings and maxims can be used in different communication situations and in entirely different discourses, and if so, their genre definition is fuzzy and blurry which makes their genre difficult to define. Similarly, phraseological units, phrasemes (linguistic clichés) and words lack a rigid genre definition. According to the type of formal organization, folklore sayings are closer to prosaic folklore texts.

The conceptualization of the notion of bird may differ in different folklore genres. Why is it impossible to consider its lexical implementations as a universal means of expressing meaning in such linguistic precedent units as proverbs and sayings and even in folklore genres such as folk tales and songs? Texts and structural units of the oral folk tradition may undergo change. Their origin was dictated by practical, magical or mythical purposes rather than the purposes of entertainment like today. It is difficult to say definitively what kind of conceptualization procedures would be applied to the notion of bird in such thematically and functionally diverse genres as folk tale or folk

song. Similarly, the thematic and activity spectrum of proverbs and sayings is even wider. In this sense, the most structured and defined thematically and functionally are the folklore sayings.

According to the form, the following subgenres of sayings with the concept of bird can be distinguished: appeals, weather forecasts, healing, incantations, descriptions of customs and economic activities, predictions, divination, interpretation or conjuring of dreams, by-words accompanying actions, beliefs, incantations, observations, everyday descriptions, etc. In each of these subgenres, the primary mythical conceptualization may be based on the concept of a bird: in one case, what the bird does or looks like can predict the future or explain the hidden meaning; in the other, the behaviour of the bird or what happens to it can help in determining social or economic actions; in the third – certain aspects of a bird's life can help in influencing the forces of nature.

The typology of folklore genres is based not only on the allocation of appropriate models according to the form of the activity carried out but also considers the pragmatically defined content of the folklore unit.

c. semantic criterion

The third criterion, i.e., the semantic pragmatics of a folklore unit, makes it possible to consider the unit under study within the framework of each genre, text or statement. The same cognitive unit (concept or judgment) has the broadest range of properties, each of which has the potential to become an object of cultural conceptualization within the framework of a particular folklore genre. Thus, the bird itself, its flight, incubation of eggs, color, wings, feathers, character, dwelling place, time of its functioning, the ways it is used by a person, and the like can be conceptualized in folklore sayings. Therefore, we should very clearly define how the semantics of folklore saying is structured, i.e., what exactly is said, which aspects are highlighted in it, etc. Based on the reference characteristics of a bird (its qualities, features, actions, etc., including its species characteristics) in a verbal unit, an assessment can be:

- categorical (prototype, assessment of the bird as such),
- subjective (assessment of the bird as the subject of action),
- object-active (assessment of a bird as an object of human activity),
- attributive (assessment of bird attributes),
- procedural (assessment of the bird's actions),
- local procedural (assessment of the place of action of the bird),
- temporal-procedural (assessment of the time of the bird's action),
- procedural-objective (assessment of the object of influence by the bird) or
- quantitative (assessment of groups of birds).


d. pragmatic criterion

The last criterion for the typology of folklore sayings with the notion of bird is the axiology of their genre types. Considering this criterion, the material's typology is based on the semantic models of behavior that underlie certain types of sayings.

We analyze the axiology of the selected units through **the assessment of the significance** (role) of the concept of bird (or the conceptual judgment about the bird as such) in the semantics of the saying (meaning the definition of their role by the subject of folklore experience). Within the framework of the theory and practice of subjective experience, we distinguish three types of assessments: **mundane mythological**, cognitive-magical and magical. In all cases, concepts or conceptual judgments are mytheme or mythologeme.

The pragmatics of folklore sayings can be demonstrated using the scheme of types of human experience proposed by O. Leszczak [Лещак 2016: 7], which identifies six basic types of experiential activity and six macro discourses: three real ones – everyday life, economics and social life, and three virtual ones – science, art and philosophy. Since this scheme is built based on the fractal principle, every section can be represented as a sphere built on the same foundations as the entire experience scheme. Therefore, let us present the everyday part of the experience as a full-fledged sphere in which one can single out one's everyday, economic, social, cognitive, aesthetic and worldview problems. If, however, we take into account that our task is not to represent the entire everyday sphere of experience, but only that of its ordinary mythological part, which is "regulated" by folklore (more specifically, folklore sayings), we can eliminate the everyday (physiological and vital) component, as well as combine all the virtual aspects of mythological everyday life into one – worldview (in the everyday form of experience there is no rigid opposition of cognition, comprehension and aesthetic experience). Hence, the pragmatic (axiological) typology of folklore sayings could be represented as follows:

Pragmatic scheme of sayings in the discourse of folklore



Conclusions

The Russian folklore and spoken genre of folklore sayings, expressing beliefs and prejudices associated with birds, is a peculiar way of organizing and interpreting objective reality and depends equally on the ordinary mythical understanding of natural phenomena and everyday, economic or ethical conditions of communication in society. The primary specific feature of folklore activity and folklore discourse is the cognitive-magical and mythological pragmatics and the semantics of the cognitive and sign units used in them.

The object of our study is folklore sayings as speech signs organized within the framework of a single genre pragma-semantic model that serves to verbalize judgments (or reasoning) of a narrative, descriptive, deliberative or prescriptive (often magical) nature about a bird as an object of ordinary mythological knowledge about the world or human experience. Unlike reproduced precedent statements (paroemias, maxims, sayings, etc.), folklore sayings that variably verbalize the same mythical judgment are speech signs (utterances or super-phrasal units) united by genre properties. The main property is the representation in a compressed but syntactically free form of the quintessence of knowledge about a certain fragment of the mythological picture of the world. Most often, this is a valuable observation (the so-called “folk wisdom”) or an indication of how one should or should not behave in society or nature (“useful advice”, “wise warning”) or a recommendation related to contact with otherworldly forces. In our case, the thematic binder of


all units of this type is the concept of bird, which is quite frequent and characteristic of Russian folklore. Quite often, such advice or prohibitions and valuable observations or magical knowledge are associated precisely with the bird concept.

The grounds for the typology of the lexical realizations of the concept of bird in folklore sayings described in this work can be in the nature of successive steps of the **structural** (defining the essence of the folklore saying and the lexical implementation of the notion/concept), **functional** (defining the genre features of the folklore saying), **pragma-semantic** (determining the semantic potential of the notion/concept) and **pragmatic** (the definition of the pragmatics of folklore sayings) character. The proposed principles of linguo-semiotic typology considered as conceptual prerequisites for analyzing lexical implementations of the concept of bird in the investigated material allow us to adequately approach the analysis of actual speech facts.

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The Problems
of Conceptualization
in Social Sciences

Axiological Conceptualization of the Cultural and Civilizational Space of Human Experience

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Abstract. This section is devoted to conceptualizing society's cultural-civilizational system (model). It presents the anthropocentric concept of civilization as a mental and axiological function of human macrosocial experience. The author proposes the allocation of a system of eight basic cultural and civilizational systems: turanism, tribalism, corporatism, statism, ideocracy, theocracy, consumptionism and civil system based on specific values and principles. This section also proposes a methodology for analyzing communities of various types based on mixing basic types according to the "dominant – subdominant" principle.

Foundations of the axiological typology of cultural and civilizational space (introductory remarks)

One of the three criteria for a typology of human experience understood as life activities in the natural, technological and social environment (for more on this, see: [Leszczak 2008]) is the motivation or causal conditioning of human behavior. It's important to establish the ontological essence of activity on a scale of "real (objective) – virtual (informational)" and determine the functional focus on streamlining the objective environment (rationalization) and the social environment (emotionalization). Moreover, to understand and describe the nature of human experience, it is essential to understand the reasons for different types of activity.

The fundamental typological difference in the motivation for a given activity is based on the volitional attitudes of "desire (individual-personal motivation) – duty (social motivation)" or on the opposition of "creativity – imitation". Suppose we abstract from the individual motives that characterize each person's behavior and focus only on social motivations. In that case, we can observe our causal typological scale, organized according to the degree of synergy or cyberneticity of motives.

The most cybernetic are social motives of an institutional or legal nature. Legislation and administrative regulations governing human activities result from reasoned, intentional and strong-willed decisions of state or self-government and political bodies (including education and media influence). Traditional attitudes formed through social self-organization are at the opposite end of this typological scale. The behavior of a person who obeys tribal, folk, ethnocultural or cultural-civilizational traditions is often completely synergistic and subconscious.

Such motivational mindsets are the most powerful. They take root in minds from early childhood, are formed during everyday socialization, become a habit, “second nature”, the ultimate truth, i.e., are mythologized. These motivational mindsets determine what is commonly called the collective or public consciousness, as well as the public worldview or mentality.

The studies of many philosophers, sociologists, cultural theorists and researchers of worldviews (A. Toynbee, N. Berdyaev, O. Spengler, F. Konieczny, S. Huntington, P. Sorokin, J. Kossecki, R. Pietrowsky, O. Leszczak) demonstrate the reducibility of the entire diversity of the so-called “collective” worldviews to a certain number of types that are fundamentally different from each other according to the axiological principle, i.e. according to the hierarchy of value systems adopted in them.

The typology of cultural and civilizational systems of social organization proposed in this paper is based on the following principles of differentiation of key values:

- “collectivism – individualism”
- “reality – virtuality”,
- “synergism – cybernetism”

From the perspective of the key subject and beneficiary of the social structure, all systems of social organization can be divided into two types (collectivist and individualistic) and at the same time into three stages – pre-institutional (naturalistic), institutional (metaphysical) and post-institutional (anthropocentric or individualistic). At the first stage of the development and organization of cultural and civilizational social systems, collectivist values of a vital and utilitarian nature dominate – the life and safety of society, as well as its welfare and traditions. In the future, various kinds of institutions – classes/castes, states, religions and ideologies – become the primary collective beneficiary of the social structure. Finally, at a particular stage in the development of social relations, the role of the human personality becomes so important that the individual is perceived as the center of the axiologization of the picture of the world.

The second criterion involves the dominance of values of the vital-economic (natural systems) or ethical-ideological (virtual systems) type. In sys-

tems of a natural type, material goods (welfare), blood and compatriot relations, physical power, material position, and social status dominate ideology, moral and ethical values and status. In virtual societies, on the contrary, information factors dominate.

Finally, synergetic systems are distinguished by the dominance of causal motives for the organization of a social structure (self-establishment), while teleology (goal setting) and conscious control dominate in cybernetic systems. Furthermore, in systems of the synergetic type, tradition is critical – folk, social, religious and self-organization (market or civil), while cybernetic systems are characterized by voluntarism (leader, state apparatus) or passionarity (ideologists, citizens). If we try to bring all these criteria together, we can present our typological proposal in the form of the following table:

		real		virtual	
		cybernetism	synergism	synergism	cybernetism
collectivism	naturalism	turanism	tribalism		
	institutionalism	statism	corporatism	theocracy	ideocracy
individualism		consumptionism		civilian model	

As we can see, this proposal contains only eight fundamentally different cultural and civilizational types of social organization: two naturalistic types (nomadic tribalism and nomadic turanism), four institutional types (elite-class corporatism, statism, theocracy and ideocracy), and two individualistic or anthropocentric types (consumptionism and civil model).

It is easy to understand that with a tribal, caste or theocratic organizational system, the synergy of tradition is much more critical than cybernetic management procedures. In comparison, essentially militaristic turanism, statism based on vertical power structures and ideocracy based on direct ideological control should be classified as cybernetic systems.

The fact that free-market self-regulation and entrepreneurship (entrepreneurial initiative) are both critical in the consumption system, and public self-government and civic activity are both important in the civil system allows us to qualify them as mixed types from the point of view of the third criterion.

Each of these types has its hierarchy of fundamental values and its system for providing these values in the form of a hierarchy of principles. In the Kantian tradition, values can be seen as the ideals of pure reason and the principles of their realization as maxims of social behavior and the management of society. At the same time, values are the axiological foundations of worldviews characteristic of a given system of social structure. Spreading

in the public information space, they form the consciousness of individuals belonging to these systems. They are also the targets for the formation of ideologies and philosophical and political concepts. A completely different role is assigned to cultural and civilizational principles. They serve as socio-political, administrative and ideological tools used by those in power to manage society or as mechanisms for introducing the values mentioned above into the public consciousness. Let us consider the values and principles of each type of cultural and civilizational organization.

Values and principles of the main cultural and civilizational systems of social organization

Turanism (leader-centric, military system)

Values: military community, leader, war (conflict), power (including violence), brotherhood in arms, obedience (to leader/duty).

Principles: expansionism, militarism, voluntarism, impulsiveness, legal nihilism.

Other attributes: spatial dynamism, masculine culture, collective passionarity, fear/devotion to the leader, extensive utilitarianism, irrationalism, the immediacy of power, high cybernetism (controllability) (for more on the Turanian civilization, see: [Koneczny 1935; Гумилев 1989; Leszczak 2014]).

Tribalism (natural, communal system)

Values: natural (tribal, local) community, life and health of the community, folk tradition, native land as sacrum.

Principles: collectivism, the power of the elders, practicality, intuitionism, spiritual religiosity (immanent religiosity), legal indifference.

Other attributes: spatial and temporal statics, devotion to the community, extreme utilitarianism, irrationalism, emotionality, distrust of institutions and formal decisions, and social synergy (self-government) (Leszczak proposed distinct tribalism as a cultural and civilizational type, first under the name of paganism [Leszczak 2014], and later as tribalism [Leszczak 2017]).

Corporationism (elitist hierarchical society)

Values: power and social hierarchy, the autonomy of public institutions, ethos, private property.

Principles: corporate law (privileges), elite corporate culture, ideology/historicism, cultural traditionalism.

Other attributes: social stratification of society, caste, metaphysical foundations of social structure, cultural synergy and statics (petrification of social stratification), high axiologism of public information, and aestheticism.

Statism (society of state domination)

Values: state power, statutory law, administrative hierarchy (power vertical), state property.

Principles: bureaucratic formalism, performing culture, historicism, ideology, hypostasis of formal institutions.

Other attributes: the metaphysical foundations of state power, legalism, state expansionism (including imperialism), and monumentalism (elevation, pathos) (Leszczak [2014] proposed this type as a variety of so-called *byzantinism*).

Theocracy (religious society)

Values: God/religious faith, eschatology, religious community (monotheism), sacred sacrifice.

Principles: clerocracy, religious law and ethics, religious elitism, charity (helping the needy), religious esotericism, sacred initiation.

Other attributes: fideism, religious transcendence of socially significant information, symbolism, “natural” law and traditionalism of mores (up to fundamentalism), temporal statics (petrification of the social order) (for more on theocracy as a sacred civilization, see: [Koneczny 1935; Huntington 2002; Kossecki 2003; Piotrowski 2003]).

Ideocracy (secular ideologized society)

Values: belief in a social idea, unanimity, metaphysical intra-group brotherhood.

Principles: partocracy, system of state (administrative) violence, populist propaganda, ideologized ethics and law, futurism.

Other attributes: dynamism, transcendent foundations of public information, high information cybernetism (management of public opinion).

Consumptionism (consumer society)

Values: freedom + individual property, prestige, equality, individual welfare, tolerance, life and health.

Principles: free market, state of law, security, democracy, civil society institutions, standardization, globalism (economic expansionism), pop culture, peace.

Other attributes: economic dynamism and innovation, mercantilization of ethics and law, hedonism, egocentrism, economic initiative and passionarity, protection of consumer rights, and the cult of success (for more on this type, see: [Peculiarity of Man 2012]).

Civil system (liberal democratic society)

Values: human dignity, brotherhood, equality, freedom, life and health.

Principles: civil society institutions, tolerance, solidarity, democracy, the rule of law, the welfare of the society, a socially oriented market economy, peace, rationalism.

Other attributes: synergy of public opinion, panetism, the supremacy of human rights, focus on cooperation and self-government, personal passionarity and responsibility, and active citizenship (for more on the value system of the civic model, see our work: [Stefański 2014]).

Methodology of cultural and civilizational analysis of the real situation of social experience (concluding remarks)

When discussing the peculiarities of the analysis of real social groups, starting with individual families, clans, tribes and ethnos and ending with macrosocial communities called cultures and civilizations, it is worth emphasizing that, under the anthropocentric methodology, all such social beings are understood as functions of the socialization of individual people and not as real metaphysical creations. An ancestral or national mentality can only exist as a system of values in the consciousness (and subconsciousness) of individual people.

Therefore, when analyzing Polish, Ukrainian or Russian mentalities, it is worth remembering that we are referring to a system of socialized values of specific Poles, Ukrainians or Russians [see also: Leszczak 2014].

However, individuals of Polish, Ukrainian or Russian nationality may be pretty diverse within their community: there are Ukrainians, Poles and Russians whose cultural and civilization values are tribalistic, which unites them against national differences, and at the same time, there are Poles with turanist, corporate, civil or theocratic views, which divides them against their national unity. Talking about the Polish, Ukrainian or Russian mentality is always an assessment of some dominant cultural and civilization features in the social consciousness of most representatives of this or that society. In every society, one can find tribalists, turanians, statist, corporatists, theocrats, ideocrats, and representatives of consumerism or the civil system. Ones are in the major, and their discourse is more meaningful and momentous, while others are in minor, and their narrative does not reach the public debate.

Moreover, two methodological postulates must not be forgotten. First, neither communities nor individuals are representatives of “pure” civilization or cultural systems. There are often eclectic constructions in the consciousness

of a single person, in which case values characteristic of entirely different cultural and civilization types are present. The reasons for this phenomenon can be sought in the history of migrations and contacts, in the globalization of the modern information space, and in the universalization of economic and socio-political relations under the pressure of American consumerism and the European ideological expansion of the values of civil society.

The second postulate is that in today's information age and media globalization, it is difficult to see the cultural and civilization features described in this work (both values and principles) in their "pure" form. The coexistence of several cultural and civilization systems in the same ethnic area and in one person's consciousness leads to mutual interactions, especially on the part of dominant systems. Considering the dominance of the corporate system in the Polish mentality, the tribalistic system in the Ukrainian mentality and the turanist system in the Russian mentality, it can be said that a Polish statistician may be significantly different from Ukrainian and Russian statisticians. The Russian ideocrat has a different cultural and civilizational disposition than the Polish or Ukrainian ideocrat. However, some relevant patterns of their behavior may match.

A question may arise: if the real situation always looks different than the system of "pure" models of the cultural and civilization organization of a society proposed above, what is the informative value of this system? The answer is straightforward – it is a methodological tool for researching real, historical ethnocultural and socio-cultural communities, enabling the disclosure of the most detailed variations and differences in a people's behavior in specific situations using universal conceptual categories.

One of the essential methodological steps for improving the proposed typology of cultural and civilizational systems of social organization is the primary typological scheme for mixing these models according to the principle of dominant and subdominant. In the real world, the combination is always more complex, suggesting the co-presence in one object of analysis (the mind of an individual, a social group, a people) of features of all eight types at once in various configurations. In such cases, along with dominants (basic features) and subdominants (secondary features), subordinates (particular features) and marginals (sporadically occurring features) can also be observed. However, the creation of such a complete typological scheme is challenging because the number of variables is too large, and connecting new subdominants, subordinates and marginals to one basic relation "dominant – subdominant" can significantly change the overall picture of the world of the analyzed object.

As seen from the diagram below, even considering only two variables gives an additional 56 mixed options alongside the eight pure types.

sub-dominant dominant	turanism	tribalism	corporatism	ideocracy	theocracy	statism	civil	consumptionism
turanism	MILITARY NOMADISM	shepherd-hunting / commercial / existential nomadism extremism / moral despotism	class militarism elite militarism class / caste/ ethnic despotism	state militarism state terrorism	religious radicalism religious militarism religious despotism	ideological extremism ideological militarism nationalist / racist despotism	civil disobedience liberal-democratic radicalism	kleptocracy organized crime groups social Darwinism
tribalism	militarized local community xenophobic / aggressive local community	AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY	social hierarchy of the traditional community ethnically stratified / closed local community	nepotism / cronyism traditional absenteeism	ethno-religious community / local religious community / religious commune	popular anarchy egalitarian commune local government open egalitarian local communities	anarchy egalitarian commune local government open egalitarian	cooperative (professional) community utilitarian local or professional community
corporatism	military elitism	local-folk elitism clientelism racial and ethnic elitism	CUSTOM SOCIETY	oligarchy state aristocracy	religious elitism religious castes	liberal-democratic elitism economic self-governance meritocracy	democratic elitism economic self-governance	economic corporatism plutocracy
statism	despotic autocracy police state absolutism authoritarianism	anocracy ochocracy patriarchy gerontocracy	state of classes state monarchy constitutional monarchy aristocratic republic bureaucracy	STRONG CENTRALIZED STATE	clerical state religious dictatorship	totalitarianism partocratic dictatorship state missionary imperialism	welfare state polyarchy welfare state rule of law	technocracy neoliberal state
theocracy	military theocracy despotic theocracy	tribal theocracy obscurantism theocratic communism	caste (elite) theocracy particular theocracy, religious sectarianism	hierocracy	RELIGIOUS SOCIETY	religious mysticism / dogmatism / fanaticism / fundamentalism messianism	democratic theocracy liberal theocracy	consumer-commercial theocracy ethical capitalism distributionism
ideocracy	dictatorship of the proletariat agrarian communism Nazism / chauvinism / racism / fascism / militarism	moral racism genetic populism popular nationalism social populism national anarchism national communism	elitism / conservatism class nationalism ethnocracy secular sectarianism	partocracy state ideology (republicanism, monarchism)	clerical society religious populism religious xenophobia quasi-religious movements	IDEOLOGICAL SOCIETY	extreme liberalism extreme egalitarianism extreme pacifism	economic populism anarcho-capitalism libertarianism, neoliberalism
civil	anarcho-communism illegalism insurrectionism	anarcho-collectivism	mediocracy conciliationism corporate institutions of civil society	liberal and social democracy legal state	religious anarchism religious democracy	moral liberalism egalitarianism / direct democracy	CIVIL SOCIETY	economic liberalism
consumptionism	society of aggressive free-market egoism	mercantilism egocentric vitalism	corporate consumerism netocracy	state consumerism	commercialization of religion religious commerce	turbo-capitalism ethical capitalism	social and market consumerism welfare society	CONSUMER SOCIETY

The table shows the dominant types horizontally and the subdominant types vertically. The cells at the intersection represent the most distinct subtypes of the organization of societies or communities of various orders (from communes, sects or small, local communities to ethnic, ideological, political, religious or public social formations). This typological sketch can be interpreted, on the one hand, as a particular methodological proposal that can serve as a tool for analyzing real communities, and, on the other hand, as an exemplification of the idea of an anthropocentric understanding of the cultural and civilizational type of social organization through a hierarchy of values and principles.

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Optional Democracy and the Attempt to Conceptualize It

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Abstract. Few scholars have paid attention to the emergence of a new form of quasi-democracy – also optional democracy – that primarily occurs in Central and Eastern Europe and is mistakenly defined as a simple verbal manipulation in the linguistic image of the world of politics and the extralinguistic image of the world of the so-called common man. This article is an attempt to conceptualize the idea of optional democracy in terms of its presence in the linguistic image of democracy and as a form of a new socio-political entity separated from broadly understood democratic systems. The article assumes that the linguistic image of the world of the “democrats” in optional democracy consists of plexes, available at the level of the linguistic perception of the common man: simplex (the simplest presentation of information that states a fact/“fact” without comment), complex (extended information with basic comments understandable to the common man), multiplex (full information including comments, conclusions and analysis in accordance with the principles of populism, a little something for everyone in here), omnplex (multi-lateral information that includes not only comments, arguments and conclusions, but also a description of the possibility of, e.g., “redress” in the form of legal acts, resolutions, wars, etc.).

*Les mots, les phrases, les expressions
que vous utilisez et que vous entendez quotidiennement
laissent des traces beaucoup plus marquantes que vous ne l'imaginez¹.*

Yanick Tremblay

*My jesteśmy w demokracji.
A dlaczego mamy być w demokracji jakiegokolwiek przymiotnikowej?
A ja nie chcę demokracji przymiotnikowej, ja chcę demokrację normalną².*

Witold Waszczykowski

¹ *The words, sentences, expressions that you use and that you hear on a daily basis leave much more lasting traces than you imagine* (English translation – G.M.).

² *We are in a democracy. And why should we be in any adjectival democracy? But I don't want the adjectival democracy, I want a normal democracy* (English translation – G.M.).

Introduction

For over 20 years, researchers have notoriously analyzed liberal (or illiberal) democracy – its various forms, revelations and influences on socio-politics, economics, etc. [cf. Uitz 2015: 279–300; Mounk 2018; Surowiec, Štětka 2020: 1–8; Piotrowski 2020: 196–214; Smith, Ziegler 2008: 31–57; Zakaria 1997: 22–43, etc.], and almost every persuasive political discourse is characterized as a manipulation of public opinion [cf. Sonik 2020] or as an *election bribe* [cf. Sobczak 2019], etc. Unfortunately few scholars to date have paid attention to the emergence of a new (often verbal) form of quasi-democracy – the so-called *optional democracy*, which is mistakenly defined as a mere manipulation of the linguistic image of the world of politics and in the non-linguistic image of the world of the so-called *common man*³ (i.e., the most important element of democracy – the *voters*).

This chapter is an attempt to conceptualize the concept of *optional democracy* in terms of its presence in the linguistic image of democracy, as a form of a new socio-political entity separated from democracy broadly understood.

Conceptualization

The very notion of *conceptualization* in principle

consists in defining the key concepts for the study, describing phenomena that are the subject of research interest, and in determining the relationship between these concepts (...). In the case of scientific research in the social sciences, a properly prepared conceptualization should refer to theories about phenomena that are the subject of the researcher's interest. The key feature of a good conceptualization is its precision in defining the terms used (...) [Magierowski 2013].

One can also reach for a polish dictionary definition of *konceptualizacja* (conceptualization), which claims that it is “the process of creating concepts based on general knowledge about the world by determining the problem and defining a given word” [SJPPWN], or it is “a procedure whose aim is precisely defining the research problem, terms and indicators used to de-

³ Whenever *common man* is mentioned in this chapter it refers to the an average person, one who does not stand out [cf. Bańko 2002], apart from having an electoral vote.

scribe it, and determining the methods, techniques and tools with which the research will be carried out” [Dobrebadiana.pl].

Some sources almost equate *conceptualization* with *categorization*, meaning the process of using categories (notions) [Grabarczyk 2013: 456] because “one doesn’t know where to draw the border between purely perceptual and conceptual categories” [ibid. 463]. Based on the analysis of the relevant literature, it can be concluded that, regardless of the field of science, *most authors treat the terms ‘formulation’ and ‘conceptualization’ as synonyms* [cf. Słysz 2017: 14].

These deliberations may go on indefinitely because there is no specific definition of conceptualization for *optional democracy*. In other words, in this case, it must be assumed that it refers to the general idea or concept of *optional democracy*, combining all its (recognized) features or specified attributes [Dictionary.com].

In this part of the article, one more question remains: why is conceptualization so important in terms of the cognition of *optional democracy*? We are talking about a specific form of democracy that lies between autocracy and democracy (in the classic sense of the people’s rule) and we can consider it as a specific (gentle) transition period from democracy to autocracy [cf. Alizada et al. 2021]. This transformation, which can be conventionally regressive, is an accomplished fact, evidenced by the results of the elections of populist governments. In “recent years, populists have taken power in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and right-wing populist movements are raising their heads higher and higher also in France, Spain, the United Kingdom and other countries” [Zagrożenie...]. The *case of Venezuela Hugo Chávez and Bolivia Evo Morales* can also be mentioned [Ratke-Majewska 2014: 227–249; cf. Wysocka 2011; *Populism...*].

Despite the (often unjustified) doubts of the scientific community, in this case, one should agree even (but not only) with the popular Wikipedia in English and French that there is also a distinction between a *notion* as a pre-theoretical concept; and a *concept* as one that has already been theorized; conceptualization is the process taking place between the two [cf. Khairullina 2018: 303–313; Balacheff 1995: 219–244; TLFi; Wikipedia.org]. Therefore, in this attempt to conceptualize *optional democracy*, I must assume that we are dealing with the process of creating concepts based on general knowledge about at the very least the linguistic perception of *democracy* by establishing the issues and defining the processes taking place in the linguistic image of the world of *optional democracy* – something such as “finding the concepts to present knowledge about the problem” [cf. Wikipedia.org, KJP PWN]. So, conceptualization is also about “shaping the concept of something, interpreting something in a conceptual [...] way [...]” [Zgółkowska

1998, t. 17: 111] because it is the process of “breaking and converting research ideas into common meanings to develop an agreement among the users” [Sequeira 2014: 1].

Persistence of the concept of *optional democracy*

The simplest and shortest definition of the verbal perception of this (new) conventionally called *optional democracy* is a colloquial concept of *something nice for everyone*. In other words, we choose (at least verbally) for each voter (that is, the *common man*) what s/he wants to hear or what s/he wants to believe or imagine.

Due to the already mentioned omissions, the formation of a practically “independent” *optional democracy* is slowly being crystallized as a process of consolidation of a conglomerate of various discourses in the language of both the political opposition and the authorities. This, in turn, strengthens its influence on the political (i.e., election) decisions of the *common man*. What is more, the populist language in political discourse begins to reveal itself to the *common man* as simply popular (not populist), i.e., understandable (building at the same time a certain primitive culture for the quasi-broad masses⁴).

The above-mentioned situation is still called *democracy*, but the extralinguistic similarities to *proletcult*⁵ and *a red professorship*⁶ are already visible. These phenomena have been observed for about 10 years in the political discourse, for example, in Poland (the flourishing of the art of *disco polo*, Polish TV elevated to the highest viewership, and the reform of university education by Jarosław Gowin, which, as O. Leszczak calls it, particularly “demonstrates” the *fight for the measurability and visibility of the results of scientific research leading to the emergence of various kind of virtual and quite fictitious factors of influence, indexation and evaluation indicators that significantly blur the line between science as creativity and economy as the*

⁴ “Illiberal democracy negates cultural pluralism as undermining the desired unity of society. [...] [A] new, illiberal consensus emerges regarding the unquestionable rights of the majority [...]” [Antoszewski 2018: 18].

⁵ *Proletkult* (acronym from Russian *пролетарская культура* [*proletarian culture*]) – a cultural organization operating between the years 1917–1932 in Soviet Russia and then in the USSR, aimed at developing a new class culture of the proletariat.

⁶ The Institute of the Red Professorship (Russian: *Институт красной профессуры*) in the years 1921–1938 was a university preparing cadres dealing with social sciences at Soviet universities in terms of compliance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

production of material social goods, etc.). However, it is still in the transitional stage of the *optional democracy* based on an absence of principles and the presence of only primitive satisfaction of basic needs: everyone will hear something pleasant for themselves (not necessarily meaningful), which paves the way first to linguistic despotism, and later it has not been ruled out that to actual despotism [Откуда взялась...; Степанов 2019; Сергеев 2019; Егоров 2018].

In the last 10-15 years there has also been a specific extra-linguistic geographic area of this *optional democracy* from the epicenter in Eastern Europe up to the Huntington (red) line⁷ [Huntington 2005: 14–22]. In addition to the countries mentioned as the epicenter, even the countries with a mature democracy (with centuries of experience of a civil state), e.g., France (Le Pen's success), Germany (parliamentary promotion of the Alternative for Germany) etc., are queuing up to “implement” the *optional democracy*.

It is here that the following linguistic areas of the *optional democracy* influence the perception of the reality of the abovementioned *common man* by strengthening at least:

- a xenophobic area (with aggressive infantilism) with a transition from a linguistic to a non-linguistic image of the world (hatred of strangers or alleged strangers, the desire to dominate them, etc.),
- an area of inflated pride in one's own uniqueness: a popular/populist linguistic image of the world dominated by primitivist cultural features (the extra-linguistic area is closed in its own country, e.g., Russia which is proud of its exceptionally “fast” development and disgusted because of the “backwardness” of the West [Гома 2015; Тренин 2006; Россия и Европа; Дубровин 2019], etc.),
- the area of concealing mediocrity and lack of personal achievements (mocking the *not-mediocre* and highly developed people based on the psychological defence mechanism of rationalization⁸), etc.

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⁸ Justifying or advocating in a rational manner the attitudes and actions (deeds) conditioned by emotional factors or motives that the individual wishes to hide or are not fully aware of. Psychoanalysts consider the rationalization as a personality defense mechanism that reduces or eliminates internal conflicts [Racjonalizacja 2010].

In other words, a linguistic/narrative pride of extraordinary national superiority is built as a linguistic image of the world of uniqueness but without the necessity of an extra-linguistic reality: a closed circle of linguistic ideas about self-perfection in a non-linguistic image of the world distances every society from (liberal?) *democracy* towards Russia, Belarus, Turkey, etc.

From the above perspective, specific issues arise that require:

- searching for/identifying the “language complex” of *optional democracy*,
- revealing the genesis of *optional democracy* and its erroneous definition as a common manipulation in the linguistic image of the world of politics and the extra-linguistic image of the world of the *common man*; it is about functioning as an independent (but only linguistic) form of the democracy, which does not exist as a non-linguistic entity,
- analysis of the linguistic perception of a multi-vector narrative by representatives of various trends in *democracy*, in particular, against the background of the linguistic image of the world.

The lack of above-mentioned studies, i.e., the lack of knowledge in these areas, causes the *optional democracy* creeping westward to be a linguistically attractive phenomenon for the *common man*, with particular emphasis on the extra-linguistic image of the world of dissatisfaction with *liberal democracy* [cf. Dorociak 2019; Dobrowolski 2017: 151–168; Zmierczak 2019: 465–474; Zmierch...; Wike, Silver, Castillo 2019, Galston 2020: 8–24, Wegscheider 2020]. A vivid illustration can be the example of over 40% of French voting in the presidential elections of 2022 for Marine Le Pen, who perceive her as a nice person and not a threat to democracy [see: *Élections...*; Kucharczyk 2022].

Based on my previous research and analyzes (and the judgments presented above), I have also divided the conceptualization of the linguistic image of the world of “democrats” in *optional democracy* into so-called vector plexes (i.e., targeted into specific activities), available at the level of linguistic perception of the *common man*:

- *simplex* (the simplest piece of information that states a fact or “fact” without any comments),
- *complex* (extended information containing the basic elements of comments understandable to a *common man*),
- *multiplex* (full information including comments, conclusions and analyzes in accordance with the principle of populism – *something nice for everyone*),
- *omniplex* (multilateral information that includes not only comments, arguments and conclusions, but also a description of the possibility of f.e. “redress” in the form of legal acts, resolutions, wars, etc.).

The aforementioned plexes are of a universal nature and are not only the *concepts* of materialization of the narrative of *optional democracy* but also

specific consequences of this narrative in the forms of audio, video, episto, i.e., the phenomenon of information, analysis, commentaries, lawsuits, wars, possible redress, etc. It is peculiar “the picturing of the scene [imagery/construal]: is the ability to construct situations in various ways to capture thoughts. The meaning is a function of both elements: the conceptual content and the image superimposed on it [...]” [Waszakowa 2020: 14]. Thus, “meaning is treated as a conceptualization related to linguistic expressions” [ibid. 11]. That is, if any of the plexes (itself) is a mental concept from the linguistic image of the world, its materialization in the above-mentioned characters is the result of external interaction with the extra-linguistic image of the world. It is not just about imaging mental concepts. Rather, it is necessary to talk about their tangible materialization (some specific benefits from the implementation of plexes – some new areas, compensation, loot, contributions, etc).

Thus, it can be assumed that it is about *conceptualization* at the same time and, resulting from the *conceptualization*, *verbalization* and, only then, *materialization*. Such a simple sequence of events may raise doubts as to their impact on extra-linguistic reality because there is a close relationship between *conceptualization* and *verbalization* [ibid. 21]. Indeed, “[...] meaning is identified not with notions but with conceptualizations, and the very choice of the term is precisely intended to underline the dynamic nature of the process. Generally speaking, *conceptualizations* are understood as all events (manifestations) of mental experience, and in their number: (i) new and established concepts; (ii) not only so-called intellectual concepts but also sensory, motor and emotional experiences; (iii) an assessment of the physical, linguistic, social and cultural context; and (iv) concepts that are born “au courant”, during processing, and do not coexist with others. Thus, even if we consider the “notions” themselves to be static beings, the conceptualizations are not [...]” [ibid. 16].

No plex from the linguistic world has to be consistently implemented in the extra-linguistic world (except for wars in the *omniplex*). Each of them, however, can decide on the constitution of mental structures (functioning in the extra-linguistic world) of the, as the Polish controversial right-wing politician J. Kurski put it in a contemptuous phrase *ciemny lud* (dark people) [cf. Watoła 2022; Wszyńska 2005], even on a verbal level.

In the above scope, I was unable to find any research on *optional democracy*. There is simply no definition or recognition of it. Until now, no one has recognized and analyzed its meaning and functioning even as an entity on the plane of the linguistic image of this already existing phenomenon.

The degree of rooting (in the linguistic image of the world) of new (pro) democratic patterns and cultural exemplars (often due to poor (pro)demo-

cratic education in the extra-linguistic image of the world) is so hard to perceive that, at least in the linguistic context, it unequivocally leads to the world of the *closed identity*, which (*as opposed to open identity, which is a necessary feature of civil society*) characterizes an infantile society, is xenophobic and being in love with myths of one's greatness [cf. Sikorski 2021].

Why is this happening?

Verbal rejection of authoritarianism (recognizing/"recognizing" democratic governments as better than other ones) does not rule out the disappointment/dissatisfaction/frustration with (*liberal*) *democracy* and the desire to find something that could replace it [Antoszewski 2018: 12], even at the linguistic level. Moreover, the transition from the so-called *real socialism*⁹ of the extra-linguistic world (especially of the members of the so-called Soviet Bloc) to (*liberal*) *democracy* in the linguistic image of the world of a *common man* is not a *fait accompli* but the result of a political discourse that is often incomprehensible (sometimes is based on some empirical knowledge and the experience of researchers/journalists/politicians). In addition, the transition from a *command and distribution system*¹⁰ to a *market economy* for the majority of the representatives of the Soviet bloc in the linguistic image of their world has not changed into a non-linguistic living reality but to date has often led to the perception of the economic reality as *les illusions perdues*.

The paradoxical contradiction between new capitalist systems (with *liberal democracy*) and the old socialist systems (with socialist democracy¹¹) is strongly emphasized in the discourse of *optional democracy* as the actual contrast of the extra-linguistic image of the world of, e.g., entrepreneurs and the *common man* (especially for *ex homo sovieticus*). As J. Schumpeter mentions

the spectacular rewards, much higher than the need for special effort, fall to a handful of winners, driving much more efficiently than a more equal and 'fair' distribution could the activities of the vast majority of entrepreneurs who receive as a reward for their efforts with very modest gains or nothing or less than nothing, and yet they try their best because they have these big wins before their eyes and they constantly overestimate their chances of similar success [Schumpeter 1995: 90-91].

⁹ *Real socialism*, also known as *developed socialism*, was an ideological slogan promoted during the times of L. Brezhnev in the countries of the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union [cf. Silber 1994; *Brezhnev...*: 3–5, 7; Carden 2020].

¹⁰ It is an economic management system, consisting of top-down orders – decisions are made by a central authority rather than by market participants [cf. Scott 2020; SJPPWN].

¹¹ It is the interpretation that the means of production should be in the hands of the entire population and power in the hands of the people.

Under these circumstances, the anti-system populism of the linguistic image of the quasi-liberal world (and especially of *optional democracy*) is based on the failures of *liberal democracy*.

The lack of a similar (pro)democratic and relatively homogeneous narrative by the so-called democratic political options becomes a self-standing proof of the existence (at least in the linguistic image of the world) of the *optional democracy*. Worse, any (pro)democratic party becomes *de facto* (at least linguistically) democratic only in the case of the narrative against anti-democratic populism (even without the awareness of the linguistic image of democracy and the extra-linguistic image of liberalism).

To the current research on this topic, an interesting place is occupied by the research of O. Leszczak. According to him, the linguistic verbalization in the extra-linguistic world of the so-called *common man* reduces himself to the “presence,” e.g., at political press conferences (instead of real achievements), etc. [cf. Leszczak 2010: 109].

Thus, the linguistics of *optional democracy* with examples of the subconscious message of (*un*)liberal democracy may include at least the following conclusions:

- “the electorate forgets (or does not know) that politics is a zone of emotional persuasion and expects from politicians what simply should not be expected of them: truth, rationality, efficiency, credibility, deep reflection or even common sense. All these are functions outside the field of political agitation and propaganda” [Leszczak 2010: 110], which are at the same time the foundations of *optional democracy*;
- (*liberal*) *democracy* has at its core a rational linguistic image of the world [cf. *ibid.* 111], which does not exist in the case of the *optional democracy*;
- the outer envelope of any democracy as an absolutely political, optional, and sometimes also manipulative entity, conflicts with the extra-linguistic image of the world [cf. *ibid.*].

The legitimacy of *optional democracy*?

After the start of Putin’s war in Ukraine, a new reality has begun emerge that at least in one aspect resembles the end of the 20th century – a somewhat romantic opposition with democracy and civil society against the communist authoritarian regime. If now Russia wins, which does not seem to be a foregone conclusion [*Wojna...*], a new political entity will be created just beyond the eastern border of Poland, an almost identical copy

of Belarus, i.e., a state under the Kremlin rule, which was deprived of any characteristics of civil society. In March 2022, representatives of the US administration presented a rather pessimistic forecast of the further course of the war for Ukraine and assessed that the next wave of Russian troops could overwhelm and break the Ukrainian defense with “numbers alone” [*Administracja...*]. Therefore, if Ukraine even partially moves to the sphere of Russian influence [cf. Zapałowski 2019: 9–28], any hope of a safe and democratic zone in front of authoritarian Russia will completely disappear in our neighborhood.

Under these circumstances, the language of *optional democracy* gains exceptional importance for each political option, at least on the level of verbal communication with the *common man* – how to present to him the ideologies of freedom, law and civil society so that he can understand it without falling into the regressive awls of *optional democracy*?

In at least one country, the far-reaching effects of the *optional democrats'* activities (already in the extra-linguistic image of the world) are visible: “86.6 percent of Russians tolerate and support a potential attack on the territory of the European Union, including Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and others [...]. 75.5 percent of Russians approve of the idea of a military invasion of another country [...]. The [...] countries that, according to the poll, will be attacked by Russia are Poland (75.5%), the Baltic states, including Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia (41%), Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary (39.6%)” [*Sondaż 2022*]. Even the simplest observation shows that the construction (also the content) of *optional democracy's* narrative is quite simple and in this simplicity it is effective, e.g., the above-mentioned Russian-speaking mentality; and contains at least self-delight with its “uniqueness”, e.g., an excerpt from a propagandist’s speech during a program on Russian TV: “I’ll tell you what our children are doing there (*in the war in Ukraine – G.M.*)! They are killing the fascist reptiles (*Ukrainians – G.M.*)! This is the triumph of the Russian army! This is the rebirth of Russia!” [Radkowski 2022] etc.

Unfortunately, no one has so far examined the linguistic aspects of *optional democracy*, no one has analyzed or measured its practical dimension (in terms of the linguistic image of the world) in the processes of social development.

Avoiding the need to analyze the linguistic perception of an already ideologizing *optional democracy*, in particular in the circumstances of propaganda of warfare, will unequivocally lead to the degradation of the perception of the entirety of *democracy*. In these circumstances, only a veiled version of *totalitarianism* is constituted under the title of *optional democracy*, which leads to a long (exhaustive) struggle for the values of a free democratic world.

It should be emphasized that, as regards the linguistic image of the world of *optional democracy*, it has been synthesized that certain so-called peculiarities and events of civic life which “receive different (often antonymic) names depending on the political, ideological and philosophical options of the person using these names : *freedom of expression – offending religious feelings ; natural family planning – Vatican roulette ; planned motherhood – murdering unborn children ; free market – the civilization of death ; peace mission – military intervention ; media monitoring – political censorship ;* etc. These units entering into the linguistic image of the world of a citizen (*common man? G.M.*) create models of ‘mental shortcuts’ and shape his way of discussing social and political issues and gradually supersede his own reflections, feelings and intuition” [Leszczak 2010 : 108–109].

Conclusions

Agreeing with W. Giełżyński, it should be emphasized that, being aware of the above-mentioned problems, in the present conditions, even when looking for the concept of a new (narrative) ideology, “political parties which formerly addressed their slogans to specific classes or social groups, [...] try to represent everyone and please everyone” [Giełżyński 1989: 143]. However, the conceptualization of *optional democracy* allows us to state that the phenomenon of the linguistic image of the world of *democracy* has practically evolved towards the so-called *ambiguities and enigmatization, and their watchwords are more and more slogan and vague* [ibid.], more and more resembling the above-mentioned “something nice for everyone”. This is confirmed by the still valid statement that *all parties, apart from the extreme ones, have lost their ideological identity, “none of them is sure what they are” and does not know how to emphasize their difference from others, and politicians are unable to define concepts such as social justice, equality, people, freedom of initiative, quality of life, etc* [ibid. 143–144]. The lack of ideological identity, at least in the linguistic world, also causes a lack of specific actions aimed at the processes of democratization of the society (also in the extra-linguistic world of the *common man*). What is worse, “the political divisions inherited from the nineteenth century (*also clearly from the twentieth – G.M.*) do not meet the most urgent needs of the world nor the real crystallization of interests on a global or national scale” [ibid. 144] and this ideological disorientation favors processes of at least linguistic conceptualization of the *optional democracy*, which is also a specific ideological departing from *democracy* (*not only liberal?*). However, the problem is much more complicated and this

peculiar transition period from *democracies* through *optional democracy* to a possible *autocracy* has been going on since the end of the 20th century because “attempts to remodel the existing political spectrum, although frequent, have so far been lost, as they have not created a clear alternative and they live with generalities” [ibid.]. It is also impossible to deny that in fact “there is an undoubted crisis of parliamentarism, but no better system proposal has emerged because only dictatorship is an alternative” [ibid.]. By the way, the described problem of the regression to authoritarianism (both in the linguistic and non-linguistic image of the world) does not appear only in *despotic systems because the democratic movements are paradoxically in a better position – they can operate with clear slogans of (even liberal) democracy* [ibid.].

One can fully agree with the last remark because to date, at least partially, and at least only in the linguistic image of the world, *optional democracy* is usually a *narrative slogan* but not strictly a process of *ruling the state*. The situation will change (or it is already changing, e.g. in Russia, Belarus, Venezuela, Salvador, etc.) when it comes to the actual implementation of the slogan of *optional democracy* in non-linguistic reality: the narrative alone (*something nice for everyone*) will be able to manage neither the economy nor society. Unless, paradoxically and in contradiction to historical experience, society accepts the supremacy of slogans (i.e., the linguistic image of the world in this case) over the materiality of the extra-linguistic world. This is an unlikely scenario leading to full socio-economic stagnation [cf. Mazat 2016; Rutland 1992; Allen 2001].

The problem is that similar “democratic” points of view increasingly take on an ideological and even philosophical character as they increasingly require an overly politicized ideology or an ideologized philosophy justifying the “independent” (non-linguistic) existence of the *optional democracy*.

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The Russian World: a Problem of Conceptualization

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Abstract. The “Russian world” concept is increasingly infiltrating various discourses and drawing researchers’ interest, facilitated by the geopolitical events of the past ten years. However, there is still no consensus in the research community about the nature of the “Russian world.” Within the framework of this study, it is proposed to conceptualize the “Russian world” concept in the form of three components. Namely, the Russian world I is a world of people united by faith in a unified space of the “Russian world,” the Russian world II is represented by the Russian intelligentsia, which forms the smallest of three groups. And finally, the Russian world III, the Russian authorities’ ideology, aims to strengthen its influence and expansion.

Introduction

Today, the “Russian world” concept is increasingly encountered in political and media discourses. Nevertheless, despite its active functioning in Russian and non-Russian discourses, there is still no clear definition of this cognitive unite as a notion¹. It is due to diverse reasons, such as the unstable geopolitical situation in the post-Soviet space and the Russian endeavor to maintain a sphere of influence. However, the most significant interest in this notion is associated with the protracted Russian-Ukrainian military conflict that began with the annexation of Crimea and escalated to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

One of the possible reasons can be considered an insufficient understanding of this phenomenon as both a concept and the political course of Russia. Despite the variety of approaches and research objectives, the existing definitions often do not reflect the entirety of this concept and are greatly expanded or narrowed. Sometimes they are subjective and depend on the current Russian government’s rhetoric and actions. Thus, the essential char-

¹ In the framework of this study, by a *notion*, we mean any categorized and conceptualized information, while by a *concept*, we mean such a notion that has passed the cultural conceptualization stage, giving them an axiological value.

acteristics of the “Russian world” are not represented by separate definitions but rather by opinions.

Mentioning the existing research, we would like to note that in semiology and linguoculturology, the “Russian world” as a civilizational narrative or cognitive concept was studied by D.S. Likhachev (1980), Yu.M. Lotman (1994), N.A. Narochnitskaya (2000), A.G. Dugin (2000), V. Averyanov (2005), V.A. Tishkov (2007), and others.

The “Russian world” is a most complex sociocultural reality that, in addition to its sociological study, also requires an interdisciplinary comprehension. The discrepancy between this notion’s interpretations, opinions, and definitions indicates its intricacy, which is not amenable to formalization and one-dimensional categorizations. Discussions about the core of the “Russian world,” its components, periphery, signs of belonging, borders, ethnic composition, mentality, and genesis are ongoing and far from finishing.

The emergence and conceptualization of the “Russian world”

Turning to the historical aspect, most researchers, such as M.A. Neimark (2015), V.V. Krivopuskov (2016), and N.A. Kozlovtseva (2017) consented that the notion called the “Russian world” phraseme has a relatively long history of development and originates as early as the 11th century. Despite the extended history of existence, the revival period of the “Russian world” notion in its modern sense fell in the 1990s and is directly connected with the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin.

The year 2006 became the starting point in forming ideas about the “Russian world.” Since then, V. Putin stated that “the Russian world can and must resist everyone who cherishes the Russian word and Russian culture, wherever they live, in Russia or outside of it” [A verbatim report, November 2006]. It was the commencement of the “Russian World” cliché functioning in the speeches of officials and the representative office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as in media discourse, especially progovernment. However, it is necessary to clarify that in this case, the unit we are describing was used in the sense of *compatriots abroad*. These include, first of all, Russian and Russian-speaking diasporas living in the post-Soviet space, descendants of white emigrants, and emigrants of the Soviet period who determine themselves with Russia. At the same time, the prominent rhetoric was directed at the compatriots living in the former USSR. An essential element, in this case, was the language issue, namely, attempts to affect the Russian language position through the “Russian world.”

In 2007, V. Putin confined the “historical geography” of the so-called “Russian world” first of all to “the Orthodox community” [Гронский 2017: 187] and, in fact, the emigrants of the first wave, “a world tragically split as a result of revolutionary events and civil war,” the so-called ‘white emigration’ [Цурганов 2010: 5]. Given the context of Putin’s speech, since it diverged in 1917, the “Russian world” notion might have existed before. It is worth noting that, in the same year, V. Putin spoke about the “Russian world” in a broader sense, bringing together “political figures, scientists and educators, Russian-speaking media workers from various countries,” namely “those to whom the Russian language and the Russian word are close and dear” [Vladimir Putin’s welcome speech]. A year earlier, Vladimir Putin mentioned that National Unity Day unites not only the multinational people of Russia but also “the souls of compatriots abroad, [...] the entire so-called Russian world” [A verbatim report, December 2006].

However, despite the popularity of this term, today, the question of its definition remains problematic: is the “Russian World” a scientific notion or a concept (an ideologeme, a mythologeme, a cultureme, or something else)?

Approaches in the study of the “Russian world”

To date, two main approaches to the “Russian world” research have developed: cultural-civilizational and linguosemiotic, which can be called the most prevalent.

First of all, within the cultural-civilizational approach, the “Russian world” appears as a notion with a semantic load related to “a historically established unique set of spiritual and cultural characteristics” [Гапоненко 2016: 45]. Based on this approach, a complex of worldview ideas was formed, which were included in the “Russian world” ideology. These approaches idealize Russia, extol traditional Russian values and Orthodoxy, and aspire towards “Russian messianism,” attributing to Russia “a messianic role in the history of world civilization” [Дугин 2000: 107]. For them, genuine Russia is much more than its state and geographical borders; such a Russia, identified with “Russian civilization, is Great Russia” [Нарочницкая 2015: 13].

Some researchers working within the framework of the cultural-civilizational approach are critical of the “Russian world” notion and propose to abandon it since, according to V. Lepekhin, it contains an ethnic factor. He considers that the notion of “Russian civilization” is currently more correct than the “Russian world” [Лепехин 2019]. In his works, the historian N.I. Kostomarov points out that the “Russian world” notion has a meaning

close to the notion of the “Slavic world” [Костомаров 2018: 49-50]. One of the main ideologists of Eurasianism, P.N. Savitsky, reflecting on Russia’s cultural, civilizational, and geopolitical specifics, suggested the “Eurasian-Russian cultural world” [Савицкий 1997: 37].

This proposal is highly controversial since the notion of “Russian civilization” is much broader and includes cultures with different codes and various value systems. For example, Orthodox, Islamic, and Buddhist, whose organic integration into a unified civilizational entity is still in question, despite the long coexistence of these cultures within the boundaries of a single state entity.

Along with the cultural-civilizational, a linguosemiotic one emphasizes “the Russian language as the primary marker” of belonging to the “Russian world” [Щедровицкий 2006]. The Russian language is an effective tool for national self-consciousness and self-awareness for the Russian culture assimilation. Within the linguosemiotic approach, the “Russian world” is considered a single network structure of the Russian language-speaking groups. Suppose, in the context of the cultural-civilizational approach, the emphasis is on the incompleteness of the social life of the divided Russian people. In that case, this approach interprets the “Russian world” as a world of Russian-speaking diasporas, and Russia acts as a partner and protector.

The linguosemiotic approach rejects the provisions on the unique role of the Russian people and Russia in history, and the Russian language is understood instrumentally and utilitarianly. For example, V. Tishkov defines belonging to the “Russian world” through “the Russian language, Russian-speaking culture, and interest in the Motherland” [Tishkov 2007]. A similar opinion is shared by O.N. Batanova (2009), who also defines affiliation with the “Russian world” through Russian culture and language. Such an approach usually emphasizes the need for the organic inclusion of the “Russian world” in the modern globalization processes.

Director of the Institute of Russian Abroad S. Pantelev singled out two groups that include all the main approaches to the “Russian world” concept. The first group can be characterized as embodying the cultural-civilizational: here, the “Russian world” is understood as “a unique civilization, the cultural core of which is Russian Orthodoxy, folk spirit, and traditions,” as well as “Great Russian culture, philosophy, poetry, and Russian literature” [Пантелеев 2015]. Another approach is connected with the interpretation of the “Russian world” as a cultural phenomenon, “which is based on the linguistic factor, that is, the factor of knowledge of the Russian language” [ibid. 2015]. At the same time, according to S. Pantelev, the third basis of the “Russian world” is a shared historical memory and views on further development.

The “Russian world” and the Russian Orthodox Church

It is also conceivable to reflect the view expressed by the Russian Orthodox Church, which actively refers to this term while emphasizing its apolitical nature and the crucial role of its cultural and civilizational content.

In 2008-2009, the Russian Orthodox Church introduced the “Russian world” notion, the core of which was defined by Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. This world includes people who do not belong to the Slavic world but have perceived this world’s cultural and spiritual components as their own and are united by “a common origin, the Orthodox faith, the Russian language, and culture” [Кривописков 2016: 113].

The head of the World Russian People’s Council, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill stated that:

the Russian world is a person’s spiritual, cultural, and value dimension. [...] Russia is more comprehensive in civilization than it belongs to the Russian Federation. We call this civilization the Russian World. The Russian world is not the world of the Russian Federation; it is not the world of the Russian Empire [Авторская программа].

It is crucial to consider that this speech was given in 2014 against the backdrop of the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict in the Donbas and the annexation of Crimea, namely at the moment of intensifying the appeal to the “Russian world” concept. In addition, in this case, it was said about *a triune people, a brotherhood, a single Slavic civilization* united by Russia, the “cradle of the Russian world,” thereby creating the image of Russia as *a liberator, a gatherer of lands*, and an attempt to justify an armed conflict. According to this approach, the only Russian language is not enough for integration and belonging to the Russian civilization.

In the religious dimension, the “Russian world” is characterized by a combination of “cultural pluralism and religious monopoly” [Алейникова 2016: 25]. Ideally, the “Russian world” can imagine itself as the “Third Rome” – a new incarnation of the Byzantine civilization, which, with the help of the Russian Orthodox Church, based on Orthodoxy, would gather the countries of the “Russian world” into a global civilizational project [Leszczak 2014: 134]. Accordingly, the following are the main grounds: the Orthodox faith, Russian culture and language, general ideas about historical memory, and a single system of values. It would be accurate to designate this list of grounds as a compromise understanding of history, expressed in the collegial choice of a priority model of the historical past, since it implies not so much a shared historical memory as a single attitude towards it.

In March 2022, concerning the armed Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Orthodox specialists and Hierarchies developed a document recognizing the “Russian world” concept as heresy and rejecting it. According to this document [A Declaration], the essence of accusing Patriarch Kirill and other hierarchs of the Moscow Patriarchate of heresy lies in the idea that the “Russian world” denies Christian teaching, citing the following biblical quotes: “My kingdom is not of this world,” “love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may become the children of your Father in heaven,” etc.

Summing up, the “Russian world” can be assumed to be a transnational sociocultural space based on the interactions of its subjects (cultural, social, linguistic, and personal). Considering the available research, we have proposed the following conceptualization of the conceptual field nominated by the “Russian world” cliché.

The Russian world I

In this case, we single out a group with identical (highly similar) mentality and cultural and civilizational manifestations. At the same time, we exclude the unity of ethnic, territorial, or religious affiliation. All these criteria are not paramount to belonging to the notion under study.

The Russian language can be considered influential. However, not an utterly decisive factor in determining the typological features of belonging to the Russian world I, which we understand as a civilizational, sociocultural space of people who have spiritual and mental signs of Russianness and are not indifferent to the fate and place of Russia in the world since their fate also depends on it. Most representatives of this community speak Russian as their native language. Regardless, it is possible to allow a situation where this is only the language of the so-called “interethnic communication” for a native speaker of another language and, in some cases, a foreign language in general for a person mentally self-identifying with this community. In addition, a large number of people for whom Russian is their native or second language, but at the same time do not share “Russian world” values such as the “spiritual unity of the people, autocracy, unanimity, and devotion to the leader (authorities), the greatness and strength of Russia,” the exclusivity of the “Russian way,” the Russian messianism on the world stage, etc., cannot be attributed to the Russian world I [Leszczak 2014: 98-136].

In this case, the “Russian world” acts as a pure mythologeme, a belief that determines belonging to the notion under consideration. *Myth* is the most “authentic and concrete reality” and “a transcendently necessary category

of life and thought” for a mythologized consciousness [Лоцев 1990: 6]. Myth as a story about the world and man’s place in it is, in fact, an explanatory model of the world. The mythologeme as the plot of a myth through which the archetype shines through is fundamental, while the ideologeme is the final, ready-to-consume product of the political process. Therefore, “myth and mythologeme are ontological, while ideology and ideologeme are day-to-day” [Габриэлян 2019: 353]. Ideology, in turn, acts as a fundamental mechanism for translating myth into social life. Ideology, like mythology, “objectively exists as a regulator of human behavior and regulates everyday life as an image of the desired present and future” [Фролова 2016: 19]. To avoid a conceptual controversy, we will objectively accept the term used by S.M. Frolova as a synonym for the expression ‘synergetically socialized.’ Ideology is impossible without composition, plot, image, myth, and mythologems. It relies on them, structured by them. The mythology of the “Russian world” has certain connotations and belief which determines belonging to the Russian world I. The “Russian world” mythologeme is created in the cultural field, fixed in everyday life structures and, above all, in the language, customs, and traditions of the people outside the state borders. Everyday life, saturated with mythology and its conscious or unconscious application, is a robust basis for the Russian world I. We consider the “Russian world” as a mythologeme not in the sense of fiction, or a pure idea, but as the social and cultural reality that a person lives in and that has special significance for him.

First, such a myth offers an ordered worldview system in one’s culture. For the vast majority of the Russian world I representatives, its existence and perception are entirely natural phenomena that do not necessitate proof. Due to certain personal or historical circumstances, those included in this sociocultural space undergo a procedure of conversion from one culture to another, or, at least, it becomes necessary to harmonize their own culture with the codes of the Russian world I. Secondly, the noted process ensures the self-identification of a person. That is, it answers existential questions for a person: who is he, where is his place? Involvement in the “Russian world” mythology, even if only at the everyday level, allows him to answer the question about his place in this world, about belonging to an inevitable global community united by the common idea of “spirituality, ancient primordial traditions, the call of ancestors, glorious history, great victory.” Belonging to the Russian world I today gives its members a civilizational identity that is more complex than just ethnic, linguistic, and cultural. The Russian idea acts as the basic concept and basis of the Russian world III ideologeme, which will be presented later. Russian World I is the co-creation of a common myth by people with a shared history, interaction, and mutual complementation. Under current conditions, “the myth of the Russian world is a quasi-religious

ideology” [Скира 2022]. The civilizational mythology of the Russian World I claims that there is a tremendous Russian civilization based on the “spiritual unity” of Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Russians, who have the same Orthodox faith and language (that is, Russian), that the “Russian world” is a society with “traditional family and cultural values” in contrast to the Western ones. It is a mythical historical narrative about the emergence of the “Russian world” from ancient Kievan Rus and Kyiv’s “holy city” to Moscow as the third Rome. All this is today “bequeathed” to the Russian Orthodox Church and the “Russian” people.

Considering what has been said above about the Russian world I, it can be summarised as follows: it is a mythologeme based on the past, realized in the present, and projected into the future. The Russian world I is a cultural, civilizational, and partly linguistic space of people aware of their involvement in Russia through faith in the “Russian world” mythology. Society still accepts the “Russian world” myth, even though it sometimes distorts natural history, does not match up with modern political and economic realities, and has a lot of negative connotations.

For all the significance and role of the Russian people directly in the formation of the Russian world I, this world is not its sole achievement. This phenomenon includes “the near and far Russian diaspora” [Суслов 2017: 6], the Russian-speaking communities of the post-Soviet space, and people who may not be part of the mentioned groups but are adherents of the “Russian world” mythologeme.

The Russian world II

Here we single out another crucial group of people representing the notion of “Russian spirituality,” namely the *Russian intelligentsia*, representatives of culture, and opposition leaders. At the same time, it is not uncommon for them to be part of the diaspora, live outside Russia, and take on the social function of public self-consciousness in the name of the whole people.

We separated this group from the previous one because, despite the likely similarity of some cultural and civilizational manifestations, it does not associate itself with the Russian authorities and, in most cases, opposes the current political regime. However, at the same time, representatives of this group recognize themselves as part of a single “Russian world,” which they identify with Russia as their motherland and home. The defining and unifying criterion for belonging to the Russian world II is the reliance on Russian

culture, personal spiritual choice, and association with Russia as a country and society, and not with the authorities.

Let us briefly characterize the notion of the “intelligentsia,” to which we refer in the Russian world II description framework. The “intelligentsia” is a specifically Russian cultural phenomenon. For the first time, the notion of “intelligentsia” appeared and became widespread in Russia in the second half of the 19th century, when, after the reform of 1861, an out-of-class *raznochintsy*, consisting of various social strata of society, rapidly grew in size, a social group of people engaged in mental work and, which at that time, received the name of the intelligentsia [Hayмова 2018].

If the emergence of the “Russian world” ideologeme falls at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000, that is, already in the 21st century, then the formation of the cultural concept of “Russian world” began much earlier. If we provide a brief historical background, the countdown could begin when the possibility of obtaining higher education appeared, as the first university in Russia arose “in 1755” [Чесноков 2002: 145]. In the XVIII century, under Peter the Great’s reforms, Russia conceived itself as part of European civilization and strived to adapt to the Western European cultural pattern. Previously, Russia (being part of Ruthenia) conceived of itself as part of the “Byzantine ecumene” [Успенский 1999].

Even though the 19th century is called the “golden age” of Russian culture and the Russian intelligentsia, it constituted a fragile cultural layer, which could be called Russian world II. Before this, the intellectual elite were represented by the highest aristocracy, the clergy, or the military and bureaucratic classes. Traditionally, they were alien to both the authorities and the aristocracy, who were afraid of them, seeing them as the focus of rebels and free-thinkers who undermined the traditional foundations of society and peasants or merchants who despised this layer for idleness and idealism.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the enlightened Russian class split into Westerners and those called “Slavophiles.” Of course, this was facilitated by the war against Napoleon, which led to the development of a social opposition movement that gave rise to the Decembrists, practically the standard Western intellectuals, striving to establish a European political order and abolish serfdom. The attitude towards ‘Europe and the Western world’ from the beginning of the 19th century became the key to the demarcation of the Russian intelligentsia. However, the opinion about the ‘backwardness of Russia’ and the ‘leadership of the West’ became predominant.

In February 1917, autocratic Russia first collapsed, and in October of the same year, the social system changed. If in the summer of 1917, “age-old Russia” was “still free, still acceptable” for many, then later it became “animal and icy” [Набоков 1990: 140], dying “in the whistle of blizzards”

[Зайцев 2009: 82]. The new socio-political situation not only hit the traditional “Russian world” foundations in the face of autocracy, nobility, private capital, and patriarchal-religious peasantry but also severely damaged the Russian world II. Since then, hundreds of thousands of Russian intelligentsia representatives, adhering to different political views, different in upbringing and culture, emigrated from Russia. Most of them did not believe in the Bolshevik experiment. They considered that this was “a moral and political collapse that befell the Russian people and the Russian state” [Струве 1991: 6] and that “a terrible catastrophe happened to Russia” [Бердяев 1991: 51]. The Russian intelligentsia believed that the new political system named “socialism is the deepest spiritual decline and squalor” [Булгаков 1991: 128]. Therefore, they associated it with the decline and death of Russian civilization, a break with genuine Russian values, traditions, and an attempt to cut off all ties that connected the intelligentsia with its past. The moral and ideological dictatorship policy also played an essential role in restricting freedom of speech and thought. The October Revolution of 1917 became a moment of split for the Russian intelligentsia. One part remained in their homeland, connected their lives with Soviet Russia, and the other, having emigrated, became part of the Russian diaspora. After the revolution in October 1917, the authorities were tasked with creating a new intelligent stratum of society corresponding to the ideology of the Soviet regime. The emergence of millions of people, who in Soviet times began to be called “knowledge workers,” turned the intelligentsia into “structured and united on clan grounds”: the metropolitan intelligentsia, Moscow and Leningrad (Petersburg) intelligentsia, national (in Soviet socialist republics), provincial, rural, creative, scientific and technical, the sixtiers², liberal, etc. [Хаймова 2018].

In Marxism-Leninism, the intelligentsia was deeply disillusioned precisely in the 70s. From that moment, the orientation of the intelligentsia to the West began, namely, to the European cultural and civilizational values of a liberal democratic nature. It is remarkable, but at the same time, the official authorities, on the one hand, actively used the traditional values of the Russian world I (collectivism, devotion, and obedience to the authorities, faith in the unity of command, the leading role of the Russian people as an ‘elder brother’).

After the start of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)³, there was an increasing return to the traditional ideas and symbols of the Russian world I – “the greatness of the fatherland, the strength of Russian weapons, the

² A subculture of the Soviet intelligentsia that mainly captured the generation born between 1925 and 1945, distinguished by liberal, anti-totalitarian views and romanticism.

³ The Eastern Front of World War II.

exclusivity of the civilizational path, the great victories of tsarist Russia,” the outstanding tsars and military leaders of pre-revolutionary Russia [Leszczak 2014: 118]. All this directly brought together the so-called “Soviet people” value system with a system of values embedded in the Russian world I. At the same time, the Soviet Russian-speaking intelligentsia, for the most part, developed along the opposite path – towards liberalism and the democratism of civil society.

However, it would be untrue to assert that the Russian world II is an ideologically unified cultural and civilizational space. Back in tsarist times, part of the Russian intelligentsia actively supported some of the Russian world I postulates. The so-called *pochvenniki* or *Slavophiles* promoted the ideas of Russia’s significant and unique cultural and civilizational plan as the ‘messiah of the world’s peoples.’ The supporters of the *pochvennichestvo*, such as V.M. Shukshin, V.G. Rasputin, V.A. Soloukhin, and V.I. Belov, were a slightly different offshoot of this Russian World II in Russia during the perestroika period, who saw Russia as a traditionally patriarchal society. However, *perestroika* and the turbulent period of primary capital accumulation in the 90s have pushed them to the margins of the political and media field.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and socio-political and cultural changes in the country, there have been considerable alterations in the intelligentsia. The modern Russian intelligentsia has broken up into different social strata, which differ in social status, culture, value orientations, norms of behavior, beliefs, and interests. With the increasing pressure of the Russian authorities on the media sphere and public opinion, a new criterion for the division of the Russian intelligentsia appeared: *the pro-government intelligentsia*, which upholds the ideals of the Russian world I, and most often the *pro-Western intelligentsia*, sceptical or in opposition to the authorities, continuing the traditions of the Russian world II. It should be emphasized that even that part of the pre-revolutionary Russian intelligentsia that was loyal to the authorities, positioned itself as a defender of human rights and freedoms for the ordinary people, was ready to ‘sacrifice personal well-being for the public good,’ and was guided by the Christian principles of mercy and love for one’s neighbor. The pre-revolutionary Russian intelligentsia felt its responsibility not only for what it did not directly participate in but also for what was done against its will and desire. Therefore, it was often called ‘repentant.’ As for the intelligentsia, who connected their lives with the Russian post-October diaspora and continued to consider themselves an integral part of Russia, ‘Russian citizens abroad’ retained the love and devotion to their country, which they carried throughout the whole life, ‘was rooting for the fate of the country.’ In addition to the authorities’ interests, the modern pro-government intelligentsia

also protects their economic interests, i.e., represents the ideological branch of power. With V. Putin coming to power, the mass media subordinate to him began to accuse the liberal intelligentsia of ‘hating Russia and the people (Russian in the first place)’ and ‘worshipping Europe’.

After 2014 and the forcible annexation of Crimea, another split occurred among the intelligentsia, finally separating the so-called ‘patriotic’ from the opposition one, who, after February 2022, are being persecuted not only for expressing their position towards the authorities and criticizing the Putin regime, condemning Russia’s war against Ukraine but also for ‘high treason.’ Many representatives of the second group today reflect the so-called “special military emigration.” They leave because of the unwillingness to be associated with the state that unleashed the war, with the onset of the economic crisis against the backdrop of tougher sanctions and the inability to be part of the global intellectual space, and Russia’s foreign policy isolation.

We believe that the modern Russian intelligentsia, as continuers of the Russian cultural tradition (i.e., in fact, as representatives of the Russian world II), should be considered as a unique social group of people engaged in intellectual work for whom the main fields of activity are the creation of spiritual and moral values, the search for knowledge, and active participation in their transfer to the people.

The distinctive features of the Russian world II representatives are, first of all, *conscientiousness*, i.e., the presence of moral principles that go beyond the norms of estate morality, and secondly, *education and the ability to think critically*. The following quality is *love for people*. This quality reached its maximum in the 60s of the nineteenth century in the form of the so-called “going to the people and the then cultural movement” [Успенский 1999], and in Bolshevism – both before 1917 and after – the elimination of illiteracy, access of the masses to free medicine and education (both secondary and higher education). The 60s of the 20th century marked the peak of the flourishing of the Soviet intelligentsia as a powerful, authoritative, and influential social stratum, performing the guardian functions of culture and intellectual achievements.

The fourth quality of the Russian intelligentsia is a *constant reflection on Russia and the Western world*. Here, the “line of Peter the Great” plays a significant role – Russia always and in everything lags behind Europe, and it is up to domestic intellectuals to overcome this gap, learn from the West, adopt the experience, and get ahead of it in the future. For this reason, there is either an attraction to Western culture or, on the contrary, an awareness of one’s “special path,” i.e., the desire to “dissociate itself, to survive” [Leszczak 2014: 136]. One way or another, the West, Western culture acts as a permanent cultural landmark: this is what has to be interacted with all the time.

Moreover, a whole complex of these shortcomings is associated with an essential quality that distinguishes this group from individual representatives of the Russian world II – this is *constant opposition to any Russian government*. Often, this opposition developed into antagonism to Russia in general and everything Russian in particular.

The formation of the cultural layer of the “Russian world” is also influenced by the rapid assimilation of foreign cultural values and, at the same time, the “cultural heterogeneity of Russian society” [Успенский 1999], the stratification of the cultural elite and the people, multilingualism, and multiculturalism.

First, they comprehend themselves concerning the authorities and the people. The attitude of the intelligentsia toward the authorities and the people determines the axiological coordinates of the semantic space, the positive and negative poles: the intelligentsia opposes the authorities and serves the people (to whom it also opposes).

We want to consider the attitude of the Russian world II representatives directly toward the authorities since this is one of the main criteria for separating them into a distinct component of the “Russian world” concept. It is the ‘tradition of opposition,’ of confrontation that unites the intelligentsia of different generations: first of all, it is always against power and various kinds of despotism and domination [ibid.]. Representatives of the Russian World II do not seek to define themselves as a separate social group, i.e., they do not gravitate toward elitism or corporatism. In addition to self-identification with the Russian sociocultural space, there is a need for appropriate cultural content. The Russian world II notion includes precisely such content since it is a ‘supranational multiethnic community’ that preserves cultural and ethnic diversity across all political and ethnic boundaries.

The unresolved issues of cultural identity highlight the problem of auto-reflection. The reason is that Western intellectuals confuse the notion of the Russian world III with entirely different manifestations of the “Russian world” – the Russian cultural and civilizational space (the Russian world I), Russian culture (the Russian world II), and the ideologeme that lies at the basis of the Russian authorities’ imperial policy (the Russian world III). All these processes impede the formation of the ‘nation unity,’ its consolidation into some unified community that forms the national pan culture.

The paradox of the Russian intelligentsia as the ideological bearer of the Russian world II is that it not only positions itself as a conductor and representative of the Russian world I. However, it is perceived in the West as a sufficient ‘repeater’ of Russia’s international authority and cultural heritage. At the same time, Russian culture’s values almost completely contradict the Russian world I values. Hence the bewilderment caused by the behavior of

the Russian authorities and the vast majority of Russian society loyal to them towards those people in the world whose idea of Russia and Russian culture was formed as a result of acquaintance with the property of the Russian world II, i.e., with the heritage of the Russian intelligentsia.

The Russian world III

As was mentioned before, the “Russian world” as an ideological course was introduced by V. Putin in the second half of the 2000s. During this time, it has firmly entered into the political and media discourses of the Russian Federation, the CIS countries, and the countries of Russian diaspora residence.

The principal reason for the demand for the “Russian world” ideology is primarily due to the establishment and maintenance of relations with numerous “Russian compatriots and Russian-speaking communities, especially in the border areas,” to stabilize and regulate diplomatic and economic relations to establish mutually beneficial relations with these countries [Сорокина 2013: 33]. In addition, the Russian authorities faced the task of developing a policy that would allow them to maintain a sphere of influence in the former post-Soviet space, in which the United States, China, and Turkey showed interest, and thus the “Russian world” ideology could evolve into one of the tools for resolving these issues.

Besides, one crucial foreign policy factor for the development of the “Russian world” ideology on the part of the Russian authorities was the First Ukrainian Maidan of 2004, or the so-called “Orange Revolution,” when it became clear that one of the most closely connected countries in cultural, linguistic, and economic terms could reorient the foreign policy course from East to West. The First Maidan legitimized a new course leading from Russia to the European Union in the public consciousness of Ukrainians. The Russian authorities and V. Putin responded by creating an appropriate ideology, which was supposed to legalize Russian influence through the Russian diaspora, living “mainly in the east of Ukraine and Crimea, the number of which in 2002 was relatively high, namely 833 thousand people” [Суций 2020: 10], with a total population of Ukraine of 48.2 million people.

Thus, the authorities needed to solve domestic political problems, such as the economic crisis, loss of trust in the authorities, and retention of power against the backdrop of an ever-increasing opposition movement. They also considered foreign policy trends to maintain their sphere of influence and

interests, which led to the development of the “Russian world” ideological course, which would unite both Russians and Russian-speakers.

It was also reflected in the presentation of the “Russian world” definitions against the background of these events. Namely, V. Tishkov emphasized that this phenomenon “had become part of state policy,” “a form of cultural behavior and identity, that was, a sense of loyalty and chosen service.” Also, under the “Russian world,” he comprehends “compatriots abroad who maintain contact with Russia and the Russian language” [Тишков 2007].

Later, after the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in the Donbas, the term “associations of disparate Russian-speaking compatriots” appears in the rhetoric of researchers [Алейникова 2017: 13].

Since one of the most significant ways of regulating and spreading the “Russian world” ideology was the language issue, it primarily affected the post-Soviet space. The collapse of the USSR led to the popularization of the titular languages and the reduction of the Russian language’s functioning. It, in turn, affected the Russian diaspora and led to a massive outflow of not only the Russian ethnic but also the Russian-speaking population. This phenomenon was most widespread in the 90s, when “the number of Russians in the near abroad decreased by 30%”, but it most actively occurred in the countries of Central Asia, such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan [Суций 2020: 10]. However, “the acute phase occurred in the 90s, and the emigration trend continues at present” [ibid. 289]. Thus, this led to a decrease in the number of Russian speakers, Russian schools reduction, and a decline in the share of the Russian language in the state, information, and economic spheres, which in turn reduced Russia’s influence in this cultural and civilizational space and the need to take measures to maintain and preserve the Russian language.

In the 2007 Message to the Federal Assembly, V. Putin raised the issue of the Russian language, stating the following:

Russian is the language of the historical brotherhood of peoples [...]. It is not just the custodian of a whole layer of truly world achievements, but a living space of the multi-million “Russian world,” which, of course, is much broader than Russia itself [Message to the Federal Assembly].

Since then, measures have been actively carried out to ensure the Russian language’s functioning in the post-Soviet space, including the opening of representative offices of Rossotrudnichestvo, Russian ethnocultural centers, and the conclusion of agreements on cooperation in the fields of culture, education, and science.

However, there was no significant Russian language disposal since its role in the post-Soviet space is due to the once unified cultural and civilizational

space's economic, political, and cultural contacts. It should be noted that, unlike the problem of the external Russian language functioning, the issue of the Russian language position in Russia was not raised until 2020, when it was proposed to amend the Constitution of the Russian Federation. According to the new version of Article 68 of the Basic Law [Новый текст Конституции], the state language of the Russian Federation throughout its territory is "the Russian language as the language of the state-forming people, which is part of the multinational union of equal peoples of the Russian Federation." It is substantial that the Russian language is not only declared as the "state" one but also as the language of the "state-forming people." In contrast, in other parts of the law, the Russian people are not mentioned separately but only as the "multinational people" who live as "equal subjects of the Russian Federation." It, in our opinion, is entirely consistent with the ideology of the global and multicultural so-called "Russian world," united by the Russian language.

Nevertheless, the language issue was not only one of the elements of the ideology. In general, analyzing the rhetoric of V. Putin and the current government, as well as the Russian pro-government media discourse, where this ideology is reflected, it can be noted that it is associated with the "creation of a single space," "the revival of old ties," "opposition to Western ideologies," "strengthening countries."

In 2010, an apparent metamorphosis of the "Russian world" began from doctrine to a political course that V. Putin could use to win the presidential election in 2011. In addition, the Customs Union was created in 2010, uniting the economic spaces of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which could become a platform for implementing the "Russian world" ideology under the brand name of "Eurasianism," first proposed back in 1994 by N. Nazarbaev [Назарбаев 2009: 439].

Thus, Russia's foreign policy was directed toward the return of the old and the conquest of new markets, restoring Russia's status as a world power leader and transforming it into a global influence center. Accordingly, this ideology expands the Russian Federation's borders at least "to the borders of the Soviet Union, and in the future to the borders of the Russian Empire." [Котигоренко, Рафальский 2013: 59].

It is crucial to note that the Russian authorities pay great attention to popularizing the "Russian world" ideas not only among the diaspora but also in Russia itself. For that purpose, various actions and events are maintained under the auspices of the Russkiy Mir Foundation and Rossotrudnichestvo, as well as Russian houses abroad. The most active work was carried out in the annexed Crimea, as well as in the Donbas.

For example, this includes holding various festivals and concerts, opening Russian language courses, supporting teachers of Russian as a foreign

language, assisting in enrolling in Russian universities, and facilitating the procedure for obtaining Russian citizenship under the voluntary resettlement program in Russia.

The “Russian world” ideology and geopolitics probably developed in parallel since the appeal to it by the Russian authorities took place mainly concerning the Russian diaspora and was irregular.

However, after the Euromaidan in Ukraine in 2014, the “Russian world” ideology and V.Putin’s political course aimed to save the “oppressed Russians” in Ukraine, and the idea of “great Russia” merged. The “Russian world” ideologeme has become a symbol of the reunification of Crimea with Russia under the slogan of “returning home, to the native harbor.”

In the future, these connotations were actively used in the Russian media space, as a negative image of Ukraine was created, a warning about a possible Maidan organized by the West in Russia, and presenting it not as a coup d’état but as a manifestation of “banditry, anarchism, lawlessness.” In addition, the image of the “Russian world” ideology was created in the media space as a means of confrontation, the salvation of Russians, and the new world order.

It should also be mentioned that the components of the “Russian world” ideology became one of the reasons for the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It became the foundation of the idea of saving the fraternal people, protecting the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine, dividing them into “friends and foes,” and, in fact, became a kind of justification for military actions.

Consequently, the organizations mentioned earlier, such as Rossotrudnichestvo and Russian Houses Abroad, began their most active work after February 2022, holding marches of compatriots against the background of the Russian culture cancellation and increased sanctions after Russia armed intruded into Ukraine. This ideology today fosters the ideas of confronting the West, combating the so-called Russophobia, and promoting Russian heritage and values worldwide.

The last few years’ events, which began with the “Crimean Spring” and its subsequent annexation, the war in the Donbas, and full-scale military operations in 2022, indicate that the functioning of the “Russian world” as a state ideology continues to develop, and acquires a new, not just supranational, but also supra-state scale.

Thus, the “Russian world” ideology is a model for the existence of all territories and peoples of Russia based on the state-forming people – Russian, Russian history, and culture. Moreover, border states are also included in this ideological space. The separation of any people and territory from the “Russian world” is perceived as a betrayal, requiring the adoption of measures

to “oppose external destructive forces,” “gather lands,” and save the “Russian people.”

Let us discuss the Russian world III’s distinctive features and fundamental values. Speaking about the tasks that the Russian world ideologists set for themselves, let us turn to the statements of G. Toloray, dated March 19, 2010, who lists “strengthening the position of Russian civilization in global competition” as a goal [Толорая, Чуков 2016: 98]. In turn, A. Kozyrev stated that “the primary task of the “Russian world” is the expansion of Russian culture, the Russian presence in various countries, in various linguistic spaces” [Козырев 2019: 63]. Thus, the goals of the “Russian world” include “unification of the Russian lands headed by their center – Moscow” and “saving the Fatherland from external enemies.”

Turning to the features and key ideas of the “Russian world” ideology is crucial to refer to the notions that are adhered to by both the authorities of the Russian Federation and the structures responsible for implementing the “Russian world” ideology, such as the Russkiy Mir Foundation. After analyzing their rhetoric, it is possible to highlight the specific values inherent in the Russian world III.

Firstly, it is the “world of Russia” to help one’s fatherland, to take care of one’s neighbor. It is not only about what the state can do but also emphasizes each person’s role for the “Motherland,” “from the dependency to the idea of serving Russia.”

Secondly, as the ideologists of the Russian world III write, peace is “the absence of enmity and war,” which in turn should define the “Russian world” as “reconciliation, harmony, balance, unity, overcoming the splits of the 20th and 21st centuries.” The “value” of the world for the described ideology is perfectly illustrated by the centuries-old history of wars waged by Russia throughout its history: first aimed at seizing territories in the east, West, south, and north of the historical core of Russian statehood, and then in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, even later (in Soviet times) – in Africa, the Near and the Far East, Cuba, and now – the war in Syria and aggression against Georgia and Ukraine.

Thirdly, the “Russian World” is “not only the past but also the future.” Based on the cultural heritage, “achievements, and victories,” the “Russian world’s” image and prospects are being built. Memory becomes an instrument of consolidation. It is easy to guess that relying on the historical past as the basis for building the future is needed only by those with nothing to offer the future generation.

Fourthly, the “Russian world” is a “stronghold and custodian of traditional values.” The “Russian world” is frequently opposed to “Western values” in modern Russian pro-government media discourse as an opportunity to pre-

serve conservative values such as a “traditional (i.e., patriarchal) family,” a desire for “true culture” (i.e., folklore), and “true democracy” (i.e., autocracy).

Furthermore, the “Russian world” is a “certain order” that must be maintained and improved. Order is “primary because, without it, everything else is meaningless.” The order is unity, which implies the solidarity of all peoples and confessions, the power elite, and the masses since disunity can destabilize and possibly collapse the “Russian world.” This unity can only be achieved by strengthening the “vertical of power” and getting people to think that they must obey the authorities completely.

According to S. Perevezentsev, the principal value is “the Russian world itself as a way of joint survival on the planet” [ПЕРЕВЕРЗЕНЦЕВ 2022]. All other problems – geopolitical, economic, social, cultural, ethical, military, etc. are derived from the mission of preserving the “Russian world.” This ideology implies unification for salvation and opposition to external forces that want the destruction and disappearance of the Russian people and culture. The “Russian world” is like “Noah’s ark,” which offers everyone a chance for salvation, and the Russian people seem to be “God’s chosen people with a special mission, that is, the mission of saving the world.”

Thus, the ideology links the Russian Federation’s future with the image of the “Russian world,” its development and progress. The “Russian world,” in the rhetoric of its ideologists, is not a closed space but a dynamically expanding and open area for those who share its principles of existence. Thus, anyone can become Russian, and only desire is needed. Summarizing the above, the most substantial for the Russian world III include such notions as fatherland, state, shared history, folk memory, and the Russian language. All these notions are the basis for disseminating and establishing the “Russian world” ideology.

In addition, crucial features are the “cult of the leader,” expressed in support for the President, his actions, and any dissent that is identified as a betrayal of the Motherland [Leszczak 2014: 123]. For the Russian world III, the President, namely V. Putin, is the guarantor of its existence. He is the central figure around whom everyone should rally. Hence the following cultural and civilizational attributes such as “obedience (loyalty to the leader),” “militarism and masculinity” [ibid. 15], to ensure the safety of the “Russian world,” against which the rest of the world took up arms, “missionary,” namely the spread of the ideas of the “Russian world” to countries that suffer from Western values, “fatalism, globalism (cosmism),” etc. [ibid. 96].

Conclusion

The “Russian world” has not yet become the decisive instrument of political, media, and scientific discourse and is precisely a concept, a more complex and voluminous cognitive formation, including most of the figurative representation in its vague boundaries.

The “Russian world” is a figurative construct, with the value-semantic load based on a formal ethnocultural and linguistic identity, nostalgia for an idealized historical past, unity in the face of external threats, and the need to protect borders. It consists of three groups, independent of each other, with unique features and characteristics that distinguish them from each other. At the same time, it must be said that the “Russian world” as Russian culture expresses and embodies a highly diminutive part of Russian society, whose representatives are instead the contrary of both the Russian world I and the Russian world III, so the inclusion of Russian culture and intelligentsia in the existing definitions of the Russian world is highly debatable.

Against the backdrop of an ideological vacuum generated by the collapse of the Soviet ideology, economic instability, and uncertainty in geopolitical orientations, the image of the “Russian world” is a revival of its former greatness, the restoration of a single space that existed in the Soviet period, faith in possible socialism. For the Russian diaspora, the “Russian world” ideology is the embodiment of a connection with the historical homeland and confidence in support of Russia.

Thus, it seems that the mental representations of the “Russian world” are still in a state of conceptualization and logical formulation as a modern identification and civilizational unit, which continues to acquire new connotations.

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The Concept of Community and the Classification of Community Types: the Cultural and Civilizational Base for Cross-Type Communities

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Abstract. In this section, I propose to consider such concepts as “society” and “community”. The phenomenon of combining people into groups is of interest to researchers from different fields, but there is no single criterion for distinguishing between society and community. This section reviews the proposed theories. Also, here I propose a criterion for dividing societies and communities and describe an approach to the study and research of societies and communities in the context of their core values and moral norms. This section presents the typology of social groups, and considers the principle of identifying communities based on cultural and civilizational models.

The concept of community vs the concept of society

Humans’ relations - the way people unite, establish ties, and share the same values - have always been the central issue for thinkers throughout history. Social connection is a vital human need. That’s why it determines one’s identity, worldview, and behaviour. Thus, political discourse often addresses such value-laden concepts as “nation”, “family”, “Christians” and others. Belonging to a social group often drives a person into action; thus, manifesting such belonging will always be the key to controlling and manipulating. There are a number of fundamentals for forming social units. Some of these fundamentals a person does not have the power to decide for him or herself, and some they decide independently.

Let’s take a closer look at two concepts of social units: community and society. There are different approaches to the consideration of these two concepts. The main problem with these approaches is that they take as a basis criteria that do not represent a coherent, consistent structure. Types of societies are often distinguished according to the signs of development, social prosperity, geographical location, and so on. However, in this study, I will be

interested in the fundamental aspect that will allow us to talk about society and community as groups of a different nature - namely, human experience. However, let's start with a review of existing theories.

German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies described two types of human association: *Gemeinschaft* (usually translated as "community") and *Gesellschaft* ("society" or "association"). The ideal-typical concept of "community" highlights, according to Tönnies, essential interpersonal relationships based on family kinship. Every family structure consists of hierarchically stepped positions. These are the positions of father, mother, and children. Wider family unions unite relatives among themselves. The closest major family-type formation is the clan. It consists of several large families linked by kinship, in which, as a rule, the connection goes back to one common paternal ancestor. The interpersonal relationships typical of a community are based on "natural" morality. The expression "natural" means that family relations are ultimately subject to biological reproduction. Tönnies distinguishes political, social, and economic forms of communities. From the point of view of political domination, these are hierarchical orders that have evolved throughout history mainly as a patriarchy and sometimes as a matriarchy. From a social point of view, these are associations based on a common tradition and a common religion. Religion is an expression of the inexhaustibility and indestructibility of family morality rooted in biological reproduction. From an economic point of view, we are talking about "communism", i.e., about a community of owners and workers that does not know private property. The "communist" model of the family includes, further, a special anthropology, according to which, a person is not an individual among other individuals, having equal rights with them, but an individual bearer of a social role. In contrast, the community ideal type stands for "openness," which Tönnies defines as "the human aggregate and artefact." As an "open" subject there is "each alone and in conflict with all others." The characteristic feature of the "social" are the principles of contract and exchange. The "bourgeois" society established by them is based on trade and commodity exchange. There is a general possibility to compare objects as a "commodity". The ability to compare is expressed in the existence of money as a measure of exchange. In "bourgeois society", following the words of Adam Smith, "every man is a merchant." The principle of exchange also covers human relations. Competition forms the dominant idea of "the subject in a state of conflict with everyone else." Tönnies uses in this context the terminology and treatment of Marx, according to the theory of surplus value in the 1st volume of "Capital". The capitalist manufacturer is the buyer and user of the "commodity of labour-power," that exclusive commodity which alone has the capacity to produce more value than the price it costs to maintain and operate. Interpersonal relations are based in

“society” on contractual obligations - that is, on convention. In contrast to the “natural” connections of the “community”, “artificial” mutual obligations and dependencies are developed [Tönnies 1957: 33 - 103].

This classification presents the community as an underdeveloped, primitive grouping, and society as an indicator of a more developed civilization. This in some way makes this theory related to the ideas of Charles Horton Cooley, who introduced the concepts of primary and secondary social groups. Primary groups (family, children's groups, neighbourhood, local communities) are, according to Cooley, the main social units and are characterised by intimate, personal, informal ties, direct communication, stability, and small numbers. This is where socialisation takes place, the formation of a personality that learns the basic social values and norms, and methods of activity in the process of interaction. Secondary social institutions (classes, nations, parties), according to Cooley, form a social structure in which impersonal relations take place, in which the formed individual is included only partially as a carrier of a certain function. In “Social Organisation”, Cooley asks, thanks to what is society created? It focuses on the relationship between individuals and the larger communities of society. He considers “social” and “individual” as two sides of mental integrity, and society and individuals as parts of one whole, which cannot exist without each other, as a single living organism [Cooley 1927: 10–42].

Howard S. Becker adapted Tönnies's typological community-society dichotomy. He proposed the concept of sacred and secular societies. It is always about the morality of personal relationships between people. We are regularly confronted with three categories of moral obligations: the duty of adults to take care of those who depend on them, especially children and the elderly, the duty of lower family members to obey superiors, and the duty of equal brotherhood as well as the duty to tell the truth and obey restrictions. These norms can be attributed to the core of the morality of the family model. Community morality is a cooperative morality based on the acceptance of a hierarchical system of interpersonal relations [Becker 2007].

Two main classes of norms of cooperative morality can be distinguished. The first is a class of such norms that are aimed at a single goal setting of the group actions of all members of the community. These are norms to which everyone equally obeys: for example, the obligation to tell the truth, to keep one's word, and to limit or suppress personal selfishness. The second class is the norms determined by the steps of the social hierarchy. The main type of moral norms relating to “society” is designated as the type of morality of competition or regulative morality. Norms of regulative morality are characteristically oriented towards groups (or sets of groups) whose members pursue pluralistic goals in their activities.

There are other researchers who see hierarchy as the key feature that determines how a group of people functions and what kind of social unit they form. Talcott Parsons calls hierarchy the main condition for the existence of any society and also offers 4 prerequisites for the existence of society:


- 1) first of all, in order for human activity to exist (carry out), physical conditions are necessary for the life (existence) of a person;
- 2) the existence of individuals is necessary for the existence of society. Parsons' example: if there are intelligent beings somewhere in another solar system, then they are not like us biologically, and most likely because their social life is different;
- 3) it follows that the third level of the hierarchy of necessary conditions for the existence of society is formed by psychophysiological conditions;
- 4) finally, the fourth level forms a system of norms and values that exist in a given set of people – society [Parsons 1951: 77–105].

However, these premises are difficult to take as a basis for my research. They concern the existence of a certain form of life on Earth and can serve as prerequisites equally for any human activity, and not just social organisation.

These theories offer a spectrum rather than a typology of human associations. Perhaps they can explain how society has developed and changed in a historical context. However, we cannot see in them criteria that would harmoniously separate the concepts of society and community. The fundamental difference between society and community, in my opinion, is not the degree of development of culture and civilization. In order to understand how people organise society and how they gather into communities, one has to look at the types of human activities.

I propose to use a scheme of types of human experience developed by O. Leszczak [2016: 7]. In the diagram, we see that human experience is divided into two main groups: real and virtual. Real experience can be of three types: everyday, economic, and social. Virtual experience, as we see, can also be of three types: science, art, and philosophy.

By society I mean a grouping of people that functions together on the plane of real experience. Society will necessarily regulate daily, economic, and social activities. Thus, living in a society, we automatically follow the rules this form of society provides; we live in a house that has an official address, buy products, pay taxes, use money, and get formal education. All of these are our real experiences, and they are detected and not chosen by every individual. As for the virtual part of the human experience - it can be (and most often is) present in society. But it's not mandatory. The community, in turn, can unite people on the basis of one or several spheres of life, but does not regulate all three real spheres at once. There can be a community of runners, LGBTQ+ community, community of poets, hairdressers, or pizza lovers.



Both 'society' and 'community' may represent a group of people united based not only on their geographical location, political boundaries, or race but specific characteristics too. They may share values, traditions, beliefs, and moral principles. A crucial difference will lay in the field of activity types. A society makes your real activities possible – it serves the economical, social and everyday life. While community serves some of your other interests and you can be apart from it with no loss in your functionality.

Types of social units

First of all, we should distinguish two types of social units, which we examined above. This is society and community. However, both of them can be synergistic or cybernetic in their mode of occurrence. A social group may emerge naturally, have an organic basis for community, and be governed in a more horizontal way. However, another option is also possible - when a social group is created artificially, controlled from above, and based on regulated, artificial reasons for community. Émile Durkheim also suggested these two types: society with mechanical solidarity and society with organic solidarity [Durkheim 1973].

However, I do not rely on his theory since he considers these signs as signs of a less and more developed society. As societies become more complex, evolving from mechanical to organic solidarity, the division of labour is an

antidote to and a substitute for collective consciousness. In simpler societies, people are connected to others by personal ties and traditions; in the larger, modern society, they are linked by increasing dependence on others to carry out their specialised tasks necessary to survive in a modern, highly complex society. Progress from mechanical to organic solidarity is firstly based on population growth and increasing population density, secondly, on increasing “moral density” (the development of more complex social interactions), and thirdly, on increasing specialisation at the workplace.


A similar aspect is used by Max Weber when he divides social groups into three types: “class” (in relation to property and income level), “estate” (in terms of lifestyle) and “party” (in terms of beliefs and ideology). So, people belonging to the same class, obviously, have approximately the same level of income, and, consequently, similar living conditions. Changing these conditions, for example, for the worse, leads to the fact that people will react in a similar way to it. M. Weber called this reaction “mass-like”; people act in a similar way, but at the same time everyone makes a decision and acts (more precisely, joins the action) themselves. In a class that stands out in terms of lifestyle, people are already much more oriented towards each other. They feel like a single entity, and implement similar cultural behaviours and standards. At the same time, a person chooses for himself and maintains a way of life himself; he consciously relates to it. In fact, the estate is a closed group, where “strangers” are not accepted [Weber 1947].

However, if a person implements a “correct” way of life, from the point of view of this class, he is recognized as “one of his own”. And parties are completely consciously formed social formations. They do not just focus on some general ideas, but actively create them, change them, plan their activities, and so on. Thus, in Weber’s classification, we see a community of a cybernetic nature (as a class) and a community of a synergetic nature (as a party). However, Weber does not offer a single criterion for distinguishing these three types. Without such a criterion, this list can continue and also contain communities by profession, age, or preferences, not only ideological (party), but also culinary, sexual, and so on. Therefore, I will take causality and theology as the main factors as a basis and propose the following classification of social groups:

COMMUNITY		SOCIETY	
synergistic one (or more) common spheres special optional		cybernetic shared real experience multifunctional mandatory	
TELEOLOGICAL	CASUAL	TELEOLOGICAL	CASUAL

Such a classification is closely related to the types of human experience and can characterise the group in two ways. The first is on the basis of what activity the group functions. Is the functioning of this group indispensable for the prosperous and efficient existence of each individual? If it is the group that provides every day, economic and political (social) life, then we can call such a group a society. If a group is based on a person's virtual activity, or affects only one area of a person's real experience, then we call such a group a community. The second criterion is the way the group functions. The group may be synergistic or cybernetic in nature.

Society and communities can intersect and overlap each other, or vice versa - not coincide.



Returning to the scheme of human experience according to the theory of O. Leszczak, one can also distinguish communities based on each type of human activity. However, let's focus on the area called "philosophy". This area of human experience includes worldview attitudes, moral principles, and values. When considering this or that society (nation), researchers mistakenly believe that they are dealing with a group of people with the same values and morals. The so-called mentality is considered one of the prerequisites for the existence of this society. However, given the above scheme of interaction between societies and communities, we can safely assume that communities based on such a virtual sphere of human experience as philosophy will play a more important role than society as a whole in the analysis of certain significant discourses.

If we want to analyse the values, moral attitudes, or driving incentives of this or that society, we will not get a correct picture if we examine the discourse of “American society”, “Russian society”, or “Japanese society”. The active process of globalisation makes this increasingly impossible. Based on the identification of cultural and civilizational communities within society, we can make a more correct analysis. Also, an important factor here will be the nature of the functioning of these communities. If they share the same values or follow the same morality, then you should pay attention to whether this group has a cybernetic or synergetic character.

The main values that determine the type of cultural and civilizational community can be as follows:

- a family;
- place of residence, own land;
- private property;
- attitude to power;
- observance/non-observance of the law;
- acceptance/non-acceptance of caste or class orders;
- attitude towards religion/God;
- vision of human value/human dignity.

Based on such values, we can distinguish different cultural and civilizational models. On the basis of such models, we single out communities and can determine the dominant community in a particular society according to its worldview.

Conclusions

I propose to consider the main and fundamental difference between society and community as those areas of human experience that this group covers. Society is such a social group that functions as a single organism in all three real spheres of human activity. This group ensures the functioning of the economic, everyday, and social life of a person. Without the organization of these spheres within society, a person cannot function as effectively. A community is a social group based on one or more areas of activity, functioning freely and independently of the main social needs of the individual. Community is not a necessary condition for the successful functioning of man. Different communities can be created both within one society and at the intersection of several societies.

Any social group (both society and community) can have a teleological or casual character. A group can be created spontaneously, naturally, or central-

ly, and regulated from above. One of the most important spheres of human experience is the so-called philosophical sphere, which includes a person's values, his political, religious, and moral views. Not all members of society will share the same values, which means that within one society there are always communities based on cultural and value views. If we want to study and analyze the views of the so-called "European society" or "Ukrainian society", we should pay attention to those communities that spontaneously arise on the basis of people's moral attitudes. The ideological position of a person often determines which community he belongs to. Such communities may have less pronounced activity.

However, communication, attendance at certain events, participation in rallies, protests, parades, use of certain information sources - all this makes the functioning of such groups possible. Such an approach requires further study and opens up some new perspectives in the analysis of societies and communities and the discourses associated with them.

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